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FBENCH FOREIGN POLICY, I763-I778, WITH
SPECIAL BEFEBENCE TO THE CARIBBEAN
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Soon after the end of the Seven Years* War in I763» 
the French began to revise their colonial policy and, in so 
doing, initiated a new mode of diplomacy. As a defeated 
nation, they made new plans fdr the recovery of lost terri­
tories and prestige, and they embarked on a general reform 
program in order to rebuild the army and the navy. Clearly, 
the French had not accepted their humiliation by the English 
as final. French officials began at once to prepare a 
retaliatory scheme which would press into service all French 
forces, whether on the continent or in the colonies. The 
purpose was clear, France intended to ready herself for a 
war of revenge. Historians of French diplomacy in the 
post-1763 period have agreed that she marshaled her re­
sources for such a war of revenge against England and that, 
to this end, French foreign ministers sought to strengthen
their country's relationships with allied powers,'Spain 
in particular. But many historians, particularly in the
1
2eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, have given little 
attention to the vital role which French colonies played In 
Implementing the policy of preparing for a war of revenge. 
Cauelit In the Interest of European expansion Into the new 
world and the competition for colonies In the age of 
Imperialism, they assumed that colonies existed to serve 
the exclusive Interest of metropolitan countries and as 
centers of trade and commerce.
Eighteenth century historians were also Influenced by 
the philosophy of colonization and mercemtlllsm which had 
dominated political practice and economic thought. There­
fore historical literature justified the planting of colonies 
from a utilitarian position. Examples are given In the 
following chapter which described the writing of travellers, 
navigators, and explorers who encouraged the use of colonies 
In the prosecution of metropolitan expansion and economic 
Interest. The works of Edward Long, History of Jamaica 
{Vf7^) and Bryem Edwards, History civil and commercial of 
the British colonies In the West Indies (1793) also re­
flected the vested Interest of European nations In the 
colonies. Such emphasis was similarly felt In Abbd Baynal's 
Histoire philosophique et politique des établissement et du 
commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes (1780).
In general, eighteenth century historians recognized 
that the purpose of French colonies was to serve the 
economic Interest of the Métropole. This Interpretation
3underplayed the military or diplomatic value of the colonies. 
But there were exceptions to the InteriKcetatlrn of Long and 
Edwards. When Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations 
(1776) he attempted to remove European monopci.'.? in the 
colonies by waging war on mercantilism. Smith's work raised 
crucial Issues pertaining to the colonies, for example 
slavery, and served as the foundation for later economists 
In the nineteenth century like David Ricardo and Karl Marx 
who stood against economic exploitation and for natural 
liberty, justice, and the rights of mankind. The same 
Intellectual atmosphere also Influenced Thomas Clarkson 
who wrote Abolition of the African slave traie (I830).
Like Smith, Clarkson discussed many Issues affuctlng the 
colonies, such as the need to abolish the slave trade, 
and urged a humanitarian position In dealing ^ith the 
colonies. In contrast to Long and Edwards, Clarkson's 
work foreshadowed a different attitude among later 
historians, particularly In the twentieth century, an 
attitude which recognized the role played by ths colonies in 
European diplomacy. An example Is Eric Williams* Negro 
In the Caribbean (1942), Capitalism and Slavery (1961), 
and British Historians In the West Indies (I966), which 
discuss the problems and role of the colonies In the age of 
Imperialism and their role In the making of the European 
past. Williams' works have generated considerable Interest 
In Caribbean studies and In the Importance of the colonies.
4Contemporary historians, especially since World War II, 
have devoted more time to colonial studies and to the use of 
colonial archives. They are increasingly aware, additionally, 
of the participation of the colonies in the past in develop­
ing the nations of Europe, For example. Gouverneur Gënëral 
Olivier wrote that colonization established between the 
colonizing country and the colonized peoples a relationship 
which can only be compcired to that of mutual obligation and 
reciprocal services we find in a family between parent and 
children. Seen in this way, one cannot ignore the importance 
of that relationship. The colonial situation is bilateral. 
Olivier statedt TThe interests of those colonized ought to 
be given at least as much consideration as those of the 
colonizers. And these interests must not be solely material 
ones. The share of the spirit ought to be at least as 
important as that of the body,
It is in the interest of those colonized— the French 
Caribbean colonies— that consideration is given in the 
present research. This is supported by evidence that 
Etienne François de Choiseul, minister of foreign affairs, 
of war, and of the marine, saw in his plan for a war of 
revenge an important role to be played by the colonies.
The findings indicate that Saint Domingue, Martinique,
French Guyane, and Guadeloupe and its dependences were
Gouverneur Général Olivier, France and the Colonial 
Problem (Paris: Centre d"Information Documentaires, 1938),
p. 36,
5a primary factor in influencing the formation of a foreign 
policy designed to war with England. This study further 
reveals that, according to the plan, the colonies were to 
contribute significantly by supplying forces for that forth­
coming war whether such troops fought independently or 
supported French battalions of regular soldiers to be sent 
from the Métropole. The thesis is supported largely by 
reference to a Mémoire which Choiseul wrote to Louis XV 
in 1765. Choiseul anticipated that the struggle with 
England would be fought on the seas and in the colonies. 
Consequently, French colonial forces must be adequately 
prepared to attack English colonies both in the Caribbean 
and North American areas. He knew that the English colonies 
in America were dissatisfied with the mother country, and he 
predicted in his memoir that they would certainly revolt 
against England. If France had not declared war against 
England before the time of this expected American revolution, 
then French forces, including those in the Caribbean, would 
be summoned to aid England's rebellious colonies.
The thesis finds additional support from an examina­
tion of Choiseul *s strategy for war. The French minister 
recognized the possibility that the outbreak of war with 
England could take place on the continent Instead of in 
the colonies. He expected that William Pitt, Earl of 
Chatham, and English foreign minister who had resigned 
in 1761, might return to office and that if he did.
6Anglo-French hostilities might erupt again Into a conti­
nental war. In such circumstances» France could counter 
with a war of diversion against England. Spain» allied to 
France by the pacte de Famille, would attack Portugal In 
an attempt to divert English forces from concentrating In 
the north of France. Hopefully» tha Spanish attack would 
force England to come to the aid of Portugal» as In 1?62» 
a course of action which would divide English forces In 
Europe. England would then be unable to send further 
divisions to protect her colonies In North America and In 
the Caribbean. The way» therefore, would be opened for an 
assault of English colonies by combined Franco-Spanlsh 
colonial regiments.
This study focuses on the role of French Guyane 
(Guyane) In order to exemplify In one Instance Choiseul*s 
scheme for war and to show that the colony was an Important 
Influence In his formation of foreign policy. Guyane was 
strategically located» In the direction of the wind» to 
lend support to French forces In the Caribbean In times of 
war. Choiseul was convinced of this advantage as eeurly as 
1762» but he did not utilize the colony's valuable position 
since overtures for the peace of 1763 had been made. In 
the changed circumstances of 1763, he reexamined the military 
usefulness of the colony and then Issued orders for Immediate 
colonization and establishment of bases.
Guyane was Important In still another way. Choiseul
7expected that In a war of diversion whereby Spain attacked 
Portugal, the Spanish Monarch, Joseph I, would escape to 
Brazil and establish his empire. This course of action, 
affecting both French and Spanish interests, possibly 
could be averted by an invasion of Brazil by Guyanese 
regiments supported by French battalions stationed in the 
Caribbean.
Choiseul's plan for war, however, was not realized 
during his administration, which ended in 1770, and the 
peace of Europe was maintained. The only major disturbance 
of the peace was the *Hrar scare** of I768-I77O. It was 
during the ministry of his successor, the Comte de Vergennes 
in 1774, however, that Choiseul's plan was finally 
implemented. The new minister, following the policy 
laid down in the previous administration, successfully 
inaugurated it in 1778 when France, and in 1779* Spain, 
Joined the American revolution against England in a war 
of revenge.
CHAPTER II 
FBENCH FOBEIGN POLICY AFTER 1?63
"I command my cousin the Due de Choiseul," wrote 
Louis XV In 1770, "to place his resignation as secretary of 
state and superintendent of posts In the hands of the Due de 
la Vrllllêre and to retire to Chanteloup until further orders 
from me."l Thus ended the political career of a man who had 
directed the domestic and foreign policies of France from 
1759 to the time of his fall from office In 1770, The Due 
de Choiseul began his service at the time when France was 
making little progress In the Seven Years* War, and during 
his term of office, he attempted to defend France's vast 
and scattered colonial empire against Britain, the greatest 
naval power In the world. He allied France with Spain, 
Slcllly, and the House of Hapsburg but to no avail,
Choiseul's ultimate failure to save the French empire In 
North America and India led, after 1763, to a revision of 
French foreign policy and, consequently, to the opening of
^Ab quoted In John F, Ramsey, Anfclo-French Relations, 
1763-1770i A Study of Choiseul's Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 
California* "University of California Press, 1939)t p. 1^ 3.
8
9A new era In diplomatic and colonial affairs. The revised 
pollwy, aimed at a war of revenge against England, provided 
for major reforms of French army, navy, and artillery, 
closer cooperation In foreign affairs with Spain based on 
the Pacte de Famille. and reform of the administration and 
defense of the French colonies.
A look at the foreign policy of France beginning with 
the establishment of peace In I763 Indicates that It was 
Choiseul's plan to restore the French empire and position. 
French prestige was badly damaged by the Seven Years' War,
In addition to the loss of numerous colonies, and Choiseul 
was determined to restore both. He wanted to reconstruct 
the empire and restore France's position as a colonial power. 
In his Mémoire to Louis XV In I765 he outlined the reforms 
he had started In 1763» part of which Included reforms In 
the colonies. England, wrote Choiseul, was the "declared 
enemy" of the Bourbon crowns and wanted to govern the entire 
world. It was Imperative that France make every effort to 
guard herself against England's "dangerous designs." War 
with England was Imminent, he said, but peace should be 
maintained for a few years to give France time for prepara­
tion. In the event that England Initiated a continental war, 
Choiseul planned to use Spain as a means of diverting the 
English on the Continent while France attacked the English 
colonies In the Caribbean. The islands of the French 
Antilles, Martinique, Saint Domingue, and Guadeloupe for
10
example, and the colony of French Guyane, would also play 
a significant role by augmenting the French forces and 
providing strategic military bases. In the East Indies 
preparation would be made on the îles de France and de 
Bourbon to strengthen the forces at Pondicherry. France's 
energies must be concentrated on seizing British colonies, 
on helping the British colonies In North America If they
should rebel against England, and above all on carrying out
2
a suBeessful Invasion of Britain herself,
Choiseul attempted systematically and successfully 
to consolidate and strengthen France's wartime alliance 
with Spain, an alliance embodied In the Pacte de Famille of 
August 15, 1761, Throughout the period between the peace 
of Paris and the French Revolution, It was her Spanish 
alliance, far more than that of 1756 with Austria, which 
was the basis of French foreign policy. In his Mémoire 
of 1765 Choiseul himself referred to the Austrian alliance 
as "precarious," very different from the fundamental alliance 
with Spain, He suggested to Louis XV that If Charles III 
became Involved In a war with England he must be supported 
by France, The maintenance of the alliance between 
Charles III and Louis XV was vital to Choiseul's foreign 
policy. During the last phase of the Seven Years' War the 
Franco-Spanlsh alliance remained unshaken In spite of the
^Etienne François de Choiseul, Mémoire de Monsieur 
de Choiseul Remis au Bol en 1765 (Paris1 Charles Glraud, 
ïffSl), pp. 8-9, (Hereinafter cited as Choiseul, Mémoire. )
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total lack of military or naval success, contrast to the 
de facto Anglo-Prusslan alliance which emerged In 1756 and 
was broken up In 1?62. Both Spain and Prance were angered 
by Britain's maritime and colonial victories. Britain's 
possession of Gibraltar and her recovery of Minorca aggra­
vated Anglo-Spanlsh disputes. It Is beyond question that 
both Spain and France suffered from the success of England 
and, while the ambitions of Charles III and Louis XV were 
by no means Identical, the Bourbon princes had a certain 
fundamental unity In their mutual hostility to England.
The period between 1?63 and 1770 saw the alliance between 
them consolidated, most noticeably by the commercial treaty 
of 1768.
At the same time that France attempted to strengthen 
the alliance with Spain, Choiseul Informed Louis XV that the 
peace of I763 was a mere truce and that he expected a resump­
tion of hostilities anytime. He justified his argument on 
the assumption that William Pitt, former secretary of state 
In England, was planning to resume his ministry and that If 
he did, war with England could be expected. His warning 
expressed some urgency as seen In his writing. "...I will 
say In a word to Your Majesty that. If Your Majesty had 
war against England, it would be Immediate, just as we 
envisaged It..•"3 Choiseul was sanguine about the outcome
^Choiseul, Mémoire, op. clt., p. 20, "81 Elle avait
la guerre contre les Anglais, 11 serait Instant, au moment 
qu'on l'envisagerait..."
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of a war with England and believed that It could be 
subsidized by the colonies at no great expense to the 
Métropole. Continuing, he assured Louis XV of the success 
of his plant
By following this plan we will make ready your 
Majesty's possessions in this part of the world, 
and I believe that this plan, which ought to 
succeed... is the only one which can assure your 
Majesty of his possessions, and to put them in a 
position to threaten those of the enemies and even 
to have success in America,*
Choiseul was convinced that his plan, discussed fully 
in the next chapter, was sound and that it offered the only 
possible means to recover the lost possessions and power. 
But, as mentioned above, such a recovery depended upon war. 
This Boant adequate preparation and a mutual relation with 
Spain, It was the implementation of these objectives which 
paved the way for a new course in foreign policy that led 
France to recover her prestige and self-confidence. And it 
was the realization of these objectives which eventually led 
Choiseul to inaugurate a general reorganization of the army, 
a reconstruction of the navy, and innovation in artillery.
Re-colonization
An essential part of Choiseul's program of reform
*Choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit.. p. 20, "C'est d 'après 
ce plan que nous préparons les possessions de Votre Majesté 
dams cette partie du monde, et je crois que ce plan, qui 
doit réussir,,,est le seul qui puisse assurer A Votre 
Majesté ses possessions et les mettre en état de menacer 
celles de ses ennemis et même dfavoir succôss en Amérique, ”
13
constituted attempt to find new French settlements and to 
populate and reorganize the French colonies which survived 
the Seven Years* War, He searched for strategic areas In 
the East and West Indies. In the east, as In the west,
France had been defeated by the English. To preserve any 
Influence In India the French forces at Pondicherry had to 
be reinforced. The colonizing expedition of 176? to the lies 
de France and de Bourbon was predicated on the assumption 
that these islands could augment French defenses In India 
and serve as strategic bases from which to launch an attack 
against English ccanmerce.^ In the west, Martinique and 
Guadeloupe remained French strongholds. Althou^ weakened 
by the disastrous defeat of the Seven Years * War and suscep­
tible to Invasion, Choiseul strengthened these Island bases 
by Inaugurating a series of military and administrative 
reforms. He suppressed the milices which were for the 
most part Inadequately trained. In the English Islands It 
was on the poorer whites that mllltla duty fell as a heavy 
burden. The French planters, however, had ceased altogether 
to do guard duty, for which they hired mercenaries. They 
never received any military exercise except In the event 
o f an Impending Invasion for which they always turned out 
unprepared. Consequently, military defense of the French
^The îles de France and de Bourbon are the Islands 
In the Indian Ocean about 240 miles off the southeast 
coast of Africa. This expedition Is discussed below.
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Islands was Inadequate. But the Inability of the milices 
to guard the coasts presented no serious problem after the 
termination of the Seven Years' War, On the other hand, the 
burden of maintaining some kind of defense was a principal 
reason for the planters to support suppression of the 
milices and to have In Its place regular troops from the 
Métropole. Thus between I763 and 1766, two battalions 
were sent to Saint-Domingue, one to Martinique, and three 
to Guadeloupe.^ They were supplemented from I765-I768 by 
the reestablishment of the milices which were reorganized 
and placed under the direction of the military. The strength 
of the French forces was further Increased by companies of 
free slaves organized by parish administrators, and the 
entire defense force was placed under the unified command of 
Martinique and Guadeloupe. In addition, Choiseul's plan 
Intended to gain support of French Guyane which, as discussed 
above, he recolonlzed In 1763, The colony was strategically 
located sous le vent, that is. In the direction toward which 
the wind blew. This meant that French ships, aided by the 
wind, could easily give needed help to other French forces 
In the Caribbean In the event of war.
The administration of the colonies underwent certain 
changes In the new era of French colonialism. In I763, for 
example, Choiseul gave to the comptoirs et the Compagnie Gorée
^Edmund PrécUn, la France et le Monde de 1715 â 1789 
(Parlai p. Benouvln, 1952), p* 492, "
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the responsibility to administer French territories of 
Gambia end Ouidah on the Gulf of Guinea. At Pondicherry 
he placed administrative posts under the control of the 
crown and created a bureau of the Indies within the 
ministry of the marine. In the French Antilles the 
dominance of Martinique over the neighboring French 
islands was removed and each island was granted adminis­
trative autonomy. ?
Privileged commercial companies which previously 
had enjoyed a monopoly over colonial trade suffered under 
Choiseul's colonial reforms. Some critics held that these 
companies had contributed to the loss of the old empire 
by monopolizing trade solely for vested interests rather 
than for the interests of the state. Montesquieu, for 
example, ^ criticized private companies by asserting that 
they abused their rights and exploited only for profit.
He advocated that all companies should be controlled by
o
the state.” Two contemporary economists, Jean Goumay 
and l'abbé Morellet, demanded that the company system, 
if allowed to operate, be opened to every one. Agreeing 
with Montesquieu, Goumay stood for state control that 
Hopefully would lead to increased navigation, manufactures.
^Albert Duchene, La Politique coloniale de la France 
(ParisI Marchai et Godde, 1929), pp. 101-102.
^Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, revised ed. 
(New York* The Colonial Press, lB9^T, I, 3^1-372.
16
and prosperity for both the colonies and the Métropole, 9 
The reforms which Choiseul initiated led to the liquidation 
of all private companies except the Company of the Indies, 
which was finally suppressed on August 13, I769. In taking 
over the role of the companies, the state regulated 
commerce with the colonies, provided slaves, recruited 
colonists, controlled their administration, and improved 
ports and fortifications,^®
Commercial interest in the colonies was, however, 
secondary to the program of colonization. In securing 
new lands Choiseul hoped to expand and rebuild the weak 
empire, to establish a white French population, to 
augment the defenses of existing colonies, and to build 
additional fortifications and bases for the purpose of 
reinforcing French military and naval strength. These 
aims were part of Choiseul's plan for a wax of revanche 
against England. In one Mémoire he wrote, "it appears 
absolutely necessary, during peace, to populate the 
colonies and to send inhabitants there at the same time 
to improve the cultivated lands and to put them 
[the colonies] in a state of resistance against the
^Christian Sohefer, la  France Moderne et le problème 
colonial 1815-1830 (Paris1 F. Alcan, I90 7), p.~?l. 
jean-Claude-Marie Goumay, 1712-1759, was a p^siocrat, 
a member of the Grand Council and an associate of Quesnay 
and Turgot. L'abbé Morellet, 1727-1819, was a well known 
author.
^®Préclin, lA France et le Monde do 1715 à 1Z§2* 
op. cit., p. 489.
17
enemies in time of war, *'H In another Mémoire emphasizing
the import£Uice of the colonies in his plan he wrote, "if we
can get, as we hope, a population, precious by the presence
of Europeans, its capacity will be specially used to provide
the îles du Vent assistance which was no longer received since
12
the loss of the northern colonies,,," According to one 
historian, H, Temauz-Compans, Choiseul was firm in his 
decisions to use the colonies as a military base, Temauz- 
Compans cited the Kourou ezpedition of I763 as a prime 
ezample of Choiseul's plan,
^^Conseil, Mémoires 1765-1790. Archives Nationales;
Series P^ C,* Vol. VII, fol, 17., (Hereinafter cited as A,N, ),
"II paroit d'une nécessité absolue de penser pendant la paiz 
â peupler les colonies et â y faire passer des habitants tant 
pour y augmenter les cultures que pour les mettre en état de 
résister auz efforts des ennemis en temps de guerre,"
^^Mémoires sur la Guyane 1763-64. Documents divers sur 
la marine et les colonies, Archives Nationales, Series M. 1024 
(3) dossier V. "Si l'on se procure, comme on l'esp&re, une 
population précieuse en Européens, leur industrie sera 
spécialement employée à fournir auz fies du Vent tous les 
secours qu'elles ne tiraient plus depuis la perte des 
colonies septentrionales,,,"
Temauz-Compans, Notice Historique sur la Guyane 
^ancaise (Paris; P, Didot Prferes, is43) pp.89-90, Kourou, 
the new settlement established in 1763, was named after the 
Kourou river. It was about eighteen miles north of Cayenne, 
the capital of Prench Guyane, which is located on the north­
eastern comer of South America, There is no agreement on the 
date of discovery by the Prench of Guyane, also called Cayenne. 
The Ambassade de PTance. French Guiana, land of the rain forest 
(New York; Service de presse et d'information, 1961) o, 7, 
stated that Cayenne was fouxvied in l604, and that in lo33 the 
Norman Companies obtained trading rights between the Orinoco 
and Amazon Hivers, E. Daubigny, Choiseul et la Prance d'outre 
mer aprts le traité de Paris (Paris ; MacnëTte, 1092), pi "JJ, 
used 1626 as the date. There is agreement however that the 
colony was placed under the crown undér Louis XIV in I674, 
Before this, it was taken by the Dutch many times. In 1946 
the colony became a Prench overseas department.
18
Discussing the motives of the Kourou expedition, 
he wrote I
The desire to replace Canada which was ceded to England 
and to establish on the continent of America a white 
population strong enough to come to aid of those In 
the Antilles in the event that they would be attacked, 
were the true motives which compelled the Prench govern­
ment in 1763 to colonize Guyane on a large scale. 14
The Kourou expedition was the first of three attempts to
expedite Choiseul's plan and to prepare the colonies in
the event of war. As will be seen later, the expedition
had been proix)sed as early as 1762, before the termination
of the Seven Years' War. At that time the foreign ministry
saw Guyane's position as strategic for supporting French
forces in the Caribbean. In 1763 Choiseul carried out the
earlier proposal and reestablished a new settlement at
Kourou as part of his plan.
In 1764 Choiseul sent Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 
a private Prench navigator and explorer, to lead an expedi­
tion to the Falkland Islands (Malouines). Bougainville 
founded a Prench settlement. Port Louis, at East Falkland 
at the head of Berkeley Sound to serve as a base for French 
shii>s en route to the Pacific, But two years later Prance 
transferred to Spain the proposed base which was named
^^emaux-Compans, Notice Historique sur la Guyane 
Française, op. cit., pp. 89-90. "Le dôsir deremplacer 
le Canada qui venait d'être cédé A l'Angleterre, et d'établir 
sur le continent de l'Amérique une population blanche assez 
nombreuse pour venir en aide â celle des Antilles, dans le 
cas ofl elle serait attaquée, furent les véritables motifs 
qui engagèrent, en 1763, le gouvernement français â entre­
prendre de coloniser la Guyane sur une grande échelle."
19
Puerto de la Soledad. Meanwhile another port hed been 
established by Britain in I765 at Port Egmont on Saunders 
Island in the northwest of the group of islands. Britain 
formally claimed the fort. Spain negotiated for a British 
withdrawal but failed, and in 1770, a large Spanish force 
tried to expel the British from Port Egmont. War between 
Britain and Spain was narrowly averted and Britain returned 
to Port Egmont the following year, fhe Falkland crisis 
strained diplomatic relations between England and Spain.
As will be seen in chapter eight, this crisis also involved 
France and led to increased Anglo-French tension.
Choiseul ordered a third expedition in 1764, this time 
to the East Indies, to colonize the îles de France and de 
Bourbon. But the expedition was delayed, and in I766 two 
ordinances were passed urging its departure and stipulating 
conditions under which the islands were to be administered, 
Choiseul*s military objectives in the colonization ware 
demonstrated when, in his letter to the Due d 'Aiguillon, 
former governor at Bennes and minister of foreign affairs 
in 1770, he wrote that the expedition to the east would 
begin with 600 men, to be followed by an additional 600.^^
7 be command of the expedition, which was finally underway 
in 1767, was given to Daniel Dumas, major-general and
^^Choiseul (Versailles) to Due d 'Aiguillon (Paris), 
July 5» 1776, A.N., Correspondance envoyée et Ordres du 
Hoi, Colonie B,, Vol. 125. (Hereinafter cited as Col. B.,
125.)
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Inspector of troops during the Seven Years' War in Canàâa. 
Additionally, he was appointed governor of the new colony, 
assisted by an intendant, Pierre Poivre. The officials 
received full command of the French forces in the East 
Indies, The île de France, the more important of the two 
islands, was given the seat of government. Besides its 
production of valuable commodities which the French had been 
shipping to France, the island had a suitable position from 
which the French could assault the English. For this reason 
the initial stage of colonization was largely military, 
followed by adequate supplies of ammunition and additional 
soldiers. From Port Louis, France, an order was requested 
for the shipment of fifty thousand pounds of gunpowder for 
service of the legion of the île de France. later in the 
same year another ordinance created a company of canonnière- 
bombardiers for the île de Prance.1? In a Mémoire. Choiseul 
wrote that he ”• ..would hold on to the îles de France and de 
Bourbon and...would make an establishment at Madagascar.
^^Choiseul (Versailles) to Choquet (Paris), October 14, 
1776, Archives Nationales, Col. B., Vol. 125, fol. 403.
**M. le Duc de Choiseul a donné des ordres mu Port Louis 
pour qu'il soit fourni au magazin de l'artillerie de ce 
port cinquante milliers de poudre de guerre pour le service 
de la Légion de l'île de France."
^7ordonnance du 1®^ décembre, 1776, Archives Nationales, 
Col. A., Actes et Pouvoirs souverains et Edits, Vol. 10, 
fol. 173. (Hereinafter cited as Col. A., 10. )
^^tienne François de Choiseul, Mémoires du duo Choiseul 
1719-1785 (Calmettes éd., Paris 1 Plon-Nourrit et Cie,^96¥), 
pp. 393*39¥. "Je garderais les îles de France et de Bourbon, 
et je ferais un établissement A Madagascar."
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The record of the Ministère de 1* Instruction Publique 
stated that Dumas **.. .was actively occupied with the prepa­
ration of an English war, according to the Instruction 
which had been delivered to him before his departure,,. ** 
from Prance,Since the role of Dumas was Important In 
carrying out Cholseul's plan In the east, a brief discussion 
of his work on the island Is necessary. In a dispatch to 
de Castries of the French foreign ministry, Dumas wrote*
"The broad line of governmental policy entrusted to my care 
was not limited to the administration of two small Islands, 
to a local defense. It encompassed a great offense to be 
executed at the first rupture,"^® The location of the Isles 
en route to the east offered a strategic position for an 
offensive attack against the British. Assisted by Dubreull, 
chief engineer of the Isles, Dumas organized a regiment of 
3,000 men and recruited a mllltla of 800 whites and free 
Negroes, He also employed those Negroes still In slavery 
to reinforce defense. The total French force was estimated 
by Dumas to exceed 8,000 men. In another dispatch to
^^Minlstère de 1* Instruct Ion Publique et des Beaux- 
Arts. Comité des Travaux Historiques et scientifiques. 
Bulletin âe la section de Géogra^le.Tol, iL (Paris* 
Imprimerie i€Flonale, 1^5)» p. 4b, (Hereinafter referred 
to as Ministère de l'Instruction.) ",,,11 s'occupa fort
activement de la préparation d'une guerre anglaise, con­
formément aux instructions qui lui avalent été remises 
avant son départ,"
20ibld., p, 46, "Les grandes vues du gouvernement con­
fiés & mes soulns ne se bornaient pas A l'administration de 
deux petites lies, A une défense locale. Elles embrassaient 
une vaste offensive A exécuter A la première rupture,"
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Versailles Dumas stated that if the French forces were 
adequately increased, ",. .well planned, directed and 
conducted, it would make the superiority of the enemy 
forces Tain and useless i and if this plan is not judged 
sound, I do not know another plan by which we can establish 
the defense of this colony and put it in a state of safety. "^1 
Choiseul recognized that the îles de France and de Bourbon 
were vital to the maintenance of French possession in the 
east, that they were conveniently situated in the main 
stream of English traffic, and that they were essential 
military and naval bases in case of war. In addition they
could easily give some support to the French forces at
22Pondicherry, Conversely, the French at Pondicherry would 
be able to render necessary help to the force on the isles.
In his analysis of the complementary position between the 
isles and the colony at Pondicherry, Du#as said that 
",. .some troops on the iiles de France, some fortifications 
at Pondicherry, these are the principles of all defense
^^Ministère de 1*Instruction, op. cit., p. 4?, 
"...bien conçu, bien dirigé, bien ex?cut^, doit rendre 
inutile et vain la supériorité des forces de l'ennemi; 
et si ce projet n'était pas jugé bon, je n'en connais 
pas sur lequel on pût établir la défense de cette colonie 
et par lequel on put se flatter de la mettre detns un état 
de sûreté."
1780) II, 5^6. See also Henri prentout. L'île de France 
sous Decaen. 1803-1810. Essai sur la Politique coloniale du 
premier empire {Parist Librairie Hachette, Î90I), p. iz.
23
and all offense in this area of the world. "^3 in another 
letter to the Due de Choiseul-Praslin, called Praslin, 
successor to Choiseul as minister of the marine from 
1766-1770, Dumas reflected on the strength of his military 
preparation I
In the present state of affairs, we can be sure that 
(always supposing Pondicherry is fortified and has 
within its walls a garrison of at least 1200 men), if 
war is declared, there will be a revolution in our 
favor on the day when we appear at the coast with a 
squadron of 3,000 men. Then the uniting of our forces 
and the necessary dividing of those of the English, 
due to the extent of their possessions, will give us 
complete advantage of the points of attack.... If the 
Operations of war are well conducted and are directed 
by sound and continually active policy, they can lead 
us in this area to great successes.
Choiseul"s plan and preparation for war with England 
were exemplified in the administration of Dumas in the east. 
When Praslin came to the ministry of the marine he supported 
the work of Dumas and under his administration several 
ordinances were passed confirming the plan of defense in
^Ministère de 1»Instruction, op. cit., p. 5 ,^
"Des troupes & l*îîê de Francs, des Fortifications à 
Pondicherry, voilA les principes de toute défensive et 
de toute offensive dans cette partie du monde,"
2^Ibld., p. $8, "Dans l'état actual des choses, on 
peut regarder comme certain (toujours en supposant Pondichéry 
fortifié et ayant dans ses murs une garnison au moins de 
1,200 hommes) que, si la guerre se déclare, il se fera une 
révolution en notre faveur le jour où nous paraîtrons & la 
côte avec une escadre de 3 ,0 00 hommes de débarquement.
Alors la réunion de nos forces et la division nécessaire 
de celles des Anglais peur l'étendue de leurs possessions 
nous donnera tout avantage sur les points d'attaque....Des 
opérations de guerre bien conduites et dirigées par une 
politique bien entendue et toujours active peuvent nous 
conduire dans cette partie & de grands succès."
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in the east and increasing the French forces. For erample, 
an ordinance in 1768 created a second company of canonnière- 
bombardiers t in 1770 another increased the canonnière- 
bombardiers to one hundred men on both islands and established 
two companies d*ouvrier» finally, another measure provided a 
company of one hundred men with f u s i l i e r s .^5 These royal 
acts maintained Cholseul's plan in the east but after his 
fall from office in 1770, and with agitation in North America 
for a revolution, the military preparation in the east 
witnessed a gradual decline. Preparation thereafter, was 
concentrated in the west, mainly in the French Antilles 
where French military and naval forces finally carried out, 
by their support to the American colonists, the war of 
revanche.
Alliance with Spain 
The Pacte de Famille between France and Spain was a 
major influence in eighteenth century French diplomacy. It 
was signed in I761, during the last phase of the Seven Years ' 
War, when Pitt insisted on continuing the war with France 
until the latter agreed to the terms which ensured England's 
supremacy in the colonial world. Choiseul countered by a 
threat to draw Spain into the war unless Pitt agreed to 
moderate terms. When Pitt refused, Choiseul prepared to
Ordonnances du 1®^ Août, 1768» 1®** et 10 décembre, 
1770, Archives Nationales, Col, A., Vol. 12, fols. 28 and 32, 
Three chapters are devoted below to discuss French military 
activities in the Caribbean.
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continue the war with the aid of Spain. The aims of
Choiseul were explained in the 1765 Mémoire.
I then proposed to Your Majesty to play two games at 
the same time: first to maintain negotiati<m with
England in such a manner that if it did not succeed 
this time, it would serve from its simplicity as a 
base for general negotiation which should take place 
if Pitt fell before the influence of Bute, At the 
seuae time, and this was the second game which I thought 
necessary, I entered into an exchange of views with 
Spain, in such a manner that, if we were to make peace, 
that crown would find it necessary to support us in 
the negotiation, and guaranty the stability of the 
treaty. On the other hand, if we failed in this, 
my plan was that Spain should be drawn into the war, 
and that Prance would be able to gain by the events 
which this new development might produce, and repair 
her losses. Finally, if the event proved unfortunate,
I had in mind that the losses of Spain would be 
lighten those which France might suffer.^*
Choiseul *s negotiation with Spain led to the Pacte de 
Famille, a compact which united the Bourbon powers in a 
mutual defensive and offensive alliance. The eigreement 
stated that France was not to make peace until Spanish 
grievances against England were remedied, and that Spain
Z^choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit.. p. 5. "Alors je 
proposai à Votre Majesté deux partis à suivre ensemble# l'un 
de soutenir la négociation de la paix avec l'Angleterre, de 
manière que, ne réussissant pas pour oette fois, elle servît, 
par sa simplicité, de base & la négociation véritable qui 
devait avoir lieu si M. Pitt succombait sous le crédit de 
my lord Bute. En même temps, et c'est l'autre parti que 
je jugeai nécessaire, je liai la négociation avec l'Espagne, 
de façon que cette couronne, si nous faisions la paix, se 
trouvait intéressée & nous seconder dans la négociation et 
â assurer la solidité du traité. Si, au contraire, nous la 
manquions non projet était que l'Espagne fût entrainée dans 
la guerre, et que la France pût profiter des événements que 
ce nouvel embrasement pourrait produite, pour réparer ses 
pertes. Enfin, si les événements étaient malheureux, 
j'avais en vue que les pertes de l'Espagne allégeassent 
celles que la France pouvait faire."
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was to declare war on England if peace was not made. 
Additional provisions stipulated that Prance ceded to Spain, 
Minorca which was taken from England in May 1756. Minorca 
was to he garrisoned until the end of war. Other conti­
nental powers were invited to join the Family Ccxapact. 
Portugal, for example, was invited to become a party to it, 
in order to close her ports to England. But if Portugal 
refused, she was to be treated as a common enemy and an ally 
of England. Choiseul was to secure the admission of Bussia 
into the scheme. All military plans were to be concerted. 
The plan provided for an attack on Gibraltar, Jamaica, 
Ireland, and even the Austrian Netherlands.^7
Since the Pacte was the basis in negotiating for a 
Franco-Spanish relation and mutual defense after I763, 
it is necessary to examine the reasons for which Spain 
entered into the Pacte, in the first place, in l?6l.
Spain concluded the Pacte mainly because the Seven 
Years' War between England and France had increased Spanish 
causes for complaint against England. For example, in the 
period before the war, England had done very little to 
restrain English smugglers from menacing Spanish and
^^Archive d'Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance 
Politique, Espagne, Vol. 533# fols. 290-294. (Hereinafter 
cited as A.S.C.P.) For the text of the pacte de Famille, 
see fols. 270-285* As it turned out Portugal refused to 
join in the compact and was Invaded in 1762. Assisted by 
the English, she offered a successful resistance. Similarly, 
Choiseul expected England to aid Portugal in the war of 
diversion planned for after I763,
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French commerce. After the war began the English likewise 
showed complete disregard for the rights of shipping among 
the neutral islands of St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica, and 
St. Lucia. The violation of the rights of neutral islands 
increased during the war. To aid the islands, France 
permitted them to trade with the French Antilles. England 
saw this as an open-trade policy and encouraged English 
merchants to manipulate trade with the neutral islands.
This course of action reached such proportions that English 
merchants began to seize goods from their rivals, a situa­
tion that only deteriorated diplomatic relations among the 
colonial powers in the Caribbean. When it became clear 
that the tide of war was turning in favor of England and 
against France, and that William Pitt intended to seize the 
entire French possessions in North America and the Caribbean, 
Spain feared that part of the seizure might include the 
neutral islands which she had claimed. To prevent this 
and the possibility of an English descent on the neutral 
islands, and consequently the worsening of the French 
position, France and England, according to Spanish thinking, 
might end the Seven Years* War and make peace. But the 
making of peace by the two powers would still leave Spain 
to negotiate separately with Englemd, and the Spanish 
government feared that a just settlement without the aid 
of France was not possible. Therefore, it was advantageous 
for Spain to strengthen her alliance with France.
28
Choiseul was aware of the Spanish dilemma. At the 
same time he needed Spanish support. As the Seven Years'
War turned against Prance, Choiseul promised to make Spain's 
demands, that Is, protection of the neutral Islands, a 
condition of peace with England. This the English failed 
to accept. From the English view the entrance of Spain In 
the negotiations for peace made a peaceful settlement with 
France Impossible and war with Spain Inevitable. This Is 
clearly seen In Article One of the pacte made In the secret 
convention of August, l?6l. The article declared that If 
England refused the conditions of peace offered by France, 
and If peace was not made before May 1, 1762, Spain would 
declare war on England. The secret convention did not 
remain a secret to the English and peace was not made. 
Meanwhile, negotiations continued between Choiseul and Pitt, 
but England, anticipating events, declared war on Spain In 
January, 1762.^®
The territory of Louisiana was an additional factor 
affecting the Spanish decision to join the Pacte de Famille. 
Spain saw the extensive territory as a menace to the safety 
of Mexico If the English captured It from the French. 
Confronted with the possibility that Canada might also be 
lost to the English, and knowing that the French position
^®A. S. Alton, "The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession" 
American Historical Review. XXXVI (July, 1931), 701-720,
Also W. H. Shepherd, "The Cession of Louisiana to Spain. " 
Political Science Quarterly. XLX (September, 19o4), 439-458.
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could be strengthened If Spanish support was secured, 
Choiseul ceded Louisiana to Spain. Although the transfer 
was not official until the conclusion of the secret 
treaty of November 3* 1762, the arrangement for the 
cession was a factor In the creation of the Pacte of 
1761.29
As Indicated earlier, failure to negotiate a 
satisfactory peace settlement between Pitt and Choiseul 
In the preliminary discussions In early 176I contributed 
significantly to Spain's decision to conclude the Pacte 
with France. When Choiseul sent ambassador De Bussy 
to London In I76I to begin overtures for a peace settle­
ment, he Instructed him to negotiate for a "reasonable 
peace"! that Is, a peace which would maintain basically 
the colonial possession of both powers as In 1756.^^ 
France also hoped to guarantee the safety of Spanish 
possessions In America, Including her claims to the 
neutral Islands. But the correspondence between Spain 
and France for a Pacte not only made peace talks with 
England Impossible but led Pitt to declare "...that 
England and France were two champions who fought each 
other# both were wounded, but If the first was less
29Alton, "The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession" 
American Historical Review, op. clt., 7OI-720.
^®Cholseul (Versailles) to Bussy (London), May 23, 
1761, A.E.C.P., Angleterre, Vol. 443, fols. II8-II9.
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she must continue to fight to assure victory. **31
Charles III, who succeeded Philip V to the Spanish 
throne in 1759, wanted reforms and favored a change of 
course in Spanish foreign policy. Hence he agreed to the 
signing of the Franco-Spanish Pacte. Already, before his 
accession to the throne, he had displayed his reforming 
ideas as duke of Parma and king of Naples and had declared 
his intention of leading Spain once more to greatness. 
Charles III was qualified for the task and impressed 
foreign observers and his own subjects with his seriousness 
and application to state affairs. In foreign affairs he 
felt that commercial objectives were closely related with 
imperial defense. He was anxious to defend Spanish 
possessions from the attacks of rivals as well as to 
protect her trade from foreign interference. His most 
powerful rival was Britain, and he was anxious to maintain 
a colonial balance of power. This balance was one of the 
main features of his foreign policy, and it was the reason 
for entering the Pacte de Famille which offered an offensive 
and defensive alliance between the two Bourbon powers and 
which took Spain into the colonial war that France was 
waging with Britain. But Charles III miscalculated and
31As quoted in Alfred Bourguet, "Le Duc de Choiseul 
et l'Angleterre I La Mission de H. de Bussy A Londres,"
Revue Historique UOCI-UOCII (September-December, 1899), 3%. 
"L* Angle terre et la France étaient comme deux champions qui 
se battaient ; tous deux étaient blessés, mais, si le premier 
l'était moins, il devait continuer le combat pour s'assurer 
de victoire."
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underrated Britain's war potential and he entered a 
colonial conflict with inadequate naval resources. Britain 
was equal to the united forces of the Bourbon powers, and 
the Seven Years' War was a disaster for Spain as well eus 
for her ally.
In negotiating for an alliance with Spain Choiseul 
endeavored to include two important treaties which he had 
outlined in a letter of May 12, l?6l, to his ambassador to 
Madrid, the Marquis d'Ossun. The first treaty stated that 
the alliance
...will be a family compact to be drawn up and made 
binding in perpetuity on all future sovereigns of 
the house of Prance and which, being only of interest 
to the branches which compose it, will exclude any 
other power. The second treaty to which other powers 
may be admitted, will concern objectives regarding 
principally the king [of FranceJ and the king of 
Spain, which are related more or less directly with 
other kings or republics.32
As discussed below, the treaties, lAnorporated in 
the Pacte of l?6l, were the subject of considerable dis­
cussions after 1763. The fundamental principle, however, 
which governed the compact was "...qui attaque une couronne
32choiseul (Versailles) to Ossun (Madrid), May 12, 
1761, A.E.C.P., Espagne, Vol, 532, fol. 235. "...l’un
sera un pacte de famille â stipuler et A constituer A 
perpétuité entre tous les souverains de la maison de France 
et qui, n'étant relatif qu'aux intérêts des branches qui la 
composent, sera exclusif pour toute autre puissance t le 
second traité, auquel d'autres puissance pourront être 
admises A accéder, roulera sur les objets qui, regardant 
principalement le roi et le roi d'Espagne, ont aussi des 
rapports plus ou moins directs avec d'auttsssrois ou 
républiques."
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attaque l'autre,"33 The principle was stipulated in 
Article Four. The other twenty-eight articles dealt with 
military and naval matters and committed both powers to a 
mutual defense and offense against England. Essentially, 
the compact limited the union to the two Bourbon princes ; 
it obliged one member to supply aid to the other upon 
request, and gave the one who provided aid the right to 
claim compensation in the event of loss of territory due 
to the assistance rendered. Accordingly, both crowns strove 
to maintain a common understanding in foreign policy and 
a united stand in facing the enemy.
The application of the defensive and offensive 
provisions of the Pacte of l?6l during the last phase of 
the Seven Years' War did not lead the Bourbon powers to 
victory. On the other hand, its failure to ameliorate 
the French position in the war in no way affected the 
relationship of the two crowns. Ironically, when the 
Peace of Paris confirmed the defeat of the Bourbon powers, 
the Pacte was the instrument used to strengthen the 
relationship between the two crowns. Since the Bourbons 
did not regard the Peace of Paris as final, they resumed 
negotiations shortly thereafter. France, in particular, 
reinterpreted the Pacte with a view to improve the diplomatic
33See A.E.C.P., 0£. cit.. Vol. 533. fols. 270-285,
Article Four, Note that an alliance with Spain originated
as early as 1733. It was reviewed in 1743, and greatly 
expanded in 1761,
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relation between both countries, 3^
Following 1763f Pranco-Spanlsh exchanges centered on 
the Interpretation of the commercial provision as stated in 
Article Twenty-Pour of the Pacte. The disputed article 
provided the Bourbon princes with equal commercial privileges 
with Spanish and French colonies and stipulated that "...in 
France the Spemlsh flag will have the same rights and pre­
rogatives as the French flag, and at the same time. In Spain, 
the French flag. The subjects of the two monarchies In 
declaring their merchandises, shall pay the same duties that 
the nationals of the other country pay,"35
The French interpretation of the article implied that 
all trade restrictions were removed between the two 
countries. Spain, however, feared the loss of much of her 
commerce to France and protested the French Interpretation. 
Since the trade concession which Spain made to France was 
not very specific, the French ambassador In Madrid urged 
Choiseul to negotiate for a treaty clarifying and supple­
menting the much disputed article* "I have to speak to you. 
Sir, about the need to make a commercial treaty with Spain1
3^A,E.c .P., Espagne, Vol. 533, fols. 270-285. The 
commercial aspect of the alliance Is continued later In 
the chapter.
35ibld., Art, 24, . de sorte que le pavillon
espagnol Jouira en France des mêmes droits et prérogatives 
que le pavillon français et pareillement que le pavillon 
fxrançals sera traité en Espagne avec la même faveur que le
ÎSciarant®î8u§8°mârcÈandÎ8âSÏ®payeron8*lês”mSmês®Sf‘oî?s 
qui seront payé par les nationaux,,. "
3^
since the Family Compact has made our privileges unsteady 
,,«it is necessary for us. Sir, to have a firm and perma­
nent title which must be respectively obligatory. "36 
Ossun "s request for a permanent treaty found support in the 
French ministry as indicated in Choiseul *s reply t
H. l'abbé Beliardi will deliver. Sir, to you the various 
mémoires which the king has approved relative to our 
commerce and to the expleuiation of the Family Compact....
I have no need to describe to you the magnitude of this 
negotiation and the secret that it requires in order that 
it is not disturbed by the intrigue of our enemies, 
especially the English and Foreigners. 37
In another document. Réflexions sur l'état du commerce Anglais 
et Français par rapport â l'Espagne, Choiseul stated that the
main object of both Spain and France was the protection of
commerce in the colonies. "They can adopt," thou^t Choiseul,
"means of which the English will not be able to complain
reasonably. It is necessary to undermine our enemies by the 
same peaceful war which they use against us. "38 Consequently,
36ossun (San Ildefonso) to Choiseul (Versailles),
August 14, 1763, A.E.C.P., Espagne, Vol. 539, fols. 121-124. 
"II me reste Monsieur, A vous parler sur la nécessité de faire 
un traitté (sic) de commerce avec l'Espagne vous voyez que le 
Pacte de Famille de rendu nos privilèges chancelants.... Il 
nous faut. Monsieur, un titre solide, permanent et qui soit 
respectivement obligatoire."
37choiseul (Versailles) to Ossun (San Ildefonso), May 1% 
1765, Bibliothèque Nationale, Papers of l'abbé Béliardi,
P. Fr. 10766, fol. 3. (Hereinafter cited as B.N., P.B.)
"M. l'abbé Beliardi vous remettra. Monsieur, les différents 
mémoires que le roy a approuvés relativement A notre commerce 
et A l'explication du pacte de famille....Je n'ai pas besoin 
de vous représenter la grandeur de cette négociation et le 
secret qu'elle demande pour ne pas être troublée par les 
intrigues de nos ennemis et principalement des Anglais et des 
Etrangers.”
38ibid.,'fdl, 49. "Elles peuvent adopter des moyens 
dont les Anglais ne pourront pas raisonnablement se plaindre. 
Il faut miner nos ennemis par la même guerre de paix dont 
ils font usage contre nous."
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he asked Spain to provide a good market In the colonies 
for French commerce and at the same time pressed for a 
treaty preparatory for war. He argued that If war began 
and went against France, Spain and her flourishing empire 
would be an attractive target of English Invasion, while 
France, with a small colonial empire, would suffer little 
from the fury of the enemy; that Is, In the event of war 
Prance might be able to hold on to her meager overseas 
possessions, whereas Spain would not be able to do so since 
her colonies were very extensive. With this rationale 
Choiseul argued that It was more beneficial for Spain to 
obligate herself to France than France to Spain,
The correspondence between France and Spain after 
1763 suggested the holding of a convention to clarify the 
Pacte and the meaning of the disputed article. The con­
vention, which finally met on January 2, 1768, drafted a 
treaty consisting of a preamble and twenty-one eurtlcles.
In clarifying and elucidating the Pacte, the new treaty 
accorded more extensive commercial provisions to the French 
with a reciprocal provision for the Spaniards In France.
The last article made the convention a part of the Pacte 
of 1761, On March 13, 1769, another convention was called 
to work out some of the details of the earlier convention,^9 
The commercial treaty benefited France more than Spain,
39por the convention of 1768 see B,N,, P,B,, og, clt,. 
fols, ^73-501; and that of 1769, fols, 545-555.
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It also contributed toward the realization of Choiseul*s 
design for closer relations with Spain in colonial and 
foreign affairs, for obtaining increased commercial 
privileges from Spanish colonies in order to aid in the 
reconstruction of the French economy, and for preparation 
of an eventual attack against Britain. The treaty likewise 
attempted to reduce the English trade concession which had 
been obtained by the Assiento at the Treaty of Utrecht. 
Prance requested her ally to keep a continual watch on 
England and to reduce her commerce ; she encouraged Spain to 
use every possible means to reduce English prosperity in 
North America and to prevent her from any conceivable 
attempt to take Latin America. The urge to repress English 
commerce and influence and ultimately her forces was also 
expressed in a letter from Ossun to Choiseul asking that 
France unite with Spain in augmenting their forces against 
England.^0
The commercial treaty strengthened ties between the
Bourbon governments not only in economic matters but also
in military affairs. This is seen in the following
anonymous document entitled Projets d"accords commerciaux
sur différents produits coloniaux.
She [Spain) must invite France to have a dockyard and 
a strong squadron Windward to the coast of America. The 
position of the islands of St. Domingue and Puerto Rico
^Oossun (San Ildefonso) to Choiseul (Versailles), 
June 20, l?65t A.E.C.P., Espagne, Vol. 5^3t fol. 125.
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Is 80 good that It could be able to form the bulwark 
of the whole of America if these Islands were ceded 
to France. By this means we will be able to prevent 
activities from Jamaica and all the establishments that 
the English can csurry on the coast of Campeche.
The attempt of France to obtain military commitments 
from the Spanish colonies and from Spain was more suscessful 
after the resignation of General Richard Wall, Spanish 
minister of foreign affairs, on August 21, 1763. His 
administration had been an impediment to Franco-Spanlsh 
relations, for he was generally In opposition to bringing 
Spanish policies Into coordination with the French. Wall 
was succeeded by the Marquis de Grimaldi, former Spanish 
ambassador at the court of Louis XW, whose appointment was 
applauded by the French. Grimaldi's successor at Versailles, 
the Comte de Fuentës, further aided France In Improving her 
diplomatic ties with Spain. Fuentès was one of the few 
Spanish diplomats to defend the Idea of a Franco-Spanlsh
I l O
alliance,
The choice of Grimaldi renewed the French hope of
^IB.N., P. B., op. clt., fol. 68. "Elle devrait 
engager la France d'avoir un chantier et une forte escadre 
au Vent des cotes de l'Amérique, La position de l'île de 
St. Domingue et de Porto-Rleo est si belle qu'elle pourrait 
former le boulevard de toute l'Amérique si ces 2 lies étalent 
cédées à la France. On briderait par ce moyen la Jamaïque 
et tous les établissements que les Anglais sont ààportée de 
faire sur la côte de Campeche."
^%eneral Richard Wall, former Spanish ambassador to 
London, became minister of foreign affairs In 175^* He also 
headed an anti-French party. Under Wall the Spanish cabinet 
was against any alliance with France, but, as seen below, 
this position was changed.
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consolidating the alliance of 1761, In the voluminous 
correspondence which both courts exchanged, Cholseul's 
Influence over Grimaldi wcis apparent. As Louis filart 
stated. In "...this period one can truly say, to some degree, 
that the Due de Choiseul governed the foreign affairs of 
Spain..." and that Spain sought frequently advice from 
the French minister. This was done In order to avoid con­
flict and reduce difficulties that seemed Inevitable.
Blart stated further that Grimaldi exercised a preponderant 
Influence on Charles III In spite of opposition from the 
Spanish council which was unfavorable to French war design.
Choiseul also corresponded directly with GrlmaMl, 
sometimes without the knowledge of Ossun. He adopted this 
method to test his Ideas and plans for war before presenting 
them to the French government. It was. In his opinion, a 
safe way to keep top level diplomacy secret, Blart *s 
study of Cholseul's correspondence reveals that some of 
his letters to Grimaldi were even unknown to Louis XV, 
that the French minister felt more comfortable discussing 
Franco-Spanlsh affairs with the Spanish minister than with 
his colleagues at Versailles, and that his plan for a 
projected war with England had to be In the strictest 
confidence since he "...thought already to take his revenge.
^3lou1s Blart, Les Bapports de la France et de 
l'Espagne après le pacte de Famille (pariss Librairie
P é n r i i c M 7 % i 5T . “ p r 77:------------
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hh
and his entire care led toward this goal. "
At the same time that Choiseul negotiated for an 
alliance with Spain, he encouraged Louis XV to correspond 
with his Bourbon ally, Charles III, for the purpose of 
improving diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
Pranco-Austrian relations, thought Choiseul, were précaire. 
and in order to carry out his plan against England it was 
essential to have a balance of power on the continent. He 
informed Louis XV that just as Spanish trade was necessary 
to recover French trade in order to revive the economy, 
Spanish foreign policy should be guided by French foreign 
policy in order to secure a formidable defense. In a 
letter to Ossun, Choiseul expressed the hope that Louis XV 
and Charles III would strengthen the union contracted in 
1761, under the Pacte, so that "...the two nations whose 
common glory and reciprocal advantages must from now always 
unite. **^ 5 There were occasions when Choiseul*8 letters to 
Ossun reflected his impatience with the Spanish govern­
ment, A typical example of this was contained In a letter 
to Ossun in June, 1764. He wrote 1 **I will be forced.
44Blart, op. Pit., p. 78. The correspondence between 
the two Ministers are conserved at the Archives Nationales, 
Series K 144. No, I8I. "pensait déjà A prendre sa revanche, 
et tous ses soins tendaient â ce but,"
^5choiseul (Versailles) to Ossun (San Ildefonso),
May 31, 1763. A.E.C.P., Espagne, Vol. 538, fol. 198.
"...deux nations que leur gloire commune et leur 
avantages réciproques doivent aujourd'hui unir pour 
toujours..."
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sooner or later If the Family Compact is not consolidated
by the Bourbon House, to give again Spanish affairs to the
[French ministry^ of foreign affairs.. , It is difficult
to ascertain what Choiseul meant in this letter. It is
likely that he had the notion of ’’war” by his use of
a^ffaires étrangères. " But this cannot be assumed.
Certainly he sought for more than just an entente cordiale.
He wanted a treaty that would definitely commit Spain to
France, for he was convinced that Spanish alliance was
necessary to French interest. To this end he wrote to
Louis XV in his Mémoire of l?65i
ghe king must]... treat with the most scrupulous care 
his system of alliance with Spain as a necessary 
power to France....If you should lose this ally you 
would have no other in Europe....It is necessary 
therefore. Sir, that you engage more and more with 
Spain, your natural ally,..*^ 7
Choiseul assured Louis XV that Charles III also needed France
and that in the event of a colonial conflict Spain would be
drawn into it eventually. For this reason France should
maintain good relations with Spain and give her direction
^^Choiseul (Versailles) to Ossun (San Ildefonso),
June 25» 1764, A.E.C.P., France, Vol. 574, fol. 148. "^e
serai forcé tôt ou tard, si le Pacte de Famille n'est pas 
consolidé par toute la Maison, de remettre l'Espagne aux 
affaires étrangères..."
^7choiseul, Mémoire. op. cit., p. 6. "De ménager, 
avec la plus scrupuleuse attention, son système d'alliance 
avec l'Espagne de regarder la puissance espagnole comme une 
puissance nécessaire A la France....si vous perdiez cet 
allié, vous n'en auriez plus dans l'Europe..,.11 faut donc. 
Sire, vous attacher de plus en plus A l'Espagne, votre 
allée naturelle..."
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In order to insure a firm and indissoluble bond. Choiseul
wrotet "...the Spanish king was obliged or determined by
his haughty character to war against the English; I sustain,
even until this misfortune, my ideas of necessary direction
in order to maintain the indissolubility of union between
the two crowns. "^8
The question which must be raised is to what extent
did Choiseul expect Spanish involvement in a French plan
for war? Did Choiseul anticipate complete participation
as under Article Four of the 176I Pacte. "...qui attaque
une couronne attaque l'autre"? Did he want limited Spanish
involvement and if so, how limited? Two things are clear;
(1) Choiseul believed he needed Spain in the event of war,
but (2) the extent and effectiveness of that support was
in doubt, Choiseul wrote to Ossun in Decembex; 1?64, that
There are two points of view to consider in a political 
system; in time of peace and that of war. The latter 
is prepared during peace when there is hope that during 
war the ally that you treat with care will furnish you 
with the help and money or men which you will employ 
to fight your enemies with advantage. This case is not 
true of Spain nor of Naples because this power will be 
only a dead body; in time of war it would be absurd to 
count on its force.., .Although Spain has been useful to 
us to make the last peace, this same usefulness has 
revealed so clearly her weakness that it is necessary 
for us to watch ourselves a second time; and the first 
consideration that will be for France, if war came 
between her and England, will be that Spain, despite the
^Choiseul, Mémoire. op, cit,, p, 6, "Le Hoi 
Catholique ôtait obligé ou déterminé par son tempérament un 
peu ait 1er, A la guerre contre les Anglais; Je porte Jusqu'à 
ce malheur, mes idées de ménagement nécessaire pour le 
maintien de l'indissolubilité de l'union entre les deux 
couronnes."
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stipulations of the Facte de Famille, will evade from 
engagement in this war. Whereas if Spain had war first, 
we would be obligated by sentiment and politics to enter 
into it, without which I think that she would lose 
America in two years. 49
In substance, the letter stated that if war came it 
was unlikely that Spain would agree to commit herself, but 
Choiseul did not rule out the possibility that Spain might, 
nevertheless, be useful to France. Choiseul emphasized, 
in another letter two years later, the need to be cautious 
with Spain,
It appears to me that in this situation [war] we 
should be reserved in our relations and interest 
with Spain. It is necessary to consider our own 
interest and not to count on Spain if we have war...
We must regard Spain useful to our commerce and for 
this reason to sacrifice in other aspects what is 
possible....We would make war alone at the beginning, 
and perhaps to the end if we are successful. If we 
are beaten we will try to engage Spain in it, as
^^Choiseul (Versailles) to Ossun (San Ildefonso), 
December l6, 1?64, A.E.C.P., France, Vol. 541, fols. 275-276. 
"Il y a 2 points de vue â considérer dans un système 
politique, le tems (sic) de paix et celuy de guerret ce 
dernier se ménage pendant la paix, quand on a l'espérance 
qu'à la guerre, l'allié que vous ménagez vous fournira 
des secours ou pécuniaires ou de forces qui vous mettront 
en état de combattre vos ennemis avec avantage ; ce cas ne 
peut s'imaginer de l'Espagne ni du royaume de Naples, car 
cette puissance ne sera long tems (sic) qu'un corps mort 
en tems (sic) de guerre sur la force duquel il serait 
absurde de compter...quoyque l'Espagne nous ait été utile 
pour faire la paix dernière, cette même utilité nous a 
dévoilé si clairement sa foiblesse qu'il faudrait bien 
se garder de nous la procurer une second foist et la 
première attention qu'aura la France si la guerre 
survenait entre elle et l'Angleterre serait que l'Espagne, 
malgré les stipulations du Pacte de Famille, évitât de 
se mêler dans cette guerre, au lieu que si l'Espagne avait 
la guerre la première, nous serions par sentiment et 
politiquement obligés d'y entrer, sans quoy je pense 
qu'elle perdrait l'Amérique en deux ans."
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In the last one, to help us get peacei such Is my 
system,,.50
Obviously, Choiseul felt that Spain was more useful 
in time of peace than in time of war, that in time of war 
Prance would not be aided by Spain because the latter was 
wesüc, but that in time of peace Spanish colonies would be 
useful to France by giving commercial privileges and 
concessions, Choiseul held, in effect, that during peace 
time Spain would be most useful to France since her commerce 
would aid France to prepare for war. On the other hand he 
did not dismiss the possibility that Spanish military aid 
could be of some help to France in war if the latter were 
in a very difficult situation, Choiseul held, however, 
a second position in regard to Spanish aid. He wanted to 
use Spain in a war of diversion against England, 51
50choiseul (Versailles) to Ossun (San Ildefonso),
June 9, 1766, A.E.C.P,, Mémoires et Documents. France et 
Divers Etets, Vol. 574, fols, 1^3-194% (Hereinafter cited as 
H, et d79 ’Quoiqu'il en soit, il me semble que dans la 
situation actuelle, nous devons mettre beaucoup de réserve 
dans le feu de nos démarches et de notre intérêt pour 
l'Espagne; il faut songer à la notre avant tout, ne pas 
compter sur l'Espagne si nous avons la guerre,,,il faut 
regarder l'Espagne comme utile â notre commerce et pour 
cette partie sacrifier dans les autres genres tout ce 
qui sera possible,,, et quant â la guerre nous la ferons 
tout seuls dans les commencements, et peut-être jusque s 
â la fin si nous avons dû succès. Si nous sommes battus, 
nous tâcherons d'engager l'Espagne comme â l'autre guerre 
pour nous procurer la paix. Tel est mon système,,,"
5^A full discussion of a war of diversion is given 
in the following chapter in connection with Choiseul *s plan 
for a war of revanche.
How did Spain react to Choiseul's position? It was 
indicated eetrlier that Grimaldi was well disposed toward 
the thinking of Choiseul and, in general, cooperated, and 
that he tried to influence Charles III to have a foreign 
policy similar to that of Louis XV. Historians disagree, 
however, on the extent of Choiseul's influence in Spain.
F. P. Renault, for example, held that French influence 
was decisive and that Spanish ministers supported the idea 
of a w a r . 32 Louis Blart, on the other hand, stated that 
the Spanish ministers did not support the war aims. He 
wrote that "...the ministers in Madrid showed themselves 
clearly hostile, the nation, unfavorable...", that it 
was an alliance brought about by a few statesmen, the 
Duke of Choiseul and Grimaldi, that the agreement had both 
strengths and weaknesses, and that its success or failure 
was at the mercy of events. 33 Blart recognized that the 
alliance was indispensable to France in a maritime war.
At the same time, France could be of service to SpaiA in 
Italy, byitmeans of her Austrian alliance, and particularly 
in America where she could aid her against the English.
Hence Spanish help to France against the English constituted 
a definite part of Choiseul's plan, a plan for war.
32F, p. Renault, "Etudes sur le pacte de Famille et la 
politique coloniale Française, 176O-1790," Revue de 
l'histoire des colonies des Français. Dixième Année (Premier 
semestre, 19&2),
33Blart, op. cit.. p. 78.
CHAPTER III 
CHOISEUL'S PLAN FOR VAR
Based on the willingness of Spain to join Prance
through the pacte de Famille in a war against England,
Choiseul began to lay the foundation for a plan. The plan
was presented to Louis XV in a Mémoire written in I765.
In the document Choiseul stated candidly that England was
France's enemy and that she was a threat to France.
England is the declared enemy of your power and of
your state, she will always be. Her avidity in commerce, 
the haughty tone she takes in the world's affairs, her 
jealousy of your power, the intrigues which she has made 
against you, make us foresee that centuries will pass 
before you can make a durable peace with that country
which aims at supremacy in the four quarters of the
globe.1
Choiseul predicted, however, that England's quest for 
world supremacy soon would founder on the shoals of an
^Etienne François de Choiseul, Mémoire de Monsieur de 
Choiseul Remis au Roi en 1765 (Paris 1 Charles Giraud, 
188Ï), p.B7 (Hereinafter cited as Choiseul, Mémoire). 
"L'Angleterre est toujours l'ennemie déclarée de votre 
puissance et de votre Etat; elle le sera toujours* Son 
avidité dans le commerce, le ton de hauteur qu'elle prend 
dans les affaires, sa jalousie de votre puissance et plus 
que cela les particuliers des différentes cabals qui tour 
a tour la gouvernement, doivent vous faire présager qu'il 
se passera, qu'il encore des siècles avant que de pouvoir 
établir, une paix durable avec cet Etat, qui vise à la 
suprématie dans les quatre parties du monde."
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American devolution, that the colonies would lead England
to disaster and to defeat, that England would cease to be
a threat to Europe.^
Consequently, France would be wise to pursue a course
that would create increasing financial burdens for England
without stimulating undue alarm. As he put its
Meanwhile we must, in politics, take precaution against 
her dangerous designs, and by defending ourselves 
against her [Englanc^ according to the means that I 
will indicate to Your Majesty, such as I conceived 
them in the article of the Marine, endeavoring to 
provoke not so much enemies against her as occasions 
for expenses. That is why the war against Portugal 
will always be, in every case, a useful war to Your 
Majesty, no matter what events result.3
Choiseul knew that England was in great financial
difficulty as a result of the Seven Years* War and that she
could not afford another war. He was certain that another
war would not oAly increase England's national debt but
would ultimately destroy her as the maritime power.
Consequently, he advised that France devise means by which
England would be forced to expend huge sums of money to
support her army and to finance an expensive war. His plan
2Choiseul, Mémoire. on. cit., pp.8-9. An analysis of 
Choiseul's views on the American revolution is given in 
Chapter h'ine.
3ibid.. pp. 8-9. "En attendant, il faut, en politique, 
se précautionner contre ses desseins dangereux, et en se 
defendant contre elle, selon les moyens que j'indiquerai à 
Votre Majesté, tels que je les ai imaginés, A l'article de 
la marine, chercher à lui susciter moins des enemis que des 
occasions de dépenses. C'est pourquoi la guerre contre le 
Portugal sera toujours, dans tous les cas, une guerre utile 
A Votre Majesté quelque événement qui en résulte, "
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called for a war which the English would be forced to defend
whether it is fought **...on the continent, in Germany or in
Flanders... " and naturally at great cost.4 The forthcoming
American revolution, thought Choiseul, would have similar
results, but that event was remote. He added, howeveri
That which is more immediate and which will cause a 
necessary fall is the immensity of English debts. When 
this power returns to war with Your Majesty, no matter 
what the events, the main task that Your Majesty must 
impose on its ministers is to spare Prance expense, in 
as much as it will be possible, while giving occasion 
to the English for the greatest possible expense. I 
realize the difficulty of this system, but I believe 
in knowing the possibility, and if Your Majesty, without 
letting yourself be carried away by excessive expenses 
in the first years of the war, like it has nearly always 
happened, will take care in such a way as to be able to 
afford to prolong this war a year more than the English 
will be able to afford, then it will no longer be the 
successes that will determine the peace, it will be the 
financial state of each kingdom, and Your Majesty will 
be the master of conditions.5
It is evident that Choiseul's basic strategy included
4choiseul, Mémoire. op. cit.. pp.8-9. "II en sera
de même d'une armée anglaise sur le continent, soit en
Allemagne, soit en Flandre."
5lbid.. p. 9, "Celui qui est plus prochain et qui
procurera une chute nécessaire, est l'immensité des dettes
de 1 "Angleterre. Quand cette puissance rentrera en guerre 
avec Votre Majesté, quels que soient les événements, 
l'attention principale qu'elle doit ordonner A ses ministres 
est d'épargner à la France la dépense, autant au'il sera 
possible, en occasionnant aux Anglais la plus forte dépense 
au'il se pourra. Je sens la difficulté de ce système t mais 
je crois en connaître la possibilité, et, si Votre Majesté, 
sans se laisser entraîner A des dépenses excessives dans 
les premières années de la guerre, comme il est arrivé 
presque toujours, se ménage de manière A pouvoir fournit A 
cette guerre une année de plus que les Anglais ne peuvent 
y fournir, alors ce ne seront plus les succès qui détermine* 
ront la paix, ce sera l'état des finances de chaque royaume, 
et Votre Majesté sera le maître des conditions,"
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the creation of a war of diversion, either In the colonies
or on the continent or both, that would cause England huge
expenditures. As will be seen In chapter seven, the plan
called for French forces In Guyane to attack Brazil in order
to prevent the Portuguese monarch, Joseph, from escaping there
to establish an empire since a Portuguese empire In South
America would threaten Spanish and French Interests,
To fight a new war with England also meant that French
forces on the continent and In the colonies needed to be
reformed add augmented. Time was essential to that task
and Choiseul understood that France must prevent a crisis
until fully prepared. He wrote in the Mémoire i
Moreover, to attain this basic goal (of revenging herself 
against England] It Is mandatory, by every possible 
means, that your political affairs. Sir, be managed In 
such a way that the war does not take place sooner than
In 1769. I do not know If we will be able to forestall
until this time the misfortune of war, especially If 
Mr. Pitt returns to office, but I believe t^t we must 
employ all our talents to attain this goal. °
Choiseul's 1765 weu? plan was similar to an earlier
one conceived In 1763.? The latter, entitled Réflexions
^Choiseul, Mémoire, op. clt., p. 9. ”Au surplus, pour 
parvenir â cet objet essentiel, 11 est Indispensable, par 
toutes sortes de moyens, que vos affaires politiques. Sire, 
soient ménagées de manière que la guerre n'ait lieu tout au 
plus tôt qu'en 1769, Je ne sais si l'on pourra parvenir k 
reculer jusqu'a celle époque le malheur de la guerre, surtout 
si M. Pltt rentre en place, mais je crois qu'il faut 
employer tous ses talents pour y parvenir."
^Réflexions sur une guerre particulière entre la 
France et la GMnde-Èretagne. Archive d"Affaires Étrangères. 
Correspondance PoïïtIque, France, M, et D., Vol, 574, 
fol. 143. (Hereinafter cited as A.E.C.P.)
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sur une guerre uarticullêre. stated that "...England had con­
templated for some time to prevent France from having a 
powerful Marine and to make her fight on land in Europe...,
But France will fight henceforth a war on sea. Anticipa­
ting an English attack of France on the continent, Choiseul 
planned to counter by sea with forty ships of the line 
docked at Brest and Bochfort plus twenty ships of the 
line at Toulon. French defense would be further augmented 
by three companies of regular troops on each ship of the 
line. It was hoped that the French counter attack would 
be so formidable that the British forces would be forced 
to concentrate on the coast of Brltanny In order to patrol 
the channel, In the Gulf of Gascony, and In the Mediterranean, 
Such a concentration of English ships In European waters 
would deprive the English colonies of adequate defenses 
and would allow the French Caribbean forces freedom to 
strike at will. The French squadron possessed a natural 
base at Môle Salnt-Nlcolas (Haiti) or at Cap Tlburon 
(Saint Domlngue). In addition, the French flotte at Brest 
would prevent the English forces In Europe from coming to 
the aid of their colonies In the Caribbean. The plan 
anticipated that the French flotte would be aided by French
^Bibliothèque Nationale, Papers of l'abbé Béliardi, 
Mss Fr. 10770, fol, 6 3. (Hereinafter cited as B.N., P.B. ) 
"L'Angleterre s'est arangée auparavant pour empêcher la 
France d'avoir une Marine puissante et la faire combattre 
sur terre en Europe,,, .Mais la France fera désormais une 
guerre de mer, "
50
troops gathered In Flanders and Brittany and at Ferrol In 
Spain, and that If the English attempted to shift their 
forces from Europe!to the colonies, two additional squadrons 
of fifteen ships of the line along with one hundred and 
twenty companies of troops could be sent to Saint Domlngue. 
However, Choiseul was convinced that once the war began on 
the continent the English would be trapped In Europe, 
thereby allowing the French Caribbean forces to strike 
at the English In Jamaica and possible In America, ^
According to the Réflexions, the French goal In the 
colonies would be to destroy English war supplies In 
America at Providence, St. Augustine, and the Bahama, and 
to destroy English commerce in Newfoundland, Quebec,
Florida, and Jamaica. A successful campaign against 
England at these strategic places was predicted on the 
assumption that the French colonies could prepare all of 
their forces and be ready to strike before the English 
declared war.^®
Both the Réflexions and the Mémoire postulated the 
beginning of a continental war which would be expanded Into 
a colonial and maritime war. Hence Choiseul's basic plan 
of 1763 was maintained, although the 1765 Mémoire con­
tained a more elaborate plan based specifically on a war 
of diversion.




In planning for a war of diversion Choiseul carefully
examined the diplomatic position of the various European
powers In order to assess those positions vls-â-vls Prance
and England. Hoping to gain Louis XV *s support for his
strategy, Choiseul submitted his findings to Louis XV In
the Mémoire of 1765. He Informed Louis XV that Austria's
Interest In Italy, to cite one example, could lead to a
disturbance of the peace of Paris, a course which France
should prevent In order to maintain the peace for at least
a few more years thereby giving France time to prepare for
war, Choiseul wrote t
In Italy peace can be disturbed only by the House of 
Austria, either she will aim her ambition In the 
conquest of the Kingdom of Naples or In war against 
France. Your Majesty will plan to make a diversion 
against her In her Italian states. In either case, 
the king of Sardlna Is necessary, and I think that 
we must, for these goals, spare with care the court 
of Turin. As long as Your Majesty will be united with 
the court of Vienna, Italy will be peaceful, but this 
union, as I have explained above, may cease; we must 
therefore, in order to support It expect, each day.
Its end and war.l^
^^holseul. Mémoire, op. clt.. p. 8. ”En Italie, 
la tranqullltô ne peut être troublée que par la Malson 
d'Autriche, soit qu'elle porte son ambition A la conquête 
du royaume de Naples, soit qu'étant en guerre contre la 
France, Votre Majesté songeât A faire une diversion contre 
elle deuns ses Etats d'Italie. Dans les deux cas, le Bol 
de Sardalgne est nécessaire, et je suis d'avis qu'il faut, 
pour ceé objets, ménager soigneusement la cour de Turin. 
Tant que Votre Majesté sera unie A la cour de Vienne, 
l'Italie sera tranquille, mais cette union, comme je l'al 
expliqué plus haut, peut cesser; 11 faut rneme, pour la 
soutenir, envisager chaque jour sa fin et la guerre."
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Choiseul's concern about the position of Italy in
European affairs also stemmed from attempts made at the
court of Turin to establish diplomatic relations with the
court of London. He wrote t
One can only foresee for suecess the attachment 
stemming from the court of Turin for the court of 
London, attachment known to me, which has engaged 
me during the last war, to advise your Majesty about 
the arrangement of Plaisantin, without which the 
court of Turin, without any doubt, would have 
tightened its bonds with London; instead, the con­
fidence in Your Majesty, which was firmly obtained 
by clarity and good faith from this arrangement, 
stopped the intrigues of England at Turin and put 
us in a position to put forth strongly the interest 
of the Kingdom of Sardina in favor of Prance, if 
circumstances take war to Italy. ^
Choiseul sought to improve relations with Turin and 
with Sardina in an effort to offset any potential English 
influence in Italy and in order to maintain friendly 
relations between France and Austria.
Elsewhere in Europe, Holland presented some problems 
for France. According to Choiseul, Holland was "...inwardly 
as much an enemy to France as England, and is checked in 
its animosity by the greediness of profit that this state
^Choiseul, Mémoire, on. cit.. p. 8. "II n'y a A 
prévoir pour le succis que l'attachement enraciné de la 
cour de Turin pour celle de Londres, attachement connu, 
qui m'a engagé, pendant la dernière guerre, A conseiller 
A Votre Majesté l'arrangement du Plaisantin, sans lequel 
la cour de Turin, il n'en faut pas douter, aurait reserré 
ses liens avec Londres; au lieu que la confiance dans Votre 
Majesté, qui a été solidement acquise par la netteté et la 
bonne foi de cet arrangement, a arrêté les menées de 
l'Angleterre A Turin et nous a mis en mesure de faire 
valoir puissamment l'intérêt du Roi Sardaigne en faveur 
de la France, si les circonstances portent la guerre en 
Italie."
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makes by neutrality. "13 in his plan for a continental war
of diversion, Choiseul envisaged attacking Holland just as
Spain would attack Portugal. He wrote in his Mémoire that*
I dafe suggest to Your Majesty that if England wages war 
with France at the time when you will be obligated with 
Austria, Sir, that will leave us no other theatre of war 
on the continent than to go to Hanover, a ruinous and 
profitless war; as I say, I dare advocate to Your 
Majesty that in this case, I would advise to act towsuxLs 
Holland as Spain should act toward Portugal. In my judg­
ment I would carry the war to the Seven-Provinces that 
would serve me in case of success, as guarantee against 
losses that Your Majesty could have in America.1*
Choiseul assured Louis XV that once the continental 
war began, and given reasonable military reforms and prepa­
rations, France could keep the English occupied in Europe 
while the French colonial army and navy invaded the English 
colonies in the Americas. French military forces from 
Martinique, Guadeloupe,and Sainte-Lucie were large enough 
to undertake an invasion of English colonies in the 
Caribbean. The strength of the French approximated
l^Choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit., p. 9. "(^ uant à la 
Hollande, elle est intérieurement aussi ennemie de la 
France que l'Angleterre, et n'est retenue dans son animofetté 
que par l'avidité des gains que cet Etat fait par la 
neutralité."
Ibid. "J'ose avancer & Votre Majesté que, si 
l'Angleterre fait la guerre A la France dans le temps où 
vous serez lié. Sire, avec la Maison d'Autriche, ce qui ne 
vous laisse aucun theatre de guerre sur le continent que 
d'aller â Hanover, guerre ruineuse et peu profitable, j'ose, 
dis-je, avancer â Votre Majesté que, dans ce cas, je lui 
conseillerais d'agir vis-à-vis de la Holland comme l'Espagne 
devrait agir vis-à-vis du Portugal. A mon avis, je porterais 
la guerre dans les Sept-provinces, qui me serviraient, en 
cas de succès, de nantissement aux pertes que Votre Majesté 
pourrait faire en Amérique."
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twenty battalions, excluding an army of 4.000 from Saint 
Domlngue and a smaller army from Guyane. In addition. Spain 
was expected to assummean important role in the proposed war 
of diversion and to strengthen French forces both in Europe 
and in the Caribbean.
In another document Choiseul mentioned the role to be
played by Spaint
If England attacks France alone....Spain must then attack 
Portugal by diversion, and perhaps Ireland next,...Spain 
must not annex Portugal because the king would leave for 
Brazil and ruin the Spanish possessions in America. The
war of diversion must last four or five years.^5
The proposed attack on Portugal would be pronged; one
on Portugal, the other on Brazil by the combined Spanish- 
French colonial forces. The attack on Brazil would avoid 
the establishing of a Portuguese empire in South America 
which might threaten the Spanish empire and the French 
colonies in the Caribbean.
At the same time that Choiseul invited Spain to join 
France in a war of diversion, he was cognizant of the weak­
ness inherent in the Spanish army and navy. Consequently.
15n6moire des questions nNalables & résoudre entre 
les 2 cours avant d "arrester définitivement un projeiTsur la 
guerreUe Portugal. B.N.. P.B.. Mas Fr. 107?(T, fols. 43%4?7 
"Si l'Angleterre attaque la France seule.... l'Espagne ferait 
ensuite une attaque de diversion contre le Portugal et 
pect-être ensuite l'Irlande.., .L'Espagne ne doit pas annexa 
le Portugal car le Boi partirait pour le Brésil et ruinerait 
les possessions espagnoles en Amérique. La guerre de 
diversion doit durer 4 ou 5 ans."
^^Further treatment of the proposed plan of attack on 
Brazil is given in chapter seven.
^7spanish reforms are discussed in the following 
chapter.
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he proposed major reforms for the Spanish military similar
to those to be undertaken In Prance and emphasized on the
Importemce of a strong united defense In the Caribbean.
He wrote that*
Their defense (Spanish and PrencQ depend entirely on 
the squadrons which must be stationed always at Puerto 
Blco, Saint Domlngue, or St. Yago In Cuba. These 
three positions are so strategic that In addition to 
the defense of the coasts sous le Vent they can restrain 
and threaten Jamaica at the same time* but It would be 
necessary that the courts of France and Spain work 
together In order to establish a plan of naval defense 
proportionate to that used by the enemy. The same 
positions are equally useful to aid Havana and Vera 
Cruz by sea or land.,.
Choiseul's purpose in enlisting the Spanish In an 
attack on Portugal was to force the English to concentrate 
their naval forces In Europe. He opposed both the Idea of 
a permanent occupation of Portugal or Its division, as 
advocated by l*abbé Bellardl, the French Consul General 
In Spain. ^ 9
Choiseul assured Louis XV that financially the war
l®B.N.,iiP.B., Mss Pr. 10?66, fols. 148-149. "Leur 
défense dépend entièrement des escadres qui doivent être 
constamment & Porto-Rlco, St. Domlngue ou St. Yago de Cuba. 
Ces trois positions sont si belles qu'outre la défense des 
côtes sous le Vent, elles brident en même temps et menacent 
la Jamaïque* mais 11 faudrait & cet effet que les cours de 
Prance et d'Espagne se consertassent ensemble pour établir 
un plan de forces maritime proportionnées & celles que 
l'ennemi pourrait employer. Ces mêmes positions sont 
également bonnes pour porter du decours de mer et de terre 
à le Havane et â Vera-Cruz,.."
^9a.E,C.P., Espagne, Vol, 540, fol, 126. L'abbé 
B^llardl, French Consul General In Spain, 1758-1772. Prom 
1757*1771 he was general agent of French commerce In Spain. 
He was also special representative of Choiseul at the 
Spanish court In Madrid,
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would not affect France as much as England. He added 
that the colonies themselves would underwrite part of the 
cost of war by assuming responsibility to finance reforms 
as stipulated In the general Ordinance of March 24, 1763.^^ 
In addition, Choiseul expected to win the proposed war with 
England, permitting France to restore her lost empire and 
to obtain compensation for the cost of the new war.
Reference of Choiseul's plan to finance the war is 
found In his Mémoire of 1765 and a letter to Ossun In 
1766. In the same letter he urged Ossun to persuade 
Spain to accept his plan for a war of diversion, adding 
that when a country (referring to Spain) was unable to 
strike against the enemy at designated places of combat, 
a war of diversion was the best means of attack.
Choiseul's plan for war of diversion was not received 
favorably In Spain. As mentioned earlier, Spanish ministers 
objected and supported their objections by referring to 
the Inadequacy of the Spanish army and the expenditure 
that would be Involved. Choiseul assured them, Grimaldi 
In particular that "...defense by sea, offense by land 
with our troops Is the only sensible part..." which the
^^he cost of war has been discussed earlier.
^^he Ordinance of March 24, 1763 is discussed later.
^^Cholseul (Versailles) to Ossun (San Ildefonso), 
August 11, 1766, A.E.C.P., Espagne, Vol. 5^6, fols. 310-312. 
See also Choiseul, Mémoire. op. cit.. pp. 8-9.
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Bourbon powers can play in another war.^^ He assured 
Grimaldi that the Portuguese army was in no better condi­
tion than the Spanish army and that just as England would 
render aid to Portugal in a war so would Prance to Spain. 
Choiseul further stated that the war would not be as 
expensive as Grimaldi envisaged and that since Pitt would 
not be expected to return to office "before one year," 
meaning before August, 1767, Spain would have sufficient 
time to prepare her military and naval forces, "Moreover," 
wrote Choiseul, "in spite of the return of Mr, Pitt and his 
very peculiar character to renew the war, I doubt that this 
event (war) would occur in a year,
Revenge was the essence of French foreign policy 
after 1763. Historians are in general agreement with this. 
In his History of Spain. Charles Chapman maintained that 
",,,France wished revenge and the restoration of her over­
seas domains while Spain's principal motive was a desire to 
save her colonies from conquest by England. Both countries 
therefore bent their energies to preparation for war.
^A.E.C.P,, op. clt,, Espagne, Vol, $46, fols. 310-312, 
"La défensive par mer, l'offensive avec nos troupes de 
terre, voilft le seul parti raisonnable,"
Choiseul (Versailles) to Ossun (San Ildefonso), 
August 11, 1766, A.E.C.P,, Espagne, Vol. $46, fol, 212.
"Au surplus malëppé la rentrée de M, Pitt on son caractère 
très propre A renouveller la guerre, je doute que cet 
événement arrive d'ici un an."
^^Charles E. Chapman, A History of Spain (New York*
The Macmillan Company, 1948)7 p. 387.
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In the view of Louis Blart, "...the Duo de Choiseul 
passionately wished revenge against England, by patriotic 
sentiment and also frœn the position of personal honor.
A synthesis of both views comes from Henri Blet In his 
assertion that "...the peace signed, he (Cholseul] exerted 
himself to prepare a war of revenge against England, 
motivated less by colonial sentiment than by patriotism. "^7 
C. A. Julien wrote that Choiseul regarded the peace as a 
mere "truce" and therefore he prepared for a new conflict 
which would be "maritime and colonial. " It Is clear that 
the single objective was revanche but this "...was to be 
essentially maritime and colonial. IMless Pltt took the 
Initiative, Choiseul was determined not to be drawn Into an 
expensive and distracting military commitment In Europe and 
the war was not to become a European one. Prance must 
concentrate on seizing British colonies In the Caribbean 
and In aiding the American colonies In revolting against 
the mother-country. An actual Invasion of Britain might
Louis Blart, Les Rapports de la Prance et de 
l*Espagne après le Pacte de pamlïle (parlsi LlEnalrle 
Pèllx Alcan, 19l3T, P. 93. "ia revanche contre l'Angleterre 
le duc de Choiseul la voulait, passionnément, par sentiment 
patriotique et aussi par point d'honneur personnel."
^7genrl Blet, Histoire de la Colonisation française 
(Paris# B. Arthaud, 194&), p, 27H, "La paix slg^^eT li 
s'efforça de préparer une guerre de revanche contre 
l'Angleterre, moins par sentiment colonial que par 
patriotism."
^®C. A, Julien, Les Prancals en Amérique 1713-1784 
(Paris# Centre de documentation universitaire, n,d. ), p, 85.
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even be necessary. But the fulfillment of these goals
depended on a general overhaul of the forces of the
Bourbon crowns, not only on the continent but in the
c o l o n i e s . 29 if revenge was the essence of French foreign
policy after 1763, diversion was the means. This plan was
well calculated. To this end Choiseul addressed Louis XV:
This plan is great, I believe it useful; it needs to 
be explained and, if I am not dead when this happens, 
and Your Majesty remembers that no matter where I am,
I will give to Your Majesty the explanations if Your 
Majesty desires them. It was the project that I meant 
to proMse to Your Majesty for 1763 if peace had not
come. 30
However, well calculated, the plan of Choiseul 
depended on adequate preparation for war. He urged Spain 
to follow France in initiating needed reforms in the army 
and in the navy. Simultaneously, he passed the necessary 
legislation for similar reforms in the French colonies.
Goodwin, ed., The New Cambridge Modem History 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 19&5) VIII, ^54-^55,
3®choiseul, Mémoire. op. cit., p. 9, “Ce plan est 
grand, je le crois utile ; il demande & être expliqué, et, 
si je ne suis pas mort quand le cas arrivera, et que Votre 
Majesté s'en souvienne, dans quelque lieu que je ne trouve, 
j'en donnerai A Votre Majesté les explications si Elle 
les désire. C'était le projet que je comptais lui 
proposer pour I763, si la paix ne s'était pas faite.“
CHAPTER IV 
PREPARATION FOR A WAR OF REVENGE
The plan which Choiseul conceived for war, soon after 
the signing of the Peace of Paris in I763, was based on 
instituting a number of reforms among the Bourbon powers 
in Europe and in their colonies. The reforms were made in 
the military, navy, and artillery. They were also adminis­
trative and they called for increasing the strength of 
forces, on the continent and in the colonies, in prepara­
tion for a war of revanche against England.
Since time was needed to prepare adequately for war, 
Choiseul was careful to avoid any conflict with England 
that would affect his preparation. As will be seen in 
chapter eight, there were occasions which could have 
erupted into a major conflict, the Nalouines episode, for 
example. But Choiseul acted as a negotiator between the 
contestants— Spain and England— to avoid war. As indicated 
earlier he did not want war sooner than I769, and even in 
1770, he felt that France was not ready, peace had to be 
preserved not only to afford sufficient time for France to
prepare, but also to give Spain needed time to overhaul 
her forces. He wrote that it was during peace that one
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should consolidate, anticipate, and acquire a firm 
political system In Europe. ^  But the creation of such a 
system presupposed completion of reforms by the Bourbon 
powers. Spanish reforms were Important In helping to 
carry out French plans. Only then would France be In a 
position to Implement her foreign policy of revenge.
Reforms Under Charles III 
At the same time that Choiseul Introduced measures 
to reform French forces In France and In the French colonies, 
Charles III, In support of the foreign policy of Choiseul, 
similarly Initiated measures for administrative, economic, 
and military reforms In Spain and In the Spanish colonies. 
Anticipating some repair to damages Incurred to Spain In the 
Seven Years' War and hoping to strengthen colonial defenses 
against another English Invasion, Charles III brought his 
foreign policy In harmony with that of Louis XV and Imple­
mented a number of French reforms In the Spanish colonies.
But the Intent of these measures, unlike those of the French, 
was purely defensive rather than offensive. The Spanish 
monarch, at least until the late 176OS, was unwilling to 
risk a war and consequently further losses In the colonies. 
And In his support of Choiseul no confrontation with England 
was In sight. However, the historian F. P. Renault wrote
Etienne Francois de Choiseul, Mémoire du Duc de 
Choiseul 1719-1785 (Calmettes Bd., Paris1 Plon-Nourrlt 
et Cle, 190# ,  pp. 246-247.
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that Charles III "...wished no more a revenge hut his 
revenge. [Italics mlne^ ) His ministers.. .were ready to 
collaborate actively with the work of revenge... .The 
Pacte de Famille was admitted as the base of Pranco- 
Spanlsh relationship."^ Perhaps It Is misleading to 
emphasize the Idea that Spain, like France, pursued a 
policy ot revenge.
That was not the case, and Renault's position of a 
revenge might be misleading. Charles III and his ministers 
emerged from the Seven Years' War as a defeated power and 
Spain's military strength In I763 was weaker than It had 
been In 176I at the time she entered the war. In such a 
state Charles III envisaged that reforms were the only 
means to recovery and to strengthening of Spanish defenses. 
Any recourse to war would be costly and damaging. He was 
equally convinced that the survival of Spain as a colonial 
power and her maintenance of status as a European power 
depended on her own political and economic resources, the 
decline of which the earlier Bourbons had done something 
to arrest but little to reverse. At the same time he was 
cognizant of his wartime alliance with Louis XV. This
F. P. Renault, "Etudes sur le Pacte de Famille et la 
politique coloniale française, 176O-I79O," Revue de 
L'hlstolre des Colonies françaises. Dixième Année,l^remler 
Semestre, 19&2), 47-48. Charles III "voulait non plus une 
revanche mais sa [Italics mine) revanche. Ses ministres... 
étalent prêt A collaborer activement à l'oeuvre de revanche 
... Le Pacte de Famille était admis comme base de rapports 
franco-espagnole."
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alliance, he conceived, would aid Spanish reforms and 
contribute to security in the Spanish colonies. On the 
other hand he was equally cognizant that the alliance could 
draw Spain into war in the event of an Anglo-French conflict. 
Spain was also vulnerable to an English assault. It was 
difficult, however, for Charles III and his ministers in 
1763 to decide on the future course of Franco-Spanish 
diplomacy and the degree with which an alliance should be 
contracted. This explains why five years of correspondence 
followed in 1763 and why a convention was eventually called 
in 1768 to resolve the nature and extent of renewal of the 
Pacte of 1761. And when Charles III finally agreed to 
renew the alliance with France it was with the intention 
that both countries would benefit mutually. The Pacte 
therefore exerted a great influence in shaping Spanish 
policies and reformed programs in the period between 1763 
and the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. It 
influenced Charles III to carry out an efficient colonial 
government aimed at rehabilitating trade with the colonies, 
improving colonial defense, and protecting the empire 
against invasion; in general, to restore Spanish maritime 
and military power in Europe and in the colonial world. ^
The colonial activity of Spain was in some respect 
parallel to the French activity. Defense was the motive
(Cambridge
A^. Goodwin, ed., The Mew Cambridge Modem History 
i The University Press, 1965)# VIII, 402-^03.
6^
which guided the expansion of the empire is frontiers. Fear 
of England led, for example, to an expedition to the 
Falkland Islands in 1?64. In cooperation with the French, 
who also made a colonizing expedition to the Falkland 
Islands during the same year, Spain tried to expel the 
English from their settlement of the islands, particularly,
k
at Port Louis and Port Egmont. On the northern frontiers 
of New Spain similar motives operated. It was hoped that 
Louisiana would serve as a barrier against Anglo-American 
penetration into the trans-Mississippi west. She also 
tried to counter Russian advances in the Pacific where, in 
17691 Spain began the colonization of California. Even 
during the American revolution the defensive expansion of 
Charles III was continuing.
Under the influence of France, Spain introduced 
administrative reforms in the colonies. The French system 
of intendances. for examplé, was used in the Spanish world.
It was first tried in Cuba in 1?64, in New Spain in 1768, 
and gradually throughout the empire. The new officials, 
with accompanying subdelegados and other assistants, took 
their place in the colonial hierarchy and were charged with 
the four departments of justice, general administration, 
finance, and war. In addition Charles III revived the visita.
Edmond Prdclin, la France et le monde de 1715 â 1789. 
7 vols. (Paris I P. Eenouvin, 193?), VII, 489%465. An 
extensive discussion of the Falkland dispute is given in 
chapter eight.
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a general Inspection of the colonies by a royal commissioner. 
In effect the Bourbon administrative reforms attempted to 
systematize and centralize colonial government and to con­
trol it at all levels,5
Additionally, Spain strengthened her overseas military 
establishment by the formation of a colonial militia which 
supplemented the regular troops sent from the Métropole.
The institution of the militia, designed after the French 
military reforms, was a part of imperial defense that 
resulted in the general overhaul of the old colonial system. 
In consequence, Mexico City had as many as fourteen compa­
nies of militia. Fortifications were also built on the 
Spanish islands in the Caribbean, mainly in Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and along main ports of the mainland of South America.^ 
The military reforms greatly strengthened Spanish forces.
A letter to this effect from Ossun to Choiseul indicated 
that Spain had built two ships of eighty guns, launched one 
of seventy and started to build four more. He also said 
that at San Anders plans were underway to build four addi­
tional ships of the line. ^ This volume of naval, military.
^A. Goodwin, ed., The New Cambridge Modem History.
22. cit., VIII, 397-404.
H. Bancroft, History of Mexico. 6 vols, (San 
Franciscos A, L. Bancroft & Co,, 1883-I888), III, 401-402,
^Ossun (San Ildefonso) to Choiseul (Versailles), 
September 3, 1764. Archive d'Affaires Etrangères, Corre­
spondance Politique, Espagne, Vol. 541, fol. 67. (Hereinafter 
cited as A.E.C.P. ) See also Vol. 540, fol. 64. San Anders 
is located in the Caribbean, east from the coast of Nicaragua,
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and administrative reforms signified a basic vbange in 
colonial policy and was characterized by an imperial defense 
for the protection of the Spanish empire against aggression, 
for the restoration of Spanish maritime and military power 
in Europe, and for the strengthening of the Bourbon powers 
against England.
A letter dated August 1, 1765, from Ossun to Choiseul, 
reported on the progress and acceleration of Spanish reforms. 
It assessed, at the same time, the position of England for 
war and urged the Bourbon powers to increasingly augment their 
forces to meet a possible threat arising from the English.
The letter indicated the apprehension of the English concern­
ing Spanish military reforms. It implied that England might 
attempt to intimidate Spain, an intimidation expressed by 
the English ambassador at Madrid, the Count of Bochfort, in 
a conversation and a correspondence with Grimaldi.
If the intention of the London court was in dictating the 
haughty sentences to Mr. Bochfort, to intimidate the king 
of Spain and his ministers, it did not succeed. We see 
with the greatest satisfaction that his Catholic Majesty 
was even more determined to accelerate, either in Europe 
or in the new world, his preparations of defense. It 
would be, of course, to put ourself in the case of being 
unprovided if we let them stay longer in the illusive 
hope that our natural enemies will negotiate faithfully 
in order to maintain the peace. 8
Gossun (Madrid) to Choiseul (Versailles), August 1, 
1765. A.E.C.P., Vol. 544, fols. 135-136. "Si l'intention de
la cour de Londre en dictant & M. de Bochfort les propos de 
hauteur qu'il a tenus, était d'intimider le Boi d'Espagne et 
les ministres, elle n'y a pas réussit, et nous voyons avec la 
plus grande satisfaction que Sa Majesté Catholique n'en est 
que plus fermement déterminée A presser soit en Europe soit 
dans le nouveau monde^les préparatifs de défense. Ce serait 
évidemment s'exposer a être wis au dépourvu que de les 
ralentir dans 1^espérance illusoire que notre ennemi naturel 
négocia de bonne foi dans la vue de maintenir la paix.”
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The letter added that England needed a long period of peace 
because of her weariness and expenditure in fighting the last 
war and for the purpose of consolidating her empire. Yet if 
her dmpire were threatened she would be willing to resume 
the fight.
Therefore we must count only on our forces. If the 
English see that we are not capable to act, they will 
use this occasion in order to make greater conquest at 
our expense. We will be obliged to buy the peace by 
concession of humiliation, but it will not last long.
They will still rape it in order to sell it again, emd 
at the end we will lose all our possessions in America 
and the respect of the entire world.... 9
Reform of the French Army 
At the same time that Choiseul tried to influence the 
direction of Spanish diplomacy after 1763 and to draw Spain 
into a war of diversion against England, he consumed much of 
his energies to reform the army, navy, and artillery, and in 
general, to improve the defenses in the French colonies.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the French army 
had been the most efficient military instrument in Europe.
But at the end of the Seven Years* War it was never able to 
gain a decisive victory over the troops of Hanover, Hesse, 
and Brunswick. The decline of the army was caused not only
9ossun (Madrid) to Choiseul (Versailles), August 1, 
1765. A.E.C.P., Vol. ^44, fols. 135-136. "Ne comptons donc 
que sur nos forces 1 si les anglois nous voyent dans 
l'impuissance de faire, ils en profiteront pour se grandir 
encore A nos dépens. Nous serons obligés d'acheter la paix 
par des cessions humiliantes, mais elle ne durera pas long 
temps. Ils la violeront encore pour nous la vendre de 
nouveau, et nous finirons par pendre nos possessions en 
Amérique et notre considération dans 1'universe entier...."
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by Inadequate financial resources allotted to It but also by 
weaknesses In Its social composition. For example, the army 
consisted of a number of Incompetent generals bound to the 
court. It also witnessed frequent bitter struggles between 
aristocratic and bourgeois officers. In 1750 one-third of 
the Infantry officers were men of middle-class origin, who 
had acquired their commissions by purchase or had risen from 
the ranks. It was by birth and money, not merit which deter­
mined the appointments to senior military positions. As late 
as 1781, a royal decree provided that every candidate for a 
commission had to satisfy the court that he had possessed 
sixteen quarters of nobility. The nobility had dominated the 
officer rank, but their number was steadily reduced since the 
reforms of Choiseul and his successors, the Comte de Vergennes^ 
for example. In 1775# the French army numbered 170,000 men.
Of this 60 ,000 were officers whose pay and pensions absorbed 
more than half the army budget even though only one-sixth 
were on duty with their regiments. Out of an army of 200 
regiments, there were, for example, 1100 colonels and 12,000 
generals. But In 1789, when the army was nearly double that 
of 1775# there were only 9#578 officers.^®
The reduction of officers was due mainly to the 
reforms Introduced since 1763. During the administration of 
Choiseul the army was cut down by nearly one-half the number
0. Lindsay, ed.. The New Cambridge Modern History. 
(Cambridge* The University Press, 1957)# VII, 181-182.
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of officers; but they continued to enjoy their pay and 
pensions. Choiseul compelled colonels in actual command of 
regiments to spend a part of a year with the soldiers, and 
instituted periodical maneuvers for the training of young 
officers. Recruiting, instead of being left to the captains 
of companies, was brought under the Minister of War; emd in 
place of the "farming** of regiments and companies, a regular 
system of accounting and administration was begun. In his 
1765 Mémoire, Choiseul wrote that commencing with the 
negotiation for peace "...I occupied myself with the reform. 
I felt that the greatest advantage of Your Majesty was that 
this reform be made promptly. I studied all the various 
reforms that had been made since Henry II.. . . Choiseul 
added that his introduction of changes in the army, had two 
basic objectives. The first was military. It involved the 
division of troops on the basis of a certain number of 
officers to ensure efficiency and reduction of costs. The 
second was political. It dealt with correcting abuses 
in the army and with increasing it especially in times of 
war.
^^Etienne François de Choiseul, Mémoire de Monsieur de 
Choiseul Remis au Roi en 1765, (Paris; Charles Glraüd, 18BI), 
p 7  il. (HereinüFter cited as Choiseul, Mémoire.) "Je me 
suis occupé de la réforme. J'ai senti quele plus grand 
avantage pour Votre Majesté était que cette réforme fût 
faite promptement. Je m'instruisis de toutes les différentes 
réformes qui avaient été faites depuis Henri II."
IZibid.
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The reforms which Choiseul had Introduced in the army 
after I763 were largely the work of the Comte de Orlbeauval. 
After distinguishing himself in the Austrian service during 
the Seven Years' War, Sribeauval was placed in charge of the 
French Artillery Corps. He was a specialist in developing 
the mechanical aspects of gunnery and artillery. He stan­
dardized the caliber of his cannon and eliminated the huge 
siege guns that had overencumbered older armies. In their 
place, guns and bayonets were made much lighter by shortening 
the barrels. This facilitated an easier and more accurate 
aim. As a result of the innovation, lighter pieces of 
weapon could be moved about the battlefield by men, and the 
artillery could keep pace with the infantry. ^ 3
Jacques Guibert, another able reformer, invented a 
means of combining mobility with close formation in the army. 
In his Essai Gënëëal de Tactique he attempted to synthesize 
various types of new military thought, thereby ppoducing a 
formula for winning decisive battles. His system enabled 
troops to maneuver freely in the presence of the enemy 
instead of being tied to a prepared position. His methods 
attempted to make changes natural, simple, and easy. For 
example, he introduced irregular formation. Lines no longer 
had to be more than roughly straight and the units of which 
they consisted might be deployed in the reverse of the usual
-^^ Bmile 6. Léonard, L'Armée et ses Problems au XVIII 
Siècle (ParisI Librairie Pion, 195?), pp. 257-258.
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order when this was quicker. One result was that an army 
marching in parallel columns could form at the double a line 
parallel to or at any angle with the line of march. In 
addition, troops posted at, or on their way to, one part of 
the line could be rapidly moved to another part. By rein­
forcing certain sections of his line at the last minute and 
by varying the formations of the different columns, so as 
to make them appear stronger or weaker than they actually 
were, the general could intensify the effect of surprise. 
Guibert*s system envisaged the decisive attack as an over­
whelming concentration of fire on a part of the enemy's line, 
followed by a charge merely to administer the coup de grâce. 
Concentration of force was the key to success and he there­
fore wanted less division of an army not more. The command 
of an army scattered in detachment involved a great multi­
plication of written orders and reports. The movements of 
the detachments had to be planned in some detail, to ensure 
that they all moved quickly in the right direction and were 
always so placed that they could be rapidly concentrated.
In general, the new methods of warfare introduced by 
Gt&beauval and Guibert called for intelligence and initiative 
in all ranks. A strong devotion to duty was also required.
The military reforms under Choiseul eliminated many 
abuses, enforced discipline, and improved training and
VII
^^^L^ngsay, ed., The New Cambridge History, op. cit.,
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Instruction. The écoles d*équitation and the école des 
dragons trained soldiers in the art of maneuvering of 
cavalry. Some of Guibert"s reforms were incorporated in 
1791 in a drillbook which became the basis of French 
tactics and training up to I830. A basic principle in the 
new system of warfare was uniformity. "If Your Majesty is 
forced to have augmentations, they will be only in soldiers 
and in uniform proportions."^5 Also the new formation in 
the army was supervised by about eighty high ranking 
officers (officiers généraux) in order to maintain a high 
level of efficiency. The modem General Staff saw its 
beginning after 1763. It was the French who advanced 
furthest in the direction of staff planning. This was a 
direct result of the lessons learned during the Seven Years* 
War and the genius of Lieutenant-General Pierre Sourcet.
In 1766 Bourcet introduced a body of officiers employé A la 
reconnaissance du pays which became a special quartermaster 
staff (service d*état-major des loges des armées) in 1770.1* 
But the latter was suppressed in I771, one year after the 
fall of Choiseul from office, on the grounds that it was too 
expensive. However, during the administration of Choiseul 
an important function of the quartermaster staff was
l^Choiseul, Mémoires du duc de Choiseul 1719-1785. 
op. cit.. p. 255. "Al Votre Majest? est forcée A faire 
des augmentations, elles ne seront que de soldats et par 
proportions uniformes."
1*D. D. Irvine, "The origin of Capital Staffs," 
Journal of Modem History. X (June, 1938), I6I-I79.
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concerned with geographical factors. It secured adequate 
geographical information before an invasion took place and 
prepared topographical sketches and expository reports. 
Individual members were also employed to investigate the 
provinces or coasts to be invaded or to conduct missions 
in foreign territories similar to the mission of De Kalb 
to America in 1?68. This type of activity continued after 
1771, hence the quartermaster staff was not entirely 
disbanded.
Choiseul*s army reforms were inspired to some degree 
by the reforms of foreign armies, notably the army of 
Frederick the Great. In writing about the Prussian army 
Choiseul stated I "If we do not imitate them for administra­
tion of troops as well as for artillery, their greatness 
will cause the ruin of the French nation. Choiseul 
recruited, in addition. Swims regiments and employed them 
in the service of the French army. He wrote in his 
Mémoire t
Frcmi the year I763, the first year of peace, I was 
seriously occupied with a reform of the abuses 
prevalent in the Swiss regiment. According to 
ordinances and by treaty with the cantons, I was 
able to form a solid body of the Swiss regiment.,.
The formation was the first pdlitical object : 
discipline and training of maneuvering were the 
second military object. I put the Swiss regiment...
^^choiseul. Mémoire, op. cit.. p. 13. "Si nous ne 
les imitons pas tant pour l'administration des troupes 
que pour l'artillerie leur perfection entraînerait la 
ruine de la nation française..,"
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In the service of the King.
Altogether there were twenty-six foreign battalions in the 
French army comprising Germans, Italians, Swiss, Corsicans, 
and Irish French, In 1770 the total number of foreign 
recruits was 152,758.^® These came under the same regimen­
tation as the French battalions, tmiforrnity, a basic 
principle of the military reforms of Choiseul, was main­
tained. When Choiseul reported in 1765 to Louis XV about 
his military reforms, he set the date of I768 for its 
completion. He was confident that by that time France 
would emerge with a strong army that would "...reap the 
fruits at the next war,
The effect of military changes which Choiseul intro­
duced led the French army to recover rapidly fr<m its weak­
ness and partial destruction during the Seven Years* War.
^®Choiseul, Mémoires de Duc de Choiseul. 1719-1785. 
OP. cit., p. 279. See also Choiseul. Mémoire, op. cit., 
p. 14. "Mais, dès l'année I763, la première de la paix, 
je m'occupai sérieusement et avec activité à réformer les 
abus sans nombre qui préjudiciaient au service du Roi dans 
le corps des Suisses. Je parvins par des ordonnances par 
des traités avec les cantons à former un corps solide de 
la nation suisse...la formation était le premier objet 
politiqueI la discipline et la connaissance des manoeuvres 
étaient le second objet militaire et utile que j'avais en 




2l$bid., p. 15. "Je l'ai proposée A Votre Majesté 
qui l'a adoptée et qui en retirera les fruits A la guerre 
prochaine."
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The Impact of defeat and the success of military and naval 
preparation under Choiseul*s administration Inspired the 
army to emerge, even after 1770, as one of the more modern 
and advanced armies In Europe. For some time France had 
lagged behind the Prussian army In which technicians were 
drawn largely from the Junker class rather than from the 
middle class. In France the nobles were unable to provide 
such technical Innovations. Choiseul*s reforms attracted 
the bourgeois class which gave the necessary technical 
leadership lacking earlier.
The reforms led to a new composition In the army that 
had been monopolized by nobles. Whereas In Prussia the 
middle class technicians had been less respected and even 
despised by the Junkers, In France their counterpart were 
given an Important place In the military. That Is 
Grlbeauval*s artillery schools failed to make engineers out 
of the French nobles, a class which compared with the Junkers 
In Prussia. In addition French engineers were very able in 
the work of fortification. This was also the case In the 
French colonies where similar military change took place. 
Consequently, the French national and colonial armies 
witnessed a complete overhauling and prepared the military 
for a new era of warfare.
Restoration of the Marine
The reform of the French navy was the most successful 
part of Choiseul *s preparation for war. Convinced that
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It was a powerful navy which had led to England's success 
in the Seven Years' War, he initiated a complete reform of 
the navy similar to the reform of the army. Choiseul 
restored the marine as a most foxmidable weapon to protect 
French commerce and French possessions. In a Mémoire he 
wrote that "...the marine must be the principal defense 
of the colony.. . . He believed that it was also essential 
if a renewal of the struggle against England was to have any 
chance of success. He held that before France could 
implement her policy of revenge, a naval reform was 
imperative.
The best documentary evidence of Choiseul's reform of 
the marine comes from his Mémoire of 1765» Choiseul wrote 
in a separate section of the Mémoire about the destruction 
of the navy in l?6l at the time he was given the additional 
portfolio as Minister of the Marine. He talked about the 
construction of ships, ports, and magazines which he had 
ordered to increase the efficiency of the marine in the 
war. He said, for example, that in 1762 he had spent 
fourteen million livres in order to send an expedition 
against the British in Newfoundland, to arm a French 
squadron at Rochefort for keeping watch over an English
^^Hémoire Concernant la déffense des colonies 
françaises de l'Amérique et le moien de tenir la marine 
militaire en activité en temp de pais, Amérique du Nârd 
1714-1777, A.N., Col. F^C, Vol, 8, Carton No. 8. "...la
Marine doit être la principale déffense des colonies...."
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squadron at the île d*Alx, to send another squadron to
Saint Domlngue for augmentation of the French forces, to
arm a third for protection of French commerce in the
Mediterranean, and finally, to prepare a fourth squadron
for the attack of Bio de Janeiro. He reported that when
the war ended In I763 France had forty-four ships of the
line and ten frigates. These were not In good condition
and demanded Immediate repairs If France were to wage a
war of revenge. 23
But the rebuilding of France's naval forces for war
required. In addition, more ships, bigger and deeper ports,
adequate supplies and more sailors. To assess these needs,
"...I leamt the most minute details...” Choiseul wrote.
Every day I spent some time In this study, and as 
sailors are the foundation of naval forces as subjects 
are the pecuniary force of a State, I counted, 
according to classes (which Is not an easy task) 
the number of sailors In the realm wh<m we could 
rely upon, to estimate, the quantity of ships which 
France could provide.
The forty-four ships of the line and ten frigates
which France possessed In 1763 were not only In bad state
but were also Insufficient to fight another war. Therefore,
^^Cholseul, Mémoire, op. clt., p. I7.
B^ibld.. ”J 'appris les plus petits details. Je 
donnais tous les jours du temps A cette étude, et comme les 
matelots sont la base des forces navales, comme les sujets 
la force pécunàAlre d'un Etat, je me mis au fait, par les 
classes (ce qui n'est pas une Instruction aisée) du nombre 
des matelots sur lesquels on pouvait compter dans le royaume, 
pour apprécier le nombre des vaisseaux que la France pouvait 
entretenir. ”
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Choiseul studied the naval problems of France and came up
with an estimation which showed that France needed more
than eighty ships of the line and forty frigates, plus
boats for transporting supplies,^5 Based on this calculation
he ordered a replacement of the ships destroyed during the
Seven Years' War and that new ships be built, furnished,
and armed. A year later Choiseul evaluated the progress
of his naval program and reported, according to his Mémoire
of 1765, that within the next four years France would have
a fleet of sixty ships of the line and be ready for war,
"It is from this information that I proposed in 1764 to
Your Majesty to have in four years sixty ships of the line
in the event that war is declared. When in 1765 he
reported to Louis XV on the military progress, Choiseul
stated that France had built the estimated sixty ships of
the line in one year rather than four, and further, that
France had exceeded the number of ships that had been
planned. Consequently, the naval forces were almost doubled
that of 1763.
You have at ppesent sixty-three ships of the line 
and thirty-one frigates. I have almost doubled 
the forces of Your Majesty, with the difference 
that next summer these sixty-three ships will be 
completely ready to go to the sea, and in a proper
^^Choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit., p. 17.
26lbid.. "C'est d'après ces connaissances que je 
proposai, en 1764, à Votre Majesté d'avoir en quatre 
ans 60 Vaisseaux de ligne, en cas que la guerre se 
déclarât."
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condition In every respect, instead of which, when 
I took them over for care, they were in a horrible 
disorder,27
In another document Choiseul wrote that by 1768 France 
would have sixty-six ships of the line and forty frigates. 
This is six ships of the line more than he had predicted in 
his Mémoire of I765. He also wrote that in 1770 France would 
secure a total of eighty ships of the line, one hundred and 
eighteen battalions and fifty-six squadrons,28
The building of the navy within such a span of time 
is a reflection of the implementation of Choiseul*s plan 
and preparation for war. The time element also reflected 
some measure of immediacy. He expected war to be initiated 
by Pitt as soon as the latter returned to office. This 
explains in part the reason for the urgency of his prepa­
ration. But his naval program was not to be ended. By 
1769 Choiseul planned to build an additional sixteen ships
of the line, 29
The French naval program included the rebuilding of
27choiseul, Mémoire. op, cit., p, 17, "Vous avez & 
présent 63 Vaisseaux ae ligne é^~Jl frégates. J'ai 
presque doublé les forces de Votre Majesté, à la différence 
que, l'été prochain, ces 63 Vaisseaux seront tous en état 
d'aller â la mer, et en état de tous points, au lieu que, 
quand j'en ai pris le soin, ils étaient dans un désordre 
affreux,"
Z^Mémoire sur les forces de mer et de terre de la 
France et l'usage qu'on pourrait en faire en cas d'une 




magazines and fortifications and the strengthening of ports, 
particularly at Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon where most of 
the ships of the line would be docked. Such repairs were 
extensive I at Brest It took eighteen months and cost nine 
million livres. But the port offered Increased docking 
facilities and provided a favorable strategic defense. At 
Lorlent, Marseille, Bordeaux, and Bayonne additional 
magazines were constructed. In the East and West Indies 
French naval bases were repaired and new ones built at 
lies de Bourbon and de Prance, Port Royal (Martinique), 
Cherbourg, and Dunkerque. The Introduction of such an 
extensive naval reform was the result of support stemming 
not only from government funds but also from the French 
public, particularly the merchant classes of the south and 
west of France. No less than fifteen ships of the line 
armed with 1000 cannons, for example, were contributed by 
the merchants In the period from 1763-1765.^®
Purging and restafflng of the marine and bringing the 
administration under stricter control of the ministry of 
the marine accounted for another phase of naval reforms.
The powers of the intendants, laid down by Colbert In the 
ordinance of 1689, and the administrative hierarchy known 
as la plume, had been greater than those of the executive.
30c. A. Julien, Les Français en Amérique 1713-1784.
Le Canada. La Louisiane. la Guyane. La Politique Américaine 
ChoiseulTParisI Centre de Documentât1on Universitaire, 
n.d.), p. 85.
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l*épée. "The corps of la plune was the object of animosity 
from l'épée." wrote Chois e u l , H e  reported to Louis XV 
that la Plume enjoyed great privileges by the ordinance, 
neglected the interest of the government, misrepresented 
and ill-treated the officers, and sought only self-interest. 
The entire administration was corrupted; hence Choiseul 
introduced the ordinance of 1?65 in an attempt to redress 
the balance of power in favor of l*épée. However, his 
successor. De Boynes, minister of the marine (1771-1774), 
attempted to reverse this by bringing officers of the 
marine in line with those of the army. The attempt was so 
unpopular that the next successor. De Sartines (1774-1780), 
dismissed nearly half of the administrative branch in order 
to create posts for executive officers in peace time. Such 
reshuffling of officers contributed, in part, to the chaos 
of the French government when France became involved in the 
American revolution. With the succession of Castries 
(1780-1787) to the ministry of the marine, another change 
followed. Wider powers were restored to the commissary 
branches of the service by the ordinance of I786.
Even more serious than the rivalry between la plume 
and l*épée were the jealousies within the ranks of the 
executive offices. The regular officers comprising the 
Grand Corps (called rouges ) had been drawn from a cadet
31Choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit., p. 18, "Le corps de 
la plume était l'objet de l'^lmimosité de l'épée."
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entry originally known as gardes.»de-pavilion, who were 
sons of the Breton and Provençal nobility. In an effort 
to widen this entry Choiseul permitted officers of the 
petite marine (called blues) to serve In either the 
merchant or royal navies. In which, however, they could 
never rise higher than the rank of sub-lleutenant. The 
Castries administration replaced the old system of entry 
with cadets known as élèves. These reforms were unpopular 
among the aristocracy, many of whom continued to regard 
naval service as Inferior to that of the army. Yet when 
the ranks of the rouges had been depleted by the French 
Revolution, It was to the élèves that the government 
turned for Its officers.32
Another naval reform dealt with the manning of the 
French fleet. The earlier system of calling up classes of 
the seafaring population proved a hardship to the Inhabi­
tants of the marine provinces. Choiseul equalized the 
system under which some 90,000 men were liable for service. 
The system, however, was Inadequate to serve In wartime. 
Hence In I769 Choiseul created the Corps Royal d'Infanterie 
et d "Artillerie. which In 1786, Castries reorganized as a 
force of 6,000 seamen-gunners. The men only served on 
board In time of war, but the force was never popular with 
naval commanders. Finally, Choiseul Inaugurated a school
3^A. Goodwin, ed., The New Cambridge Modem History. 
op. clt.. VIII, 183-184. See also Choiseul, Mémoire, op. 
Pit., pp. 18-19.
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of naval medicine and a corps of naval constructors (marine 
engineers). These institutions proved successful and 
represented some of the lasting achievements of Choiseul *s 
naval reforms.33
The prestige of the navy was greatly enhanced by the 
accession of Louis XVI who took a personal interest in 
maritime affairs. Naval building programs continued regard­
less of cost and were encouraged by royal visits to the 
dockyards. The cost soared during the American Revolution, 
for the French navy expended l60 million livres cmnually.
Such expenditure continued to rise and was a principal 
cause of national bankruptcy in 1789.^^
A revolution in artillery constituted an essential 
ingredient of the naval reforms of Choiseul. In battles, 
the use of artillery had been restricted by the weight and 
slowness of the guns, Choiseul wrote in 17651 "Artillery 
was an important part which was neglected....Since Louis XIV, 
we have neglected artillery which was entrusted to entre­
preneurs. I coordinated sea and land artillery. I formed 
b r i g a d e s . .. "33 He assigned the department of artillery to
33a . Goodwin, ed., The New Cambridge Modem History, 
ofi. cit.,VHI, 183-184.
3*Ibid.
33choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit., p. 18. "L"artillerie 
était une partie essentielle qui était fort négligée.... 
Depuis Louis XIV on avait négligé l'artillerie qui était 
livrée A des entrepreneurs. J'ai réuni l'artillerie de 
mer A celle de terre. J'ai forme des brigades..."
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Gribeauval who made changes and introduced new principles,
the most notable of which was to make guns lighter by
shortening their barrels. The innovation facilitated an
easier and more accurate aim. Cannons and other types
of ammunitions were also improved and standardized in all
ports under the guidance of Moroguer and Martil, military
experts.With such reforms, Choiseul was well underway
in preparing the navy, as well as the army, for war. In
his Mémoire of 1765» he assured Louis XV that satisfactory
progress had been made,
I believe. Sir, that the officers of the marine that I 
propose to Your Majesty are immensely more knowledgeable 
than the officers who were in the marine of Louis XIV... 
I dare to assure you. Sir, that in I769 your marine will 
be sufficient for the defense of your possessions, and 
will be stronger than it had been during the brilliant 
times of Louis XIV.
The military and naval reforms of Choiseul, including 
a "reform of morale" of the officer corps and crew men, 
meant that a substantial effort had been made after I763 
in carrying out the needed preparation for a war of revenge. 
Simultaneously, military and naval reforms had been 
implemented in the Branch Caribbean stretching from the
^^Choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit., p. 18.
37ibid.. p. 19. "Je crois. Sire, que les officiers 
de la marine que J *ai proposés â Votre Majesté ont 
infiniment plus de connaissances que ceux de la marine de 
Louis XIV n'en avaient...J'ose vous assurer. Sire, qu'en 
1769 votre marine sera suffisante & la défense de vos 
possessions, et sera plus forte qu'elle n'a été dans les 
temps les plus brillants de Louis XIV. "
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Gulf of Mexico to Guyane. As seen in the next chapter, 
Choiseul assured Louis XV that the preparation of French 
forces in both France and the colonies would not only 
defeat England but re-establish French superiority in 
the colonial world.
CHÀFTEB V
MILITARY PREPARATION IN THE CARIBBEAN
When Choiseul instituted a corps of engineers in the 
marine and added in 1769 a corps of royal infantry and 
artillery, he attempted to strengthen the naval force as 
well as to guarantee that **...la défense des colonies 
devait être assurée. His reform program, aimed at pre­
paring French forces for a war of revenge, was not limited 
to France. Choiseul envisaged that the French colonies 
constituted an important part in the preparation. Hence, 
he initiated in I763 a number of ordinances for the 
expressed purpose of carrying out reforms similar to those 
taking place in France. Choiseul's plan for the colonies, 
particularly those in the French Antilles, constituted a 
complete overhaul of colonial and military administration. 
He placed the burden of defense in the hands of regular 
French troops sent from the Métropole instead of the 
ancientijttilices instituted in the colonies.
iHenri Blet, Histoire de la colonisation française 
(ParisI B. Arthaud, 1946), p. See also Etienne
François de Choiseul, Mémoire de Monsieur de Choiseul Remis 
au Roi en 1765 (Parist Charles Giraud, ISSI), pp. 17-19. 
Tnereinafter cited as Choiseul, Mémoire.)
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The colonies which contributed significantly in 
realizing the plan and program of Choiseul were Saint 
Domingue, discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1492, and 
a group of islands called îles du Vent.^ The latter 
comprises Martinique, Guadeloupe and its dependancies 
whichkinclude the islands of Marie-Galante, La Désirade, 
the îles des Saintes, and the île de la petite Terre.
These are located east and south of Guadeloupe. Two 
other small islands also came under the jurisdiction of 
Guadeloupe: Saint Barthélémy and Saint Martin, situated
approximately 140 miles northwest of Guadeloupe. 3
These islands and French Guyane constituted the 
French Antilles after 1763. They formed a connecting link 
of forces which Choiseul attempted to strengthen and which
2saint Domingue was the western third of the island of 
Santo Domingo (Hispaniola). It was formally ceded by Spain 
to France in the Treaty of Byswick in 1697. Saint Domingue 
survived the Seven Years' War and in 1795# by the treaty of 
Basel, Spain ceded the rest of Santo Domingo to France. In 
I8O8-O9 it was restored to Spain and subsequently ruled by 
Haiti for 22 years before gaining independence in 1844.
^Guadeloupe, the largest territory of the French 
Antilles, was discovered by Columbus in 1493. In I674 it 
came under French jurisdiction and became a dependency of 
Martinique until 1775* The British ruled in Guadeloupe 
between 1759 to I763 and again briefly in 1794. In 1810 
they took it again and retained it until 1816 when it was 
returned to the French Government. In I635 Martinique was 
colonized by the Com«AJpnie des îles d it came 
under the French crown in 1674. In the latter half of the 
seventeenth century Martinique was repeatedly attacked by 
the English and the Dutch but it was not captured until 
1762 when the English held it for one year. It remained in 
French hands except for the years 1794 to 1892 and I809 to 
1814 when it was again in English hands. After 1814 it was 
restored permanently to France.
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he referred to as Prance's "colonial domain,” It was this
chain of colonies which he hoped to use in order to
establish ”.,.a European system in America...” But to
accomplish this France would have
...to transmit to America [French Antilles] twenty- 
four battalions which, the islands would discover 
that would be necessary to them, [and which] would 
be maintained in supplies as in ammunition by the . 
squadrons of Your Majesty in this part of the world.*
This was basically the plan which Choiseul sought to 
implement in Saint Domingue, Martinique, Guadeloupe, the 
îles du Vent, and in Guyane. The plan was expected to be 
strengthened by Spanish aid arising out of the Pacte de 
Famille. The main concern of France, therefore, would be 
to prepare French colonial forces in readiness for a war 
which Choiseul expected as soon as Pitt returned to office.
In order to implement Choiseul's plan in the Caribbean, 
three types of action were undertaken: re-colonization,
administrative changes, and military reforms. In his 
re-colonization scheme Choiseul attempted to populate the 
French sugar colonies with white settlers and to establish 
large centers of white population. He believed that a 
sufficiently strong white settlement would not only stimulate
*Choiseul, Mémoire, op. cit.. pp. 19-20. ”(J'ai voulu 
établir) en Amérique un système d'Europe...faire passer en 
Amérique vingt-quatre bataillons qui trouveraient dans les 
îles ce qui leur serait nécessaire, resteraient pendant 
toute la guerre en Amérique, et seraient alimentés tant en 
vivres qu'en munitions, par les escadres de Votre Majesté 
dans cette partie du monde. ” The plan Mas been discussed 
in Chapter three.
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the colonies economically but would avert uprising among 
the natives, and more Important, would help to defend the 
colonies In times of war. He realized that during the 
Seven Years' War, England had drawn substantial support 
from her white settlers who fought very ably for the mother 
country. This support was lacking In the French Islands 
where a native population had always outnumbered the 
colonists. In 17531 for example. Saint Domingue had I8,04l 
whites compared with 15^,859 natives. Guadeloupe, for the 
same year, reported 10,538 whites and 46,653 natives In 
comparison with Martinique's 12,068 whites and 65,905 
natives.^ In each Island the native population— slaves and 
free Negroes— predomlnanbly exceeded the colonists and 
consequently posed some threat to the stability of the 
colonies. During the war both white and native populations 
were reduced sharply. Thus In 1763, to cite one case.
Saint Domingue had 1,600 whites to 6,000 nativesi however, 
the white population was of a higher percentage than In 
the past.^
With the conclusion of the peace of Paris In 1763
5ch. André Julien, Lea Français en Amérique 1713-1784 
(Parlai Centre de Documentation Universitaire, n.d, ),
PP,39-41. No figure Is available for Guyane In 1753i but 
In 1749 there were 456 whites to 5,^71 slaves.
^Gabriel Hanotaux et Alfred Martlneau, Histoire des 
eolonlea fmamcalses et de 1'expansion de la Prance dans 
^  monde Tpârlsî L'Hlstolre Nationale, 1929), I, 470^79, 
(Hereinafter cited as Histoire des colonies françaises.)
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Choiseul opened a new era of colonial activities. He sent 
French settlers to the East Indies to colonize the îles de 
France and de Bourbon. In the West Indies he focused 
attention on three potential areas.^ The first was at 
Sainte-Lucie where Choiseul despatched 800 planters in
1763. The venture failed because of the severity of the 
tropical climate and the survivors returned to France 
within a year.® A second expedition in the same year was 
sent to La Désirade, but it too suffered the same fate.9 
The failure to create new colonies in the two small 
islands did not affect the colonizing program of Choiseul, 
for he had ordered a third expedition in I763. This was 
sent to Kourou in Guyane where he expended considerable 
funds and despatched a large number of planters to create 
a new colony with military bases to support his war plans 
in the Caribbean.
Tpor a brief discussion of the colonization in the 
East Indies see chapter two.
®Julien, Les Français en Amérique 1713-1784. op. cit., 
p. 40. Sainte-Lucie was first colonized by the British in 
1605. The French re-colonized it in I660. Britain took it 
back in 1722. Again France took possession in 1743 and held 
it to 1748 when it was declared a neutral island. Captured 
by the English in 1762, it was returned to Prance the 
following year. After it was captured again by England in 
1778, the island passed several times between English and 
French rule until 1814 when it was finally declared a crown 
colony under Britain.
9ibid. La Désirade, a dependant colony of Guadeloupe, 
is situated a few miles east and south of the island,
^^The Kourou expedition is treated in a separate 
chapter below.
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The military objectives which motivated Prance's 
colonial ventures in the Caribbean after 1?63 were not 
entirely separated from economic concerns. Growth in trade 
and industry enabled the colony to maintain the local 
militia and to help support the regular troops from the 
Métropole. Porlthis reason, during the Seven Years' War 
attempts were made to foster colonial trade with other 
Caribbean islands. After the war, economic reforms were 
precipitated by colonists who urged that commercial 
activities should not be restricted by the local governor 
and that they should be given a free hand in their use of 
slave labor. Pressed by the need to initiate changes 
Choiseul appointed on October 1, 1?6^, a deputy from 
Martinique, Jean Dubac, as Premier Cmnmis. to represent the 
colonies in Prance and to carry out economic measures in 
the Prench Caribbean that would increase the prosperity of 
the colonies. But the work of Dubac in curtailing the 
tyrannical power of the local governors in order to give 
greater control to the planters led to a new situation in 
which the colonies began to serve the exclusive interest of 
the Métropole. In effect, Dubac introduced the system of 
the Exclusif which made the colonies provinces of the 
mother country and centers of Prench commerce. This system 
gave greater commercial advantages to the Métropole than to 
the local planters, and it assured Choiseul that the colonies 
were able to help support his reformed measures.
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Apart from economic reforms Choiseul passed a number 
of ordinances to improve the administration in the French 
colonies. He initiated on March 24, I763, an order 
suppressing some of the privileges of the governors and 
establishing four govemor-generals at Saint Domingue, 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, and C a y e n n e . T h e  ordinance 
delegated areas of responsibility to the governors and 
intendants, a course of action necessitated by the continued 
abuse of powers by colonial officials. The measure sought 
to curb the governor's use eg the milices in dictating and 
enhancing his powers. In addition, Choiseul replaced the 
bipartite system of administering the colonies by a single 
chamber, the chamber of agriculture, and assigned to it 
only advisory functions. Supreme authority for governing 
the colonies was vested in a superior council located at 
Martinique, Saint Domingue, Guadeloupe, and Cayenne, with 
representation at Versailles through a deputy. ^  The order 
creating the councils came in February, I766. On the 
question of disharmony and inequality which existed among 
the colonials and, in his attempt to remove trade monopoly
^^Hanotaux and Martineau, Histoire des colonies 
fryicaise. op. cit., pp. 478-479. Cayenne is the ancient 
colony and capital of Guyane. The first settlers in the 
colony came as early as l604.
^^Ordonnance du 24 Mars, 1763# A.N., Col. A. 8, 
fols. 340-357.
Julien, Les Français en Amérique 1713-1784. op. cit., 
p. 4 5, The administrative reforms are discussed further 
below.
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which the planters exploited, Choiseul wrote a Mémoire
asking that the settlers begin "...to re-establish as much
as possible, by means that I indicate, equality among the
inhabitants..." Adding further that agreement among the
people and the officials and between the two major races
was essential to economic development, political stability,
and strong defense, Choiseul wrotei
If we do not disregard the means that I have mentioned 
in order to augment the forces of the colonies, inde­
pendently of increasing the population, there would be 
nothing to fear about the intention of our enemies in 
spite of the superiority of their marine.
Choiseul's reference to "the means" concerned improve­
ment of relations with the various economic interest groups 
including free Negroes. He urged government officials 
"...to understand the Negroes for what they are and to 
engage them in government according to proper means.
He meant that humane treatment should be given to Negroes 
in order to avert the possibility of revolt and to maintain 
order, especially in times of war.
^  Mémoire sur les moyens de peupler les colonies et 
d'en augmenter la force sans dépense de la Métropole, A.N., 
Colonies en général. Col. F^C. ?• fol. 39. "Rétablir autant 
qu'il serait possible par les voies que j'indique l'égalité 
entre les habitants. " "Si on ne dédaigne pas les moyens 
que j'indiquerai pour augmenter la force des colonies indé­
pendamment de tout acroissement de population on n'aurait 
rien A craindre pour elles de l'ambition de nos ennemis 
malgré la supériorité de leur marine. "
l^Ibid.. fol. ^3. "...connaître les nègres pour ce 
qifils sont et les attacher au gouvernement par les moyens 
proposés. "
It Is more significant to note that the March» 1763• 
Ordinance dealt with military reforms. Writing to the Comte 
de Belzunce, lleutemant general of the army and governor 
lieutenant general of the îles sous le Vent, and to 
De Clugny, Intendant of the îles sous le Vent. Cholseul 
said I
Various events occurred to the French colonies of 
America during the last war. Having made sufficiently 
clear that they are In a poor state to resist and 
defend themselves. His Majesty took. Immediately after 
the peace, the resolution to remedy vices found In 
their settlement, and to make new arrangements for 
them to secure all possible means to augment their 
condition during peace and to have sufficient forces 
for defense In time of war.16
By "new arrangements " Cholseul signalled that major proposals
would be Introduced at Versailles to be expedited In the
colonies. It was these proposals which came on March 24,
1763» and remained In force In the colonies until the French
Revolution, with the exception of Saint Domlngue where It
was modified In I766 and again In 1773.
The military measures constituted the major thrust
lÔMémolre du Bol, Isles sous le Vent, Année I763,
A.N., Minutes des Dépêches et des Ordres du Bol, Col. B. 
116, fols. 142-143. "Les divers événements qui sont arrivés 
aux colonies françaises de l'Amérique pendant la dernière 
guerre, alant (sic) assez fait connaître combien elles sont 
peu en état de résister et de se défendre. Sa Majesté a 
pris Immédiatement après la paix la résolution, d'une part 
de remédier aux vices qui se sont trouvés dans leur con­
stitution, et de l'autre de faire de nouveaux arrangements 
pour leur procurer tous les moyens possibles d'augmenter 
leur culture pendant la paix et des forces suffisantes pour 
pouvoir être défendue en temps de guerre."
^7ordonnance du 24 Mars, 1763, A.N., Col. A. 8, 
fols. 340-357.
95
of Cholseul*8 colonial activities after the Peace of Paris. 
He saw that the defense forces in the colonies were in a 
devastated condition at the termination of the Seven Years' 
War, He discovered that when French troops withdrew from 
the Caribbean bases with the cessation of hostilities, the 
only defense remaining was the ancient milices. But the 
old institution was obsolete and could not serve in the 
military plan of Cholseul. The militiamen were inadequately 
trained and the milices poorly organized. The training 
program had been the work of governors who lacked military 
experience. A Mémoire from Le Mercier de la Rivière, 
governor of Martinique in I763. described that the colonial 
governors lacked military skill and experience and conse­
quently were unable to give leadership and organization to 
the milices of which they were in charge. As examples. 
Mercier referred to his predecessor, the Marquis de 
Beauhamais, and to Le Vassor de la Touche, governor of the 
French Windward Islands, neither of whom had any militsœy 
credentials. It was this lack of training, explained 
Mercier, that accounted for the conquest of Martinique by 
the English in 1?62.^®
In the period before 1763, the milices were governed 
by no systematic policy and militiamen were hired merce­
naries. Whereas in the English colonies militia duty fell
^®I^ Mercier de la Rivière, Mémoire. August 5» 1762,
A.N., Col. C. 8, fol. 64.
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on poor whites, in the French colonies the poor whites
ceased to do guard duty. Even the mercenaries themselves
were given no military training or experience except In
times of emergencies for which they turned out unprepared.
Military laws had required militiamen to be in arms for
exercise only upon every alarm given of an approaching
ship from sea. Each time, to cite an example, the topsail
or mast of a ship was seen from the Island, a shot was
fired followed by a series of other shots throughout the
Island to signal the congregating of the mllltla. There
was no way to prevent a false alarm If the approaching ship
was French, Sometimes the planters took the law Into their
own hands and declined to turn out to defend the island
when they expected a convoy from England, The system of
milices was Irregular and Ineffective, and everywhere In
the French colonies the ancient Institution had been
deteriorating.
In addition to the milices the colonies suffered
militarily from an Ineffective system of fortifications.
These had been built by Negro labor under the system of the
corvée. Again the system reflected on the management of
the local governors who sometimes found It expedient to
suspend the corvée for want of funds, usually In kind, to
pay for workmanship. The system of corvée was unpopular,
disliked even by colonials who feared that It forced their 
slaves Into company with other slaves from several estates.
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thereby providing opportunity for corruption of manners or 
for plots against their masters. The use of free Negroes 
in both the militia and the corvée contributed to a weak 
defense and to the possibility of rebellion in the colonies. 
The inhabitants feared that once a revolt started it would 
spread to other colonies. It was such fear that brought 
into question the reliability of Negro military service and 
their capacity to conduct themselves respectfully. Accord­
ing to Mercier, the use of Negroes as soldiers and for the 
corvée system was useless i he added that they were lazy, 
cowardly, and unwilling to bear arms. This partly explains 
the nature of the system of defense and fortification in 
the period prior to 1763.
There were three types of fortifications existing in 
the colonies up to 1763. First, there was a system of 
batteries along the coast of the islandst second, there 
were regular forts defending important towns; and third, 
there were places of refuge in the mountains. These had 
proved inadequate during the Seven Years* War, resulting 
in English conquest of Guadeloupe and Martinique in 1762, 
Besides the absence of trained militiamen, the forts lacked 
adequate artillery. Guns were without emplacements and 
gunpowder was not always available,^9
It was these conditions that led the March, 1763, 
ordinance to provide for suppression of the ancient milices
Mercier de la Rivière, Mémoire. op. oit.. fol. 64.
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and to replace them with regular French troops from the 
Métropole, The ordinance also condemned the system of 
fortification; it provided for the building of new ones, 
and for the stocking of supplies and artillery in magazines. 
Troops were to be recruited at the île de He, France, with 
a permanent depot to be staffed initially with a commandant 
and four companies but increasing in a few years to a large 
officer corps. All military personnel needed for the 
various colonies were to be recruited at Ré. The depot 
was made port of embarcation as well as of reception of 
troops returning to France.20 To facilitate and expedite 
communication and supplies between France and the colonies, 
paquebots were operative from the port of Rochefort. In 
1763 six were in operation. From the port of Bordeaux
provisions and goods were despatched for the maintenance of
21the troops. These changes came about from the general 
ordinance on March 24, I763. Subsequently, a number of 
specific ordinsmces were enacted for each colony in an 
attempt to repair or replace their defenses and prepare them 
in accordance with Choiseul's scheme for war.
2^Mémoire sur les colonies françaises de l'Amérique, 
1765-1790, A.N., Colonies en Général, Col. F. 2, C7,
Carton 8, No. 13. See also A.N., Col. A. 14, fol. 3 2, 
and A.N,, Col. A. 15, fol. 9.
21ordonnance concernant 1'établissement des 
Paquebots, du 3I, juillet, I763, A.N., Col. B. 116, 




Military reforms for the Island of Saint Domlngue 
began during the last phase of the Seven Years' War. In 
an attempt to strengthen local defense, Cholseul ordered 
the Comte de Belzunce, commandant of the French troops
stationed at the island, to reorganize the milices Into
22companies or battalions. Belzunce reformed the local 
force, consisting of thirty-four companies, of which each 
had fifty men. The milices and the regular French troops 
together strengthened the Island's defense, but the burden 
of providing security remained largely with the troops from 
the Métropole. After the Peace of Paris, however, France 
assumed complete responsibility for defending the Island.
On March 25, 1763# an ordinance was passed calling for 
suppression of the milices and establishment of regular 
French troops.^3
In Saint Domlngue, as In the other French Islands, the 
milices served little purpose. To the ministry of the marine  ^
which Cholseul directed until I766, It was "mediocre" and 
useless In war. The Inhabitants saw It as serving the 
Interest of the petlts-blancs and as a tool of the governor 
for military rule. Because of flagrant abuse. De Clugny, 
Intendant at Saint Domlngue, 1760-1763, and a proprietor on
^^Ordonnance du 30 avril, 1?62, A.N., Col. A. 8,
1761-1763, fols. 121-122.
^^ordonnance du 25 mars, 1763, A.N., Col. A. 8, I76I-
1763, fol. 212.
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the Island, advocated removal of the ancient institution.
But Its removal In I763 and the substitution of French
regulars created other problems. By emphasizing external
rather than Internal defense, French troops were alienated
from the Inhabitants. The result was uprising on the Island
leading to the re-establishment of the milices under the
title of troupes royales on January 15t I765.
His Majesty ordered the Comte d'Sstalng to re-establish 
the mllltla of Saint Domlngue. It had been decided 
there, moreover, by consideration of the help which 
the clever governors could be able to have from the 
mllltla In the event of an Invasion.
Restoration of the mllltla did not mean removal of the 
regulars from local defense; rather the mllltla served as a 
liaison between the population and the alienated military.
It was mainly responsible for suppressing local uprising 
and for augmenting French troops In time of war. This was 
expressed In a Mémoire from Cholseul stating that the 
milices could serve In the defense of the Island. "The 
Islander, exposed continually to the descent of corsairs who 
surround the island in time of war, must still be armed 
against the enemies from outside for the security of
^^Mémolre du Bol pour servir d'instruction â M. le 
Chevalier, prince de Rohan, chef d'escadre der armée navale, 
gouverneur lieutenant général et Intendant de îles sous le 
vent, 18 mars, I76O, A.N., Col. B. 123, fol. 59. The Comte 
d'Estalng became governor of Saint Domlngue on January 1,
1764. "Sa Majesté a ordonné â M. le Comte d'Estalng le 
rétablissement des milices de Saint Domlngue. Elle y avAlt 
encore été déterminée par la considération des secours que 
les gouverneurs habiles pouvaient tirer de ces milices dans 
le cas d'une Invasion.”
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themselves and their possessions.Be-establishment of 
the milices, therefore, guaranteed internal security, but 
the settlers objected to the reconstitution and restoration 
of the militia. They rejected integrating with colored 
militiamen. The Negroes, on the other hand, tried to escape 
service in the local force. Militia officers, generally 
disliked by the inhabitants for their authority, also 
objected to the re-establishment of the ancient institution.
The Comte d'Estaing, successor to Belzunce as gover­
nor and commander-in-chief of the French troops in Saint 
Domlngue, aided in restoring the militia and directed in 
reforming the military and the defense of the island. In a 
memoir to him, Louis XV specified three military objectives 
for the administration of the colony. The first advised on 
the distribution of troops. Your "...primary object upon 
arriving must be to distribute in main places of the colony.. 
the six battalions which will remain in garrison at Saint 
Domlngue.Earlier, the governors retained troops only
Z^Mdmoire du Roi, 18 mars, 1?66, A.N., Col. B., Vol. 
123, fol. 59. "Que des insulaire exposés sans cesseaux des­
centes des corsaires qui entourent l'isle en temps de guerre 
devoient encore être armés contre les ennemis du dehors pour 
la sûreté de leurs personnes et de leurs possessions,"
^^Mémoire du Roi, Cayenne. Anne 176%, A.N., Minutes 
des Dépêches et Ordres du Roi, Col. B. 119. fols, 20-35, 
(Hereinafter cited as Minutes des Dépêches.) In addition 
to being governor of Saint Domlngue, d'Estalng was governor 
general of the îles du vent and lieutenant general of the 
army and navy. "Son principal objet, en arrivant, doit être 
premièrement de distribuer dans les principaux quartiers de 
la Colonie..,les six bataillons qui resteront en garrison à 
St. Domlngue."
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In certain important areas, for example, in the vicinity of 
his own residence and in important towns, leaving many 
places unprotected. In redistributing the troops a greater 
degree of protection was attained. The second objective 
concerned improvement of fortifications. Since the coast­
line of Saint Domlngue extended 180 leagues, garrison 
protection was necessary and was to be provided by the French 
marine. Old forts were to be repaired and dockyards 
improved, including the building and stocking of magazines. 
The third objective raised the question of the possibility 
of war and the construction of an arsenal at the Cap. "The 
establishment of this last station is also necessary in 
order to forbid entrance to the English corsairs who take 
refuge in time of war to intercept our commerce.. .and to 
be in closer proximity to attack Jamaica in time of war. "^7 
Other communiqués to Estaing reminded him of his military 
duties and the needed preparation of the army to improve 
defenses of the island. Louis XV wrote in Hay, 1?6^, that 
the governor's mission was "...to set up a garrison which 
can be necessary in peace as well as In war. The subject
^^Mémoire du Roi, Cayenne. Anne 1764, A.N., Minutes 
des Dépêches, Col. B. 119, fol. 25. "1"établissement de ce
dernier poste comme étant aussi nécessaire pour en défendre 
l'entrée aux corsaire anglois qui s'y réfugient en temps de 
guerre pour intercepter notre commerce...et être plus 
aportée d'attaquer la Jamaïque en temps de guerre."
^^Envoy d'un Mémoire concernant la police et la défense 
des colonies en paix comme en guerre, mai, 1?64. Minutes des 
Dépêches, o£. cit.. fol. 113, "...et de proposer la garnison
qui petit lui etre nécessaire en paix comme en guerre."
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of defense was raised again in September of the scune year 
when Louis XV gave instructions regarding the kind of 
armaments to be used if war came. "We propose, therefore, 
to agree on a model fusil that is not too heavy, that is 
good and strong enough for the inhabitant to operate in 
time of war and also for a chase, "^9 With the infusion of 
French regiments and artillery the defense of Saint Domlngue 
was vastly strengthened. In I763, for example, the island 
received the six battalions soon followed by 100 men from 
the royal artillery corps and two companies of canonnières- 
bombardiers. But Estaing did not carry out the reforms as 
expected; consequently, he was recalled to Versailles in 
1766 and was succeeded by Prince Rohan-Monbazon, called 
Prince Bohan, ^ 0
The new governor arrived at Saint Domlngue with a 
large fleet designed to increase the size of the island’s 
marine, and in I768 he organized a legion of Saint 
Domlngue consisting of 400 recruits from the île de Ré.
The new recruits, organized into thirty companies a year 
later, contributed substantially to the defensive strength 
of the island. Three of the thirty companies consisted
^9un projet d'armement. Minutes des Dépêches, 
op. cit.. fol, 185, "On propose en conséquence de convenir 
dTun modèle de fusil qui sans être trop lourd, soit assez 
bon et assez solide pour que les habitants s'en servent en 
temps de guerre et mime pour chasser,"
^^Ordonnance du 13 Janvier, I768, A.N,, Minutes des
Dépêches, Col, B, I30, fol, 41,
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of 60 grenadiêres each, another three of 102 men each, and 
each of the remaining companies of 104 fusllllSrs. The 
companies were distributed throughout the Island to cover 
every area susceptible to an Invasion.31
Because of the Maloulnes crisis, the supply of soldiers 
and artilleries to Saint Drailngue and the other French 
colonies Increased greatly during I768 and 1770. The crisis, 
which nearly erupted Into a major conflict between England 
and Spain, Involved France through the Pacte de Famille.
It led to a "war scare" that significantly Increased French 
military preparations In the Caribbean. After two years of 
negotiation France acted as conciliator. The crisis came 
to an end, but the affair had caused considerable alarm.
The additional reinforcements which Saint Domlngue received 
on March, 1768, consisted of two companies of workers, and 
In August, a regiment of 500 soldiers arrived, followed by 
two more companies of workers totalling 100 men; In December 
two companies of canonnières-bombardiers were received. 
Consequently, the military build-up on the Island consti­
tuted a formidable f o r c e ,32
Indication of the strength of the colonial force at
3^Lettres communes & M. le Chevalier Prince de Rohan 
de le Bongard, 12 janvier, 1769, A.N,, Minutes des Dépêches, 
Col. B. 132, fol. 47.
^^Ordonnance du mars, 1768, A.N., Minutes des Dépêches, 
Col. B. 130, fol. 69. See also Ordonnance du 11 août, 1768,
Ibld.. fol. 107.
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Saint Domlngue at the end of 1?68 Is seen from the following 
list describing the type and volume of ammunition and 
artillery despatched,33
From Bordeaux
28 cannons with a calibre of 24
5 cannons with a calibre of 18
2500 rounds of cannon balls with a calibre of 18
1000 rounds of cannon balls with a calibre of 4
Prom Rochefort*
103 cannons with calibre of 24
9 cannons with calibre of 18
96 cannons with calibre of 12
2000 rounds of cannon balls with a calibre of 8 
9 Iron mortars 
20 grills for 80 batteries 







(boulets ramés) with calibre of 24
with calibre of 18 
with calibre of 12 
with calibre of 8 
with calibre of 4
From Toulon*
500 Qulntaux of powder
8 cannons with calibre of 4 
3500 rounds of cannon balls with calibre of 24 
30 Iron mortars 
1680 bombs 
2000 hand grenades
In 1769 the volume was greater. Hand grenades, for
33ordonnance du 13 janvier, 1768, A.N., Minutes des
Dépêches, Col. B. I30, fols. 71-72.
106
example, were increased by 25,000. In the following year 
the same quota was allotted. Gunpowder, flint, bombs, 
mortars, bullets, and fusils were also increased substan­
tially. 3^
Martinique
The island of Martinique witnessed increased military 
preparation similar to Saint Domingue. k military base was 
established in Martinique and in Guadeloupe, Choi seul 
anticipated that if war came both islands could support 
twenty-four battalions at little expense to the Métropole.
In his 1765 memoir to Louis XV, he said that a war against 
England would not cost France as much as it would cost the 
enemies because the French colonies would be able to support 
the army of the Métropole and provide for their maintenance. 35 
Earlier, in 1763, Choiseul had initiated a measure assessing 
the colonies for the support of troops and for the cost of 
reforms. In the case of Saint Domingue it was four million 
livres » for Martinique it was fifteen million livres.36 
The selection of Martinique as a military base was
3^Bnvoy de l'état des articles nécessaires pour le 
service de l'artillerie demandé par les administrateurs de 
Saint Domingue, Guadeloupe,et Cayenne, le 21 août, 1767, 
A.N., Minutes des Dépêches, Col. B. 128, fols. 158-I6O. 
(Hereinafter cited as Envoy de l'état des articles. )
35choiseul, Mémoire. op. cit., pp. 8-9.
^^Ordonnance du I9 août, 1763, A.N., Minutes des
Dépêches, Col, B. II6, fol, l4l.
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due to the Island's strategic location, being windward to 
the lies du Vent, and its good harbors. These advantages, 
during the Seven Years' War,for,example, had accorded to 
the island the privilege of the seat of administration for 
the îles du Vent. In this arrangement Martinique profited 
by imposing tariff restrictions on all vessels entering 
the French Antilles. All French ships, to cite an example, 
were required to stop at Martinique. In this way the 
island obtained special revenue and trade. At the termi­
nation of the war, the island lost the economic advantage 
and the seat of administration of the îles du Vent. An 
Ordinance in 1763 inaugurated separate governments for 
Martinique and Sainte-Lucie, thereby giving the adminis­
tration of the remaining îles du Vent— les Saintes, la 
Désirade, Marie-Galante, Saint Barthélémy and the French 
part of Saint Martin— to the government of Guadeloupe.
This was part of the administrative reforms of Choiseul. 
Nevertheless, the military direction of the islands con­
tinued to be held by the government and armed forces at 
Martinique, a role which was continued through the period 
of the American revolution. Hence, Martinique played an 
important militeiry part among French colonies in the 
Caribbean. Its strategic location also made the island the 
chief naval station for continental vessels during the 
revolution in the English colonies in America.
Aware of these advantages, Choiseul conceived a plan
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in January, 1764, to overhaul the defense of Martinique.
The plan was laid out in a document to Estaing. It contained 
a system of fortification under De Hochemore as director, 
and provided for a staff of engineers. It stated that the 
purpose was defense and security of the island from "...the 
fear that this colony must not have a new seize in a next 
war."37 The document solicited improving canals, repairing 
Port Royal, constructing a pâté opposite Port Royal and 
preparing a citadelle on Mount Gamier ",..capable of 
stopping every English effort to make a new seizm-e of 
Martinique by force (jand} ... in order to defend Port Royal 
and its vicinity." It added that Louis XV*8 "...intention 
is always to fortify Martinique in order to have security 
from an English enterprise,"38 The project cost France and 
the colony fifteen million livres but it was "...absolutely 
necessary..." to assure defense of the Prench. In his 
Mémoire to Louis XV Choiseul paid special tribute to Ennery, 
governor of Martinique, and to the Comte de Nolivos, 
governor of Guadeloupe, for progress made in the works of
37Mémoire du Roi, 2 janvier, 1764, A.M., Minutes des 
Dépêches, Col. B. 119, fols. 3^-35• "la crainte que cette 
colonie ne soit de nouveau enlevée A une prochaine guerre."
38Mémoire du Roi, 2 janvier, 1764, A.N., Minutes des 
Dépêches, Col. B. 119, fols. 34-35. "...capable d'arrêter 
tous les efforts des Anglois s'ils venaient entreprendre de 
nouveau le siège de la Martinique...par la force,..pour 
défendre le fort Royal et les environs...son intention est 
toujours de fortifier la Martinique pour la mettre A couvert 
d'une entreprise de la part des Anglois. "
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fortification. He said that their^contributions "...are
good..." and "...are essential for the defense of America."39
As in the case of Saint Domingue, the milices of
Martinique were suppressed and replaced by regular French
troops provided by the general ordinance of March 24, 1763.
Similarly, they were re-established in 1?68, with the
purpose of strengthening the defense of the island. Given
military training, the militiamen contributed to the security
of Martinique and its de pendancy, Sainte-Lucie. Article
Twenty-four of the ordinance for re-establishing the militia
stated that "...in time of war and in the case where the
militia would be in active duty with the French regiments,
4othey would be commanded only by a colonel... " This 
implied that the militia was able to share in the island's 
defense, but that the burden of defense rested primarily 
on French troops.
The supply of troops and artillery to Martinique 
increased during the "war scare" of 1768-I770. The 
island had received in 1766 a squadron of 6OO men, followed 
a year later by two detachments of artillery from le Havre
39choiseul, Mémoire. op. cit., pp. 19-20.
^®Ordonnance du 1®^ septembre, I768, A.N., Minutes 
des Dépêches, Col. A. 12, fol. 87. "En temps de guerre 
et dans le cas où les milices se trouveraient en service 
avec les régiments de France, celles-ci ne pouront être 
commandés que par un colonel..."
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and Bordeaux,With the crisis beginning In I768, two 
companies of workers arrived ",, .armed and equipped as 
grenadiers of the legion,,." of M a r t i n i q u e , ^2 ^ company
of gens d 'armes In the milices was Instituted and by 1770 
the projects of fortification were near completion,
Guadeloupe
In manyxrespects the pattern of military preparation 
was the same for the Island of Guadeloupe, and to a lesser 
degree, the îles du Vent, A specific ordinance on March 25, 
1763, ordered structural changes In the government and the 
military. Administratively, the island was brought under 
firmer control from the Métropolei militarily, regular 
Prench troops replaced the mllltla,
Improvement of defenses In Guadeloupe was based on the 
submission of a report In order "...to know by the report 
which pieces of artillery are neeessary for the defense of 
the colony, The report indicated the existence of
^ICholseul, Au sujet du passage de 6OO hommes de 
recrues pour être Incorporées dans les régiments qui sont 
A la Martinique, A.N., Minutes des Dépêches, Col. B. 125, 
fol. 507, and Envoy de deux états de l'artillerie, Ibld..
127, fol. 492.
^2ordonnance du 20 mars, 1768, A N,, Minutes des 
Dépêches, Col. A. 12, fol. 89t see also Ordonnance du 
20 septembre, I768, Ibld.. fol. 91.
^3ordonnance du 25 mars, 1763, A.N,, Minutes des 
Dépêches, Col, A. 8, fol. 211,
^^Ordonnance du 28 septembre, 1763, A.N,, Minutes des 
Dépêches, Col, B. II6 , fols, 379-380, "Savoir par les états 
quelles sont les pièces d'artillerie qui sont nécessaires 
pour la défense de la colonie."
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l40 pieces of artillery, but these were in poor condition. 
Thus, in January, 1764, Choiseul ordered immediate repairs 
and building of fortifications. Concurrently, he despatched 
a squadron of 66 soldiers armed with mortars, cannons, 
bullets, and gunpowder. He transferred to Guadeloupe the 
Prench regiments of Saintonge, stationed at Cayenne, 
consisting of three battalions. These forces had been held 
as a reserve at Cayenne for the purpose of augmenting French 
forces in the Caribbean. As will be seen in the following 
chapter, the transfer of these forces from Cayenne was 
basic to Choiseul's plan of colonizing and militarizing in 
G u y a n e . Additionally, Choiseul despatched to Guadeloupe 
a shipment of bayonets, muskets, and gunpowder and in 1768 
re-established the milices which had been abolished in 
1763.^^ These measures were expedited with some urgency, 
due to the Nalouines conflict, as reflected in a communiqué 
in 1770I
I requested you. Sir, by my despatch of the 22nd of 
September last, from the observation of H. d'Ennery 
and H. Boeuf on the weakness of fortifications made 
with dirt [soil, earth], that it was necessary to 
construct them in masonry 1 but the actual circumstances
^^Circulaire aux intendants, janvier, 1764, A.N., 
Minutes des Dépêches, Col. B. 119, fol. 244.
^Lettre du Roi, 21 décembre, 1767, A.N., Minutes 
des Dépêches, Col, B, 127r fol, 587. See also Envoy de 
l'état des articles nécessaires pour le service de 
l'artillerie, 27 août, 1768, ibid.. Col. B. 121, fol, 158; 
and Col. B. 131, fol. 111. See also Ordonnance du l®r 
septembre, 1768, A.N., Minutes des Dépêches, Col. A. 12,
fol. 90.
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call for the greatest speed In putting the îles du 
vent in the best state of defense possible.
The need to accelerate defensive preparations "...for 
the next rupture..." was expressed In several letters, 
memoirs, and other communiqué during the crisis of I768- 
1770. The following decade witnessed no relaxation of that 
need as French ministers strove to complete Choiseul's plan 
for a war of revanche. These ministers Included the Comte 
de Haurepas, acting prime minister, the Comte de Vergennes, 
minister In foreign affairs, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, 
controller of finance, Sartlnes, minister of the marine,
Du May and the Comte de Saint Germain, war ministers. The 
ministers, Vergennes In particular, expected war with 
England; they tried, like Cholseul, to prevent It from 
starting on the continent; and they envisaged, consistent 
with Choiseul's policy, a colonial and maritime war. For 
this reason, and until the actual outbreak of war on the 
American colonies, military preparations In the French 
Caribbean colonies and In French Guyane continued.
^?Au sujet des fortifications aux deux îles, 22 sep­
tembre, 1770, A.N., Minutes des Dépêches, Col. B. 135t 
fol. 227. "Je vous al mandé, M. par ma dépêche du 22 sep­
tembre, dernier, d'après les observations de M. d'Ennery et 
M. le Boeuf sur le peu de solidité des fortifications en 
terre, qu'il fallait les faire en maçonnerie, mais les 
circonstances actuelles exigeant la plus grande diligence 
pour mettre les îles du vent dans le meilleur état de 
défense possible."
CHAPTER VI
GUYANE, AN ËXAHPI£ OP CHOISEUL'S PLAN FOR WAR
The colonial domain and military bases which Choiseul 
envisaged in his plan for a war of revenge encompassed a 
vast area stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to French 
Guyane. French possessions in this span of the Caribbean 
sea were both limited and scattered. It was hoped, however, 
that a military rearmament of these possessions would 
adequately provide France with forces needed to accomplish 
French foreign policy after 1763.
Choiseul's design in Guyane was primarily concerned 
with an augmentation of the defense at the ancient settle­
ment of Cayenne similar to the program expedited in 
Martinique, Saint Domingue, and Guadeloupe. He also 
attempted to strengthen the French possession in Guyane by 
establishing new settlements which would contain sufficient, 
easily accessible reinforcements and supplies to aid the 
main French forces in the Caribbean. The Guyanese scheme 
contributed substantially to the inception and formation of 
Choiseul's plan for a war of revenge and to the strategy of 
diversion. For these reasons, and not to exclude an interest
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in commercial expansion in Guyane and a desire to replace 
the loss of Canada and Louisiana, Prance embarked on an 
expansive colonization program in the ancient colony 
following the Peace of Paris. Guyane, therefore, played a 
vital part in Choiseul's plan for war, a part which 
historians seem to overlook but which constituted an 
essential ingredient of French militarism in the Caribbean. 
Although French military objectives were primary in Guyane, 
the secondary considerations were significant.
Economic interests and commercial enterprises in 
Guyane were of long standing. Actually, such activities 
originated as early as the seventeenth century under the 
direction of Colbert in the reign of Louis XIV. Colbert's 
mercantilist policies brought the settlement of Cayenne 
under the crown and led to a limited occupation of the 
colony at Cayenne. Exploration and studies promoted by 
French scientific societies in the seventeenth century, 
several of which were published. Indicated that the soil of 
Cayenne was rich and that commodities produced there in 
abundance were of demand in Europe. Private companies 
attempted thereafter to gain a monopoly in Cayenne, trading 
with the Indians, and bringing to France such commodities 
as sugar, coffee, and cotton. The undertaking was profit­
able and considerable pressure was exerted on the French 
government throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth
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centuries to found a permanent settlement in Guyane, 1
One of the earliest works urging a permanent settle­
ment came from the pen of Jean de Laon, Sieur d 'Aigrement, 
traveller and explorer in the mid-seventeenth century. His 
account established that Guyane was suitable for habitation 
and that cultivation of the land would not require much 
labor,2 In 1663, Colbert allowed another explorer in Guyane, 
Sieur Lefebvre de la Barre, to form a company, but the wars 
of Louis XIV against the League of Augsburg and of the 
Spanish succession prevented colonization and delayed 
indefinitely any plan to colonize Guyane,^ Two decades 
following the Treaty of Utrecht, however, a Jesuit mission­
ary, Père de Montville, in a letter published in 1736, once 
more created interest in Guyane, He described a wide 
variety of commodities that were grown plentifully in Guyane, 
naming in particular, cacao, sugar, coffee, and cotton, but 
little of a practical nature resulted,^
^Antoine Biet, Voyage de la France Equinoxiale en 
l*Isle de Cayenne (Parisi P. Clouzier, 16o4), p, xxiv.
See also Victor de Nouvion, Extraits des auteurs et 
voyageurs (Paris: de Bëthure, Pion, l844), pp. 39-40,
(Hereinafter cited as Extraits. )
^Sieur d'Aigremont, Relation du voyage des Français 
fait au cap du nord en Amérique, as quoted by Nouvion in 
Extraits, ibid.. pp. 31-34.
3sieur Lefebvre de la Barre, la description de la 
France Equinoxiale (Paris: J. Hibou, l666). Also in
Nouvion. Extraits, o p . cit., pp. 43-44.
^R, Père de Montville, **Extrait d'une lettre du 
R, père de Montville," Mémoire pour l'histoire des sciences 
et des beaux-arts. I (January, 1 ^ ) ,  Ô2^-83é.
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The Mémoire of Gilbert Guillouet, Seigneur 
d'Orvilliers, royal governor at the ancient settlement at 
Cayenne, 1730-1763# once more stimulated Interest In a 
settlement. He wrote that living conditions were favorable, 
that crops were flourishing, and that opportunity was 
unlimited. The Mémoire coincided with Choiseul's creation 
of a plan of revenge sigalnst the English for losses sus­
tained In the Seven Years ' War, and suggested the establish­
ment of a settlement at the mouth of the Kourou river, 
about eighteen miles north of Cayenne. The document 
Impressed Cholseul. It was the publication of the Maison 
Rustique, however, authored by Bruletout de Préfontalne, 
a seigneur of Cayenne from 1742 to 1762, that generated 
greater Interest and that contributed to the colonization 
In Guyane, préfontalne described that life in the ancient 
colony was comfortable and prosperous. He dedicated his 
book to Cholseul, who ordered It published In I763. "The 
object of this work," wrote préfontalne, "has been to be 
useful to the {prospective Inhabitants of Cayenne and to 
the colonies In general. Anticipating that Cholseul 
might seize the opportunity presented to colonize Guyane 
on a large scale, he addressed the future settlers1
^Brûletout de Préfontalne, Malson Rustique A l'usage 
des habltans de la partie de la France équinoxiale connue 
sous le nom de Cayenne (Parisi J. B. Bauche, 1763)» p. 1. 
For an extract of the book see Journal des Bcavans. LXXVI 
(January, 1764), 25-36. (Hereinafter cited as Maison 
Rustique)
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These are not mere speculation or conjectures that I 
offer* it is the experience of twenty years of habitation 
at Cayenne * it is the result of reflections and tests 
confirmed by experience,®
Choiseul, impressed by the book, appointed Préfontaine 
as counsellor of the marine. The appointment coincided with 
the Prench design to remilitarize her Caribbean possessions 
emd to find additional bases. As recommended by Préfontaine, 
Guyane offered a strategic position, Choiseul was aware of 
this as early as 1762 when he had despatched a mission to 
investigate the use of Guyane as a military base during the 
Seven Years' War,7 in I763 Choiseul resuscitated the earlier 
project. He urged Louis XV that a base in the ancient settle- 
ment at Cayenne and a new settlement at Kourou, approximately 
eighteen miles north of Cayenne, would provide easily acces­
sible aid to the French forces in the Caribbean in a war of 
revenge against England, The Maison Rustique encouraged 
Choiseul, although Préfontaine argued for a limited settle­
ment expanding gradually to adjacent areas. But Choiseul was 
urgent. Unlike Préfontaine, he envisaged the settlement as 
"political and military" rather than commercial,^ It was
^préfontalne, Maison Rustique. op. cit., p, 1. "Ce ne 
sont point de simples spéculations ou des conjectures 
hasardées que J'offre, c'est le fruit de vingt ans de séjour 
â Cayenne * c'est le résultat de réflexions et d'épreuves 
confirmées par l'expérience."
7This mission, led by Behague, a governor at Cayenne, 
is discussed later in the chapter,
®Ch, André Julien, Les Français en Amérique (1713-1784) 
(Paris* Centre de Documentation Ikiiversitaire, 1951), p, 92,
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to fit into his larger plan for a war against England, and 
accordingly, he ordered préfontalne to return to Guyane in 
1763 to commence building at least tentative accomodations 
for the 14,000 settlers soon to be sent.
In addition to Préfontaine*8 book, several articles 
advocating colonization in Guyane were published by the 
Academy of the Marine. the Royal Society of London, and 
the Academy of Sciences. And from the pages of the Journal 
des Scavans came a travel account of le Sieur Beilin, a 
member of the Academy of Sciences. The account encouraged 
the French government to explore the ancient colony and to 
colonize it.9 Henry Pauillard, another traveller, showed 
in his report that Guyane possessed the richest soil of 
the French colonies and that it offered a substitute to 
Canada. The report made an impact on Choiseul and offered 
a rationale that Guyane migjht well serve France better 
than Canada. The idea that Guyane was a good investment 
had been propounded even by the philosophes, Montesquieu, 
for example, had stated that the ancient colony was "most 
admirable" and that colonization should be started. In 1763 
that admiration, aided by published reports, led to a wide 
scale colonizing expedition, the expedition at Kourou.
9l8 Sieur Beilin, "Description Géographique de la 
Guyane^ " Journal des Scavan. LXKVIII (November, I763T, 90-103.
Daubigny. Choiseul et la France d'outre mer après
ité ^  r ' "  ^  ^
nâfter i 
lllbid.
le tra de Paris (Paris1 Hachette, 1892), p. 32. 
Tnerei a citea as Choiseul et la France d^outre mer.)
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The argument that Guyane was a good replacement for 
the loss of Canada also contributed to the expedition at 
Kourou. French possession of Canada prior to I763 was a 
greater liability than an asset. The country was huge, 
unproductive, and unpopulated. Unable to maintain its own 
cost of administration, the cession of Canada to Britain 
at the Peace of Paris was not considered a great loss. On 
the other hand, the cession was a major development that 
meant the destruction of the French empire. In an effort 
to resuscitate the empire and to restore France as a 
colonial power, the expedition to Guyane was ordered. The 
Mémoire of Pierre Victor Malouet, inspector of embarkation 
of the colonists for Guyane in 1763# and later governor of 
Guyane in 1777» reported that "...after the peace of Paris 
in 1763, the Due de Choiseul conceived the hope of replacing 
the loss of Canada by a large establishment of European 
cultivators in Guyane."^ It was Choiseul's purpose to 
relocate French Canadians as well as to offer to any other 
French citizens the chance to migrate to the new settlements.
The desire to replace the loss of Canada was, however, 
only a contributing reason for settling Guyane permanently. 
Some historians argue that personal gains accompanied the
IZpierre Victor Malouet, Mémoires de Malouet. le 
Baron Malouet, ed,, 5 vols. (Paris: E. Plon et Cie.,
1874), I, 74. "Après la paix de 1763, le duc de Choiseul 
avait conçu l'espérance de remplacer la perte du Canada 
par un grand établissement de cultivateurs européen tentés 
dans la Guyane."
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colonizing expedition at Kourou and that Choiseul antici­
pated Inheriting large estates In Guyane, Henri Blet wrote 
that Choiseul ",..granted himself a title of hereditary 
fief to all territory colonized,"13 Henri Coudreau stated 
that ",,,Choiseul, In his Intention to remake his fortune, 
gave himself through Louis XV, the territory between Kourou 
and Maronl In order to distribute fiefs to younger members 
of his family who became his vassals, "1^ And Jules Duval 
added that "when the Due de Choiseul cast his eyes on Guyane 
In order to take up an honorable revenge, he obtained a 
title of hereditary fief and shared the property between 
the two branches of his family, Other historians do not 
single out any one factor as responsible for the settlement 
In Guyane, For example, according to J, Salntoyant many 
factors led to French occupation of the colony.
After having lost North America, a great possession of
white population, the Due de Choiseul looked to Guyane
^%enrl Blet, Histoire de la colonisation française 
(ParisI B, Arthaud, 19^6), p, 2B?. "Choiseul se fit concéder 
A titre de fief héréditaire tout le territoire A coloniser,"
l^enrl A, Coudreau, "Histoire de la colonisation 
française en Guyane," Revue du monde Latin. VII (Octobre, 
1885), 36k, "Choiseul, dans"!'Intention de refaire sa 
fortune se fit donner par Louis XV le territoire entre 
Kourou et Maronl afin de la distribuer en fiefs aux aadets 
de sa famille, qui deviendraient ses vassaux,"
^3jules Duval, Les Colonies et la politique coloniale 
de la France (Paris 1 Arthur Bertrand, 1864), p, 217,
"lorsque le duc de Choiseul...jeta les yeux sur la Guyane 
pour y prendre une honorable revanche, 11 commença par en 
partager la propriété entre les deux branches de sa famille 
A titre de fief héréditaire,"
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and wished to find there a compensation, by creating a 
powerful center with the same population, forming at 
the same time a prosperous self-sufficient colony and 
a help within reach of the islands, whose preservation 
was important above all for national success and in 
which the disproportion between the races began to 
appear as very dangerous. Contrary to traditions, the 
aim of colonization was envisaged before that of trade 
in the plan, which was sufficiently advanced in 1?62, 
so that it was possible to begin to realize it. It was 
decided to establish a center of colonization on the 
side of the Kourou river...The Due de Choiseul and his 
cousin Choiseul-Praslin obtained concession to colonize 
all the territory between the ocean, the left side of 
Kourou, and the right side of the Haroni river.lo
Several factors, therefore, played a role.in the action 
of Choiseul in Guyane, perhaps most important was that the 
Kourou expedition and the attendant permanent occupation of 
the ancient settlement at Cayenne, followed by attempts to 
establish additional settlements, supported a plan for war 
of revanche. Guyane was strategically located. Being on 
the mainland it gave France a hold in South America with 
the possibility of expanding along the Amazon coast, linking
Saintoyant, La colonisation sous l'ancien regime 
(Parist La BenaissanceHu livre, 1959), p. 3531 "Âprôs 
avoir perdu l'Amérique du Nord, grande possession de race 
blanche, le duc de Choiseul regarda du côté de la Guyane et 
voulut y trouver une compensation, en y créant un centre 
puissant de même population formant A la fois une colonie 
prospère par elle-meme et un secours & portée des îles, dont 
la conservation importait par dessus tout à la fortune 
nationale et dans lesquelles la disproportion entre les 
races commençait â paraître pleine de dangers. Contraire­
ment aux traditions, le but de colonisation fut envisagé 
avant celui de commerce dans le projet, qui fut suffisamment 
avancé en 1762, pour qu'il fût possible d'entrer dans la voie 
de sa réalisation. Il fut décidé d'installer un centre de 
colonisation sur les rives du Kourou...Le duc de Choiseul 
et son cousin Choiseul-Praslin se firent concéder A coloniser 
compris entre l'Océan, la rive gauche du Kourou et la rive 
droite du Maroni."
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the French and the Spanish colonies for purposes of tr&de, 
obstructing English Influence In British Guiana and the 
British West Indies, and averting a possible attempt by 
Portugal to create an empire In Brazil In case of a war of 
diversion, ^ 7 More important was the proposed role Guyane 
would play In strengthening the French military forces on 
the Islands of the Caribbean, Guyane offered a natural link 
to the French Antilles since It was located au vent to them. 
From this position support could be sent easily to the 
Islands, particularly In time of war. Since Guyane was 
valuable militarily and contributed significantly to CholseuPb 
plan for war, most of the present chapter Is devoted to dis­
cussing the military objectives and the Intentions of the 
government of Louis XV In Guyane after 1763, Attention Is 
given to a chronological development and to an assessment 
of several documents which support the position that, In 
spite of commercial goals, the desire to replace the loss 
of possessions In North America and to make a rich fortune, 
Guyane was colonized primarily to augment Choiseul's plan 
for war of revenge against England,
The Military Importance of Guyane 
The Intention of Louis XV In establishing a military 
operation In Guyane to support French policy for a war
l^The plan for a war of diversion was discussed In 
chapter%rew. Further consideration of this plan, however, 
Is given below.
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against England was based on two considerations. First, 
the military force in Guyane would be in a suitable 
position to augment the main French regiments of Martinique, 
Saint Domlngue, and Guadeloupe in times of war. Second, 
the presence of a military base in Guyane could lead to 
expansion on the South American continent and to preven­
tion of a Portuguese empire in Brazil, a develo;ment 
which Choiseul conceived as a consequence of his strategy
in the proposed war of diversion in Europe.
These objectives were first developed in 1?62 shortly 
before overtures were made for ending the Seven Years' War, 
They grew out of a report which Choiseul received from the ' 
Comte de Behague, whom he had sent to Guyane in 1?62 on a 
military mission. Behague, lieutenant colonel and later com­
mandant of Guyane, was charged with the task of exploring 
areas of defense in Guyane in the hope that an offense stem­
ming from Guyane could be launched against England in 1762.
He was instructed to examine potential areas of fortification 
and to propose ways to secure Guyane as an important colony 
"...capable of resisting by herself any foreign attack and 
able to render immediate assistance after a period of time 
to the other colonies, when circumstances existed...,"18
l®Mdmoire du Hoi pour servir d'instruction â M. de 
Behague, Lieutenant Colonel de Dragons, 24, avril, 1?62, A.N., 
Col. B. 114, fols. 129-130. "...capable de résister par elle- 
même aux attaques étrangères, et propre A voler avec le tems 
au secours des autres colonies, lorsque les circonstances 
pourraient l'exiger." See also l'Abbé G. T. Baynal, Histoire 
philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce,
5 vols. (AmsterdamI J, L. Pellet, 1770), V, 25. Comte de 
Béhague, from a noble Dutch family, became a lieutenant- 
colonel in France in 176I, and military commandant and 
governor of Guyane in 1763. He served until 1766.
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The mission was designed to assess generally the existing 
defense force of the French In Guyane, to recommend needed 
reinforcements, and the type of ammunition and artillery 
required to establish a military base. In an evaluation of 
the mission of Behague to Guyane, historian Henri Froldevaux 
wrote that there were two objectives. First, to determine 
the southern boundary between French Guyane and Brazil,
The boundary controversy was created at the Treaty of 
Utrecht when, by confusing the Vincent Pinson river with a 
branch of the Amazon, France lost about thirty leagues of 
land, Behague was asked to investigate the Issue In the 
hope that France would gain the lost area. Second, the 
mission aimed at examining the ancient settlement at Cayenne 
for the possibility of building a port with adequate harbor 
facilities to accommodate ships with artillery and other 
supplies and to estimate the extent of repairs needed to 
fortify the port, ^ 9 The state of the port at Cayenne was 
In a deplorable condition during the Seven Years ' War,
Such was the report reaching Versailles, earlier from Pierre 
Barrére, physician of the king In Guyane during the war.
His report, confirmed by the report of Behague, established 
the need for extensive repairs. Both reports showed, for 
example, that Cayenne's defense consisted of five weak 
bastions and several pieces of cannons, most of which
^%enrl Froldevaux, "Une Mission Géographique et 
Militaire A la Guyane en 1?62," Annales de Géographie. i 
(Octobre, I89I à Juillet, 1892), 220-225.
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had no carriage.20
Second, Froldevaux contended that the Behague mission 
concerned itself with an evaluation of the military strength 
of the French at Cayenne in an actual state of war with 
Portugal. Choiseul expected Spain to attack Portugal in an 
effort to divert English forces to the continent, thereby 
giving the French forces a free hand in assaulting English 
colonies in the Caribbean. The attack on Portugal would 
force the Portuguese monarch, Joseidi (1750-77)t to escape 
to Brazil to set up a Portuguese empire,^1 In such circum­
stances, the French forces in Guyane would play a leading 
role in preventing Joseph from succeeding or in augmenting 
the French forces in the Caribbean for an attack on Brazil. 
Other consequences resulting from a military contingent in 
Guyane would be the reducing of prevailing border conflicts, 
the restraining of the British and Dutch from expanding 
along the Amazon coast, and the strengthening of the Pacte 
de Famille with the Spanish colonies. These were some major 
considerations that led to the mission of Behague, during 
the Seven Years' War, in early 1762. At that time the 
strategy in the war began to change. Portugal invoked an 
English alliance in 1762, and Spain, prompted by the
2®Pierre Barrëre, Nouvelle relation de la France 
équinoxiale (Parisi Piget-Damonneville, 17*^ 377 p. ^3.
21comment les Espagnols regardent le commerce des 
étrangers. Bibliothèque Nationale, Papers of l'abbé Béliardi, 
Fr. 10766, fol. 69. (Hereinafter cited as B.N., P.B.)
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Pacte de Famille, invaded Portugal. The Portuguese army 
was augmented by an English force led by James O'Hara, 
second Baron, and John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun.
Soon after, preliminaries to a peace settlement began and 
tentatively changed French plans for continuing the war.
In the meantime, Behague had begun his mission in Guyane 
and concluded his findings in a Mémoire. The mission of 
Behague was important nevertheless, for Choiseul studied 
the Mémoire after the signing of the peace in I763 and used 
it to develop his plan for war in the colonies.
The Mémoire showed that in the event of war Guyane 
held a vantage position since fortifications could be built 
and a base of operation established. The document laid out 
a general plan of defense, reported on defensive measures 
taken by the administrative officials at Cayenne for 
internal and external defense and suggested that French 
forces in the colony be strengthened and supplemented,
The governor of Cayenne, Gilbert Guillouet, seigneur 
d'Orvilliers, supported the proposals of Behague,
After signing the peace in I763, Choiseul re-considered 
the recommendation of Behague and used it in planning and 
preparing for his war of revenge. The result was a proposal 
to Implement a plan for war. This he reported to Louis XV 
in his Mémoire of 1765, In general, the plan called for an
^^Renseignement sur la Guyane française, Correspondance 




Immediate colonization in Guyane on a large scale in order 
to commence preparing the colony for military use.
The Paniers de Chanvalon. consisting of letters, 
memoirs, and dossiers deposited at Archives Nationales and 
at the Bibliothèque Nationale. provide evidence to substan­
tiate that Guyane was colonized in 1763 for military reasons. 
Thibaut de Chanvalon, intendant of the new settlement at 
Kourou in 1763, was charged with the military phase of the 
colonization. In his writings he stated that Guyane was more 
favorably positioned to prevent an invasion and maintain 
defense than the other French possessions in the Caribbean. 
The French islands, he wrote, encompassed a limited area and 
opened from all sides to foreign invasion. Their defense 
and fortifications were vulnerable and they would not with­
stand an English blockade, especially since England possessed 
a superior marine in the West Indies. But in Guyane the 
situation was different. He wrote 1
No one colony offers to France so many advantages as 
Guyane, to replace those which war has taken from us, to 
assure defense of that which remain to us, and to give us 
ways of attack and of diversion against our natural 
enemies or against their allies if war breaks out again 
one day between them and us.2*
^^Copie tirée d'un projet d 'établissement d'une nouvelle 
colonie dans la Guyane, 1763, B.N., Fr. 6244, fol. 83. (Heie- 
inafter cited as Chanvalon, Copie Tirée.) "Aucune colonie 
n'offre A la France autant d'avantages que la Guyane, pour 
remplacer celles que la guerre nous a enlevées, pour assurer 
la défense de celle qui restent et pour nous procurer des 
moyens d'attaque et de diversion contre nos ennemis naturels 
ou contre leurs alliés, si la guerre se rallume un jour entre 
eux et nous. " Jean-Baptiste-Thibauld de Chanvalon, b o m  in 
Martinique (1725) was sent to Guyane as intendant. Arrested 
on his return to France after the Kourou disaster, he was con­
demned to perpetual imprisonment for embezzlement (1767). He 
succeeded in getting a fresh trial cmd was acquitted in 1776.
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Chanvalon stated that Guyane offered unlimited oppor­
tunities, that its span into the interior and along tthe 
coast provided strategic military places where forts could 
be built and invasion by land or sea averted. He said, for 
example, that even if England intercepted French troops to 
Guyane by way of sea, that reinforcement, particularly 
Spanish, could be sent by land since the colony was on the 
continent. 25 Despite the superiority of English forces, 
wrote the intendant, Guyane would still be able to obtain 
foreign help by sea. The problem was not interception of 
help but the availability of adequate military strength in 
the colony to defend its vast coastal region extending to 
one hundred leagues. Chanvalon was aware of Guyane*s weak 
defenses. The existing port of Cayenne, for example, was 
unable to harbor French ships of the line except five 
leagues from the coast. On several places along the coast 
there were sand and mud banks obstructing naval communication 
to the colony. These banks were liabilities to French 
shipping! at the same time they favored defense of the 
coast by grounding invading ships. "The mud bank is an 
advanced fortification which nature itself put in the way 
for defense," wrote Chanvalon, ° But this argument was not 
meant to negate his proposal that at least one harbor should
^5chanvalon, Copie Tirée, og, cit.. fol. 83,
Z^Ibid. "Ce banc de vase est une fortification 
avancée que la nature elle même oppose pour sa défense.
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be deep and adequate enough to admit large French ships.
In one communiqué Chanvalon suggested that Guyane would 
be a suitable asylum to soldiers of the Seven Years* War, a 
home for French Canadians, and above all an aid to the French 
islands. "Most important, we have seen," he wrote, "that 
being windward of the other islands she had a precious advan­
tage for helping them and for furnishing them with what was 
most essential: defenders, wood, food from the country, and
cattle."27 He also supported the idea prevalent at that time 
in the ministry of the marine that a white settlement in 
Guyane would best serve the interest of France in the area 
of d e f e n s e . 28 it was also Choiseul's idea that only a homo­
genous European population, similar to English settlements 
in the West Indies and in North America, could produce an 
impregnable defense and the capacity to aid other French 
islands in case of attack. Such a settlement, added histo­
rian Temauz-Compans, was iiapx luted in the mind of Choiseul 
and was the basis for colonizing Guyane on a large scale.29
^7papiers de Chanvalon, Mémoires sur la Guyane 1?63- 
1764, A.N., Series no. 1024, dossier V. (Hereinafter cited 
as Papiers de Chanvalon.) "On a vu surtout qu*étant au 
vent des autres isles, elle avait un avantage prétieuz pour 
les aider, et pour leur fournir ce qui leur était le plus 
essentiel des deffenseurs, du bois, des vivres du pays, 
et des bestiaux."
^^Further discussion of the importance of a white 
settlement is given later in the chapter,
Temauz-Compans, Notice Historique sur la Guyane 
Française (Paris: Société d'études pour la colonisation de
la Guyane française, 1843)• p, 90, (Hereinafter cited as 
Temauz-Compans, Notice Historique. )
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Hence defense was the fundamental purpose for selecting 
Guyane, for excluding non-whites, for a massive settlement, 
and for Immediate colonization. Chanvalon held that the 
purpose of planting a new colony In Guyane ",, .was a pretext 
In order to form there a depot of trained men or able to 
get trained soon, and placed there in a way to help out 
colonies In an unexpected attack, or to attack those of 
our enemies. "30 He added that a well fortified depot 
would be difficult for the enemies to capture. "The 
swiftness of the currents, and the coast which Is flat, 
can be a little hindrance in certain respects, but it Is 
a natural defense against the enemies. "31
The Mémoire of Behague and the Paniers de Chanvalon 
present substantial evidence attributing the colonization 
of Guyane to military reason. Some historians propound 
the same view. "It appears that the design of the 
ministry," wrote Artur, physician of Louis XV In the 
ancient colony, "was rather to establish a colony which 
could furnish. In time of war and even at the same time.
30paplers de Chanvalon, 0£. clt., dossier V.
"C'était un prétexte pour y former un entrepôt d'hommes 
aguerris, ou bientôt propres A le devenir, et placés là 
de façon â secourir d'un coup de main nos colonies, ou 
â attaquer celles de nos ennemis."
31ibld. "La rapidité des courrans, et la côte 
qui est platte, peuvent être un petit obstacle A certains 
égards, mais c'est une défense naturelle contre l'ennemls."
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supplies to the îles du vent. "32 Agreeing, Gabriel Hanotaux 
and Alfred Martineau have stated that the settlement of 
Guyane intended to aid neighboring possessions in the French 
Antilles if the need existed. Recognizing at the same time 
that Guyane offered an economic advantage to Prance, they 
concluded "...such was not for the moment the essential aim; 
the object which they proposed was entirely political and 
military."33 Another French historian, André Julien wrote* 
"The ministry insists on the militeiry importance of the 
endeavour; " that since Guyane was windward to the French 
islands she was favourably situated to lend support in case 
of war, 3^ In a medical dissertation Paul Henry said that 
Guyane was colonized to counterbalance the effect of the 
moral loss of Canada, but more important, in order to have 
"...a reserve of colonists capable of coming to the aid 
of the islands (Martinique and Guadeloupe), the French
32m . Artur, Histoire manuscrite des colonies française 
de la Guyane, B.N., Nouvelles acquisitions françaises.
No. 2571-2572, (2), fol, 781. (Hereinafter cited as Histoire 
manuscrite N.A. Fr. 2571-2572.) "Il paraît que le dessein 
du ministre était plutôt d'établir une colonie qui put 
fournir en temps de guerre et même en tout temps des sub­
sistances aux Iles du vent... "
33Gabriel Hanotaux and Alfred Martineau, Histoire des 
colonies françaises et de l'expansion de la France dans le 
monde (Paris* L'Histoire Nationale, 192977 P# 591. "...mais 
tel n'était pas pour le moment le but essential* l'objet 
que l'on se proposait était tout politique et militaire."
3^Ch. André Julien, Les Français en Amérique 1713-1784 
(Paris* Centre de Documentation, 1951)# p. 93, See also 
H. L. Saint-Hemy, ge quelques essais ^  colonisation 
européénne sous igg. tropiques (Paris* Paul Dupont, 1849),
pp. 320-321.
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government resolved to exert all its efforts to that end,"35 
Another writer, Jean Chala, concurred with the general 
thesis that Prance's main concern in colonization after 
1763 was manifested in using Guyane to shelter French forces 
if the tide of war ran against them. "Perhaps it was not 
even a matter of revenge but of defense. In any case it was 
necessary to remain ready, seeing that Engleuid began to 
encounter serious difficulties in her American colonies. "36 
The revolt against England was predicted by Choiseul as 
early as 1765, a prediction recorded in his Mémoire to 
Louis XV in that year.  ^ 7 Such a development would contri­
bute significantly to fulfilling his plan for a war of 
revenge against England, a war in which France and her 
colonies would lend support to the American colonies 
rebelling against the mother country. Therefore Guyane 
was colonized, according to Alfred Lacroix as
35paul Henry, Sur une tentative de colonisation en 
Guyane (Thèse pour le Doctorat en Médecine 1 Faculté de 
Médecine de paris, 1940), p. 11. "lAie réserve de colons, 
capables au besoin de venir en aide aux Isles (Martinique 
et Guadeloupe), le gouvernement française résolut d'y porter 
tous ses efforts. " See also R. L. Saint-Bemy, De quelques 
essais de colonisation européenne sous les tropiques, op. 
cit., p. iT,
3^Jean Chaia, "Echec d'une tentative de colonisation 
de la Guyane au XVIII® siècle," Biologie Médicale. XLVII 
(Avril, 1958), xiii. "Peut-être n'était ce même pas de 
revanche qu'il s'agissait, mais de défense. De toute façon 
il fallait se tenir prêt, d'autant que 1'Angleterre commençait 
a* recontrer dans ses colonies d'Amérique de sérieuses diffi­
cultés. "
^^Etienne François de Choiseul, Mémoire de Monsieur de 
Choiseul Remis au Roi en 1765 (Paris1 Charles Giraud, 1881), 
p. 8. (Hereinafter cited as Choiseul, Mémoire.)
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...one other colony, capable of serving as base of 
operations in case of a new war. Martinique and 
Guadeloupe being insufficient to play this role, he 
[Choiseul] considered Guyane, which had been pointed 
out to him as suitable for this purpose.3“
The military concern for colonization was to remain 
unpublicized, however. The ministry of the marine needed 
time to achieve the necessary preparations in Guyane, as 
well as on the islands of Martinique, Saint Domlngue, and 
Guadeloupe. Until the colonies were ready, every diplomatic 
rupture with England had to be amended. With this in mind, 
Choiseul ordered the expedition of Kourou in I763.
Having decided to colonize Guyane in I763, Louis XV 
and his chief minister, Choiseul, issued an order for prepa­
ration to be made immediately to recruit colonists and accom­
modate them in the new settlement. Several proposals 
reaching the ministry of the marine suggested the use of 
African labor and creation of a seignorial system for quick 
economic exploitation. Blind to the view and purpose of the 
French government in Guyane, the proposals were only inter­
ested in profits. One of these came from Le Sieur Nau, a 
merchant from La Rochelle, who suggested that the use of 
African slaves under white proprietorship would resuscitate 
French trade destroyed during the Seven Years' War, He
3®Alfred Lacroix, Notice Historique sur les Membres 
et Correspondants de L'Acadëmie des Sciences (Paris* 
Gauthier-Villars, 1932), p. 40. .d'une autre colonie, 
susceptible de servir de base d'opérations, en cas de 
nouvelle guerre. La Martinique et la Guadeloupe étant trop 
peu importantes pour pouvoir jouer ce rôle, il pense A la 
Guyane, qui lui avait été signalée comme propre A ce dessein."
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estimated that 10,000 slaves and 6,000,000 livres would be 
sufficient for an initial settlement.^9 suggestion from 
the son of d'Orvilliers, governor at Cayenne in I763, which 
was incorporated into a memoir dated March 20, I763, urged 
Prance to cultivate the production of sugar which was a 
staple crop in tropical countries. He pointed out that the 
commodity would flourish along the banks of the Kourou 
river where sugar refineries could be built. For the supply 
of labor, he recommended, similar to Nau, the use of African 
slaves. However impressive, the plan was rejected because 
it overlooked the military objective of Choiseul and because 
it required the government to support the colonists for the 
first three y e a r s . A  third proposal, from Horisse, pay 
commissioner at Cayenne in I763, asked in a letter of 
March 25, 1763, that %he government undertake a mass ship­
ment of slaves from the African coast. As in the case of 
other proposals, this plan also aimed at profit.^1
Choiseul rejected the above plans and recruited a 
white population which he believed would be able to create 
a military force capable of resisting and of launching an 
assault. He was convinced that a mixed or slave population 
did not have the potential for war. But how could France
39Temaux-Compans, Précis Historique, op. cit.. pp. 6-8.
^®Ibid., pp. 8-9. The mouth of the Kourou river is 




obtain a large white population fully prepared in a short 
time to fulfill the military objectives? The answer was 
found in the launching of a wide publicity campaign which 
exaggerated opportunities to obtain wealth quickly while 
concealing the true reason for colonization. The advertise­
ment used to recruit French Canadians, Germans, Alsatians, 
Swedes, and Belgiums read:
Europeans who go to this beautiful country which yields 
two harvests a year, obtain there upon arriving, owner­
ship of a piece of ground* they are fed, lodged, well 
clothed, emd furnished with all that is necessary for 
them, their wives, and their children for two and a half 
years* we do not worry them because of their beliefs* 
we pay their travel to Bochefort from where we transport 
them free of cost to G u y a n e , ^2
The response was overwhelming. The Baron de Bessner, 
director of the campaign and later governor of Cayenne, 
reported to the ministry of the marine in November 5» 1763» 
that he had obtained tremendous success in the recruitment. 
He then proposed, as agreed upon in the campaign, that the 
ministry pay all expenses of the colonists to Guyane in 
return for which they would establish a seigniory composed 
of a village of ten families. The land given would span an 
area of 1600 acres, half to go to the lord and the other
^^Daubigny, Choiseul et la Prance d*outre-mer. 
op. cit., p. 44. "Les Européens qui passent dans ce beau 
pays qui donne deux récolte par an, y obtiennent un terrain 
en propriété en arrivant* ils y sont nourris, logés, bien 
habillés, et fournis de tout ce qui leur est nécessaire pour 
eux, leurs femmes et leurs enfants, pendant deux ans et 
demi* on ne les inquiète point sur leurs croyances* on leur 
paye leur voyage pour se rendre & Rochefort d'oû on les 
transporte gratis & la Guyane."
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half to the families. The system which Bessner worked out 
would lend itself to private ownership in which the families 
could redeem their share of the land by purchase, rent pay­
ment, or through manual service over a period of years, 
Bessner*s plan was approved even though it meant, to some 
degree, as in the case of the rejected proposals, a substi­
tution of one form of state servitude for another.
In describing the enthusiasm of the new planters for
Guyane, a young officer of embarkation, and governor at
Cayenne in 1777, Pierre Victor Malouet, wrotei
It was a deplorable spectacle, even for my inexperience, 
this crazy multitude from all classes, each of whom was 
counting on speedy riches, and among whom, independently 
of the peasants, there were capitalists, young men of 
good education, entire families of craftsmen, bourgeois, 
gentlemen, a crowd of civil and military employees, 
finally a troop of musicians, destined to provide amuse­
ment for the new colony,^3
The most important officer of the new settlement was 
the governor, Chevalier Etienne T u r g o t . T h e  governorship
^3pierre Victor Malouet, Collection de Mémoires et 
correspondances officielles sur l'administration des 
coloni^. ^ vols. (Pariai Baudouin, Ï6Ô^), I, 5. [Herein­
after cited as Mémoires et Correspondemces.) "C'était un 
spectacle déplorable même pour mon inexpérience, que celui 
de cette multitude d'insensés de toutes les classes qui 
comptaient tous sur une fortune rapide, et parmi lesquels, 
indépendamment des travailleurs paysans, on comptaient des 
capitalistes, des jeunes gens bien élévés, des familles 
entières d'artisans, de bourgeois, de gentilshommes, une 
foule d'employés civils et militaires, enfin une troupe de 
comédiens, de musiciens, destinés â l'amusement de la 
nouvelle colonie,"
^Chevalier Etienne Turgot, Marquis de Cousmont, 
brother of the famous statesman, belonged to a Norman family. 
He was first a knight of Malta and commanded a gallery.
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was obtained because of his support to the plan of Choiseul. 
However, Turgot failed to carry out his task. He adminis­
tered the new settlement from Versailles instead of from 
Kourou and when the effort to plant the new colony failed, 
he was accused of dereliction of duty. The precarious 
position in which he found himself was responsible for the 
problems that developed at the Kourou settlement and ulti­
mately for the complete failure of the new colony.
Turgot's official representative at Kourou was the 
intendant, Thibaut de Chanvalon. The intendant was 
experienced in colonial affairs, having lived at Martinique 
where he was a member of the superior council. He was given 
the responsibility to settle the colonists, to extend the 
initial settlement to other parts in Guyane, and to prepare 
the defenses of the colony in keeping with the intention of 
Louis XV and Choiseul. Next in rank was the commandant, 
Fréfontaine. The commandant was ordered to depart from 
Prance as early as March 1, 1763# with a crew of workmen 
and some colonists to begin temporary accommodation for the 
bulk of settlers soon to follow. The early departure was 
occasioned by the urgency of the colonizing project and by 
the climatic conditions in Guyane. Leaving Prance as 
scheduled. Préfontaine and his party would arrive by the 
end of April, during the dry season, to begin erecting 
cottages and other buildings to house the new planters. 
Preparations were expected to be completed before the advent
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of the rainy season which In Guyane meant incessant rain­
falls that commonly resulted in floods.
The new settlement was to be located at Kourou, on 
the right bank at the mouth of the Kourou river. The cite 
selected was for strategic reasons and in the event it was 
necessary to expand the camp to the three small islands 
located off the mouth of the Kourou river. The islands, 
called îles du Diable. potentially were excellent defensive 
positions. The commandant described the islands in a com­
muniqué on February 28, 1?64. He wrote that the islands 
were separated from one another by a narrow body of deep 
water suitable for docking. On both sides of the islands 
were huge rocks treacherous to ships unfamiliar with passage 
between the islands. The position, size, and elevation of 
the rocks facilitated the defense of the colony, for in 
addition to the difficulty of passage, ships approaching 
the colony could be identified from some distance. Addi­
tionally, fortifications could be built on the rocks and 
cannons fired from various positions. The islands also 
blocked the view of the new colony, hence approaching ships 
were unable to locate the French position, an advantage 
which would make enemy invasion difficult. For these 
reasons the îles du Diable were included in the plan for 
the new settlement.^5
^^Chanvalon (Cayenne) to Choiseul (Versailles), 
February 28, 1?64, B.N., Fr. $239, No. 12, fol. 148.
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However, the plans for settlement and defense on the 
Islands and at Kourou suffered In execution from the begin­
ning. The stage for a succession of difficulties was set 
when Préfontalne failed to leave France as scheduled, thus 
wasting valuable time needed for preparing the camp for the 
planters. His delay was caused by Indecision on the precise 
location for the camp on the bank of the Kourou river, by 
uncertainty In obtaining Indian labor to construct cottages, 
and by Inadequate funds to purchase land surveying equipments, 
It Is difficult to comprehend why these reasons, as stated 
In Précis Historique, justified the delay when the Kourou 
expedition was so urgent and so basic to Choiseul’s plan.^
In addition to the delay, difficulties at Kourou came 
because of Inadequate Information supplied to the ministry 
of the marine and false news dissipated to the colonists.
The new colonists did not have access to Information from 
published reports dealing with the problems of settlement 
In Guyane. Their source of Information was the publicity 
campaign engineered by the ministry of the marine to recruit 
large groups of planters for an early settlement. The 
ministry was equally misled about the difficult physical 
and climatic conditions In the proposed colony fiuid the type 
of settlers suited under such existing situations. Emphasis 
was placed on the numbers not on the quality of colonists, 
and the message preached was an opportunity to get rich
^^emaux-Ccmpans, Précis Historique, op, cit., p. 17.
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quickly. The result was an overwhelming response of French 
planters who urged eagerly to be despatched to seize the 
fortune awaiting them. But the conditions advertised did 
not exist; consequently disappointment, dissatisfaction, 
and dissension were the order of the day beginning with the 
first convoy to the last.
Finally, obtaining thirty workers to help with prepa­
ration at Kourou, and 1,300,000 francs for transporting and 
maintaining 2,000 persons for one year. Préfontaine left 
France on May 17, 1?63, with an ititial convoy of 127 
planters in three ships, la Comtesse de Grammont. le Jason, 
and l'Américain. He arrived at Cayenne two months later, 
on July 14, during the rainy season.Before proceeding 
from the ancient settlement to Kourou, Préfontaine sought 
additional help from the Comte de Behague, governor at 
Cayenne. Realizing that he arrived late, the commandant 
tried to secure as much help as available to hasten with 
the preparation at Kourou before any additional convoys 
arrived. Behague, however, uninformed about the Kourou 
expedition, felt that he had been insulted by the failure 
of the ministry of the marine to inform him about the future 
colony at Kourou and consequently refused to render any 
assistance whatever. The displeasure of Behague forced 
Préfontaine to embark for Kourou without help. Some relief 
was obtained, however, from a Jesuit camp located a few miles
^^Temaux-Compans, Précis Historique, op. cit., p. 20.
I4l
up the Kourou river. Since 1762 the Jesuits had been 
expelled from France and French colonies. But their mission 
was still maintained in Guyane at the time of Préfontaine *s 
arrival. Their director, Pierre p. Ruelle, provided eighty 
Negroes to help with clearing land and building cottages 
at the Kourou settlement. When the aid terminated a month 
later Préfontaine turned to the Indians for assistance, 
using at the same time whatever slave labor he could secure.^ 
Faced with a shortage of labor and having only a few days 
before the arrival of more colonists. Préfontaine turned 
to governor Behague at Cayenne and sought help once more,^9 
In a letter to the commandant, the governor gave assurance 
that relief would be forthcoming from the Jesuit mission 
which had given help earlier. To this effect in a letter 
to Ruelle the governor ordered that a crew of slaves be 
sent to the Kourou settlement.But Ruelle replied that 
temporary relief could not be continued due to the emergence 
of problems at the mission camp.*' Consequently the
^®Behague (Cayenne) to the ministry of the marine 
(Versailles), December 15, I763, A.N., Col. C. 1^ , 3ibis., 
No. 11, fol. 1.
^9p]-éfontaine (Kourou) to Behague (Cayenne), 
November I3 , I763, A.N., Col. C. l4, 31, No. 11, fol. 4.
^^Behague (Cayenne) to Préfontaine (Kourou), 
November I5 , 1763, A.N., Col. C. 14, 3I, No. 11, fol. 4.
^^Behague (Cayenne) to Ruelle (Jesuit mission),
>er 15, 1763, A.N., Col. C. 14, 31°^ ®*'No. 11, fol, 4.Novembe
52i
November I5, I763, A.N., Col. C. 14, 31**^ ®*»No. 11, fol. 4.
Ruelle (Jesuit mission) to Behague (Cayenne),
iDif
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settlement was far from complete when» on December 22» 1763» 
a second convoy of eleven ships disembarked 1»429 colonists 
under the command of Chanvalon,
A brief description of the settlement will partly 
explain why the Kourou expedition failed almost from the 
onset. The immediate problem which the planters encountered 
upon arrival was the difficulty of arranging for their 
transportation from the port of Cayenne to Kourou. The 
water passage to Kourou» especially to the mouth of the 
Kourou river» was obstructed by sand banks and rocks which 
made passage for large ships impossible. This situation 
became aggravated when» during rainy seasons» northerly 
winds swerved over the river and swept boats to the sand 
banks or against huge rocks. More serious» however» than 
transportation was the inadequate housing awaiting the new 
colonists. The camp was small» covering an area of approxi­
mately 2»300 feet long and 800 feet wide. The only building 
that stood on the camp at the time of Fréfontaine *s arrival 
was an old church built by the Jesuits. Préfontaine con­
structed several buildings around the church» including a 
hospital» an army service corps (intendance). and a magazine. 
He built four rows of carbets out of tree trunks» with roofs 
made of leaves and floors of mud. Streets» named after 
officials of the settlement » were laid out in parallel 
columns between rows of sheds. A well was dug in the center
^^emaux-Compans» Précis Historique, op. cit. » pp. 31-38T
1^ 3
of the camp and, at the left of the church, several cottages 
were constructed, including a store, and a house each for 
the governor and commandant. Additional buildings were 
constructed only after the cœrival of Chanvalon. These 
comprised of two guard houses, ten rows of carbets. a 
bakery, a laboratory, and a blacksmith shop.
In front of the Kourou camp ran the swift Kourou 
river; at the rear was a thick wooded forest. During the 
rainy season floods surrounded the camp and threatened its 
survival. The problems were compounded by overcrowded 
living conditions, insufficient food supplies, insubordination 
of the settlers, and disrespect for law and order.
As new colonists were assigned to cramped living 
quarters, others arrived. Forced to relocate the planters, 
the intendant transported several hundred of them to the 
îles du Diable where temporary housing was in construction. 
Since the islands provided the only rescue for the colo­
nists, their names were changed to the îles du Salut. The 
change of title was significant in another respect. As 
cited above, the islands offered a natural protection and 
defense of the colony as explained in a letter from the 
intendant.
This form announces the facility that we will have 
to defend and fortify them. They are even defending 
themselves reciprocally and can easily protect 
the ships which will be in the bay and close the 
entrance to the enemies by crossfiring cannons up 
and down, which would be established in the three 
islands...Finally, in occupying these islands
1 #
we deprive the enemies of a shelter which they could 
use In time of war to make Incursions and Intercept 
the boats,5^
The expansion of Kourou to the Islands brought no last­
ing relief to the colonists, for shortly thereafter a wide­
spread epidemic swept throughout both camps, resulting In 
deaths by the hundreds. Chanvalon wrote the ministry of the 
marine requesting that no more convoys be sent.
The camp where we are located must not be extended ; I 
have had the honor to Inform you of that by sending you 
the plan,...the sickness and contagion would spread 
soon I we have the experience of that since the number 
of persons la augmented. But to Increase the camps Is 
to Increase the expenses In vain, to Increase the abuse 
and the necessity to confide the results of the colony 
and the Interests of the king to a larger number of 
persons...! am placed at this time In the most violent 
and dangerous crisis.55
5^Chanvalon (Kourou) to Choi seul (Versailles),
February 18, 1?64, A.N., Col. C. 14, 3l“ ®^**plece 28, No, 12. 
See also B.N., Fr. 6239, No, 12, fol, 148. "...cette forme 
annonce la facilité qu'on aura â les défendre et â les 
fortifier. Elles se défendent même réciproquement, et 
pourront protéger facilement les bâtiments qui seront en 
rade, et en fermer l'entrée aux ennemis par le few croisé 
des batteries de bas et d'en haut, qui seraient établies 
dems les trois îles...Enfin, en occupant ces îles, nous 
privons les ennemis d'un asile dont Ils se servaient en 
temps de guerre pour être & portée de faire des Incursions 
et d'intercepter les bâtiments,"
55chanvalon (Kourou) to Cholseul (Versailles),
March 29, 1?64, A.N., Col. C. 14, 31, pièce 31, No. 49.
"Le camp où nous sommes établis ne saurait s'étendre, 
j'al eu l'honneur de vous l'annoncer en vous envoyant le 
plan*...les maladies et la contagion s'y répandraient 
bientôt; nous l'éprouvons depuis que le nombre des 
personnes est augmenté. Mais multiplier les ccunps, c'est 
multiplier Infructueusement les dépenses, c'est multiplier 
les abus et la nécessité de confier les effets de la colonie 
et les Intérêts du Roi â un plus grand nombre de personnes.,. 
Je me trouve, â ce moment, dans la crise la plus violente 
et la plus critique. "
1^ 5
The letter and other similar eorrespondence failed to 
reach the ministry In time and the Centaure brought 3^8 
settlers In April, 1?64. In May another 960 arrived, soon 
followed by 1,650 more. By July a total of 14,000 persons 
had arrived and 30,000,000 livres had been spent, 56
The beginning of the rainy season In July greatly 
Increased the spread of the epidemic and the death toll.
The resultant floods crowded the settlers Into their crammed 
quarters. But In entertainment halls the unaffllcted parti­
cipated Indiscriminately In sham festivals, regular banquets, 
and marriage celebrations as long as the supply of women 
lasted. The colonists tried to provide a lively spirit In 
order to pass the time; yet when weather permitted, they 
refused to work on the land, and claimed that the promoters 
of the settlement had broken their promise and failed to 
provide them with conditions agreed upon.57
When word finally reached the ministry of the marine 
regarding the devastation of the Kourou settlement,
Louis XV and Cholseul charged Turgot with Irresponsibility 
since he was governor of the new colony, A wave of resent­
ment against the government swept France. Louis XV demanded 
Turgot's Immediate departure for Kourou with vast powers to 
remedy the situation and to relocate the survivors, since
^^Malouet, Mémoires et Correspondances. op. cit., I, 6,
V?Temauz-Compans, précis Historique, op. cit.. 
pp. 53-54. 3ee also A.N., Col. C. ik, 31# pïîce 32, No. 6I.
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the Kourou crisis had temporarily halted the plan of the 
French In preparing for a war of revenge. His correspondence 
to Turgot discussed below, shows the high value placed on 
the Kourou scheme.
Louis XV's Intention In Guyane Reaffirmed 
Anticipating that the Kourou disaster could be remedied 
by relocating the survivors In another settlement In Guyane, 
Louis XV reminded Turgot of his Intentions In Guyane, not 
only at the new settlement of Kourou but also at the ancient 
settlement of Cayenne. The Kourou crisis, advised the king, 
should not delay too long enforcement of a French policy In 
Guyane or French diplomacy In the Caribbean. It should be 
also observed, as discussed In the following chapter, that 
while France attempted to build forces and a base at Kourou, 
measures were taken simultaneously to Improve defenses and 
strengthen fortification at Cayenne. Both colonies consti­
tuted, therefore, the defense force In Guyane according to 
the plan of Cholseul, a plan reiterated by Louis XV In his 
Mémoire In 1?64. Since Turgot failed to take up his appoint­
ment as governor of Kourou and of Cayenne In I763 and conse­
quently failed to Implement measures to build French forces, 
he was Instructed once again about the Intentions of Louis XV. 
These are contained In the elghty-one article document which 
unfolds the plan of the French government In ordering 
augmentation of the military at Cayenne and colonization at 
Kourou In 1763. It sought to broaden French occupation In
Ik7
Guyane by suggesting, further, that settlers from the 
Kourou colony be relocated along the Approuague river which, 
being windward to the ancient colony of Cayenne and which 
was navigable by larger ships of the line, offered a better 
chance for settlement. The expansion would also be a relief 
to the overcrowded conditions at Kourou while at the same 
time facilitating the possibility of the survival of the 
critical settlement. The Mémoire authorized the governor 
to recruit help from the Indians in clearing land for the 
colonists, to establish friendly relations with the Dutch 
and Portuguese in their adjacent territories, and to do 
whatever was necessary to fortify the French position in 
Guyane.
Article Thirty-five described the military objective 
of France in Guyane, emphasizing that a new settlement was 
ordered capable to augment French forces elsewhere in the 
Caribbean.
Le Sieur Chevalier Turgot must not lose sight that the 
intention of His Majesty is to establish the new white 
colony as well because this population is more consistent 
with the views of justice and humanity which aroused His 
Majesty, and because it is more proper to secure in a 
state a degree of force capable to be respected. This 
system of population is so much the more necessary that 
the English made their conquests in the last war only 
by means of their northern colonies which are almost 
uniquely peopled with whites, and that, actually forming, 
at Dominique, a colony from which Negroes are excluded, 
it is easy to see that they planned to conquer, by its 
means, Martinique and Guadeloupe in the first occasion 
of war. His Majesty can only oppose their armed forces 
with equal forces by giving a white population to Guyane, 
which...is very favorably situated in order to give them 
help and even to act offensively against the English 
Islands. Consequently Turgot receives order to take care
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of knowing the various sorts of culture convenient to 
white people, to encourage them and to inspire the same 
views to those who will be in command during his 
absence,5°
The Mémoire is .important particularly for giving 
evidence of the nature of French military position in Guyane 
after I763 and for the indication that Louis XV intended 
to maintain that position in spite of the failure of the 
Kourou expedition. Interpreting Louis XV's intention, the 
ministry of the marine stated very clearly in Précis 
Historique, edited by H. Temaux-Compans, published in 1842, 
that the object of French involvement in Guyane after the 
Seven Years' War was neither exploitation of soil nor
^^Mémoire du Roi pour servir d'Instructions au Sieur 
Chevalier Turgot, Gouverneur Lieutenant Général de la Guyane, 
le 31 août, 1764, A.N,, Col, C, 14, 27, fols. 46-47. 
(Hereinafter cited as d 'Instructions àiTurgot, ) See also 
A.N., Col. C. 14, 29, fol, 220 and B.N,, Fr, 6251, fols, 8-9. 
"Le Sieur Chevalier Turgot, y est-il dit, ne doit point 
perdre de vue que l'intention de Sa Majesté est d'établir 
la nouvelle colonie en blancs, tant parce que cette popula­
tion est plus compatible avec les vues de justice et 
d'humanité qui animent Sa Majesté, que parce qu'elle est 
plus propre â procurer â un Etat un degré de force capable 
d'imposer. Ce système de population est d'autant plus 
nécessaire, que les Anglais n'ont fait leur conquêtes, dans 
la dernière guerre, que par le moyen de leurs colonies sept­
entrionales, qui sont presque uniquement peuplées de blancs, 
et que, formant actuellement, â la Dominique, une colonie 
dont les noirs sont exclus, il est aisé de voir qu'ils 
méditent de faire, par son moyen, la conquête de la Martinique 
et de la Guadeloupe â la première occasion de guerre, 3.M, 
ne peut donc leur opposer des forces capables de balancer les 
leurs qu'en peuplant aussi de blancs la colonie de la Guyane, 
laquelle,,.est très favorablement placée pour leur porter 
des secours, et même pour agir offensivement contre les îles 
Angloises, En conséquence elle charge le M. Chevalier 
Turgot de s'occuper avec soin de connoltre les divers genres 
de culture qui conviennent spécialement aux Blancs, de les 
encourager et d 'inspirer les mêmes vues & ceux qui seront : 
chargés de commander en son absence,"
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research of new products, nor of a new outlet.
He wished to populate Guyane because it is situated 
windward of the French islands of the Gulf of Mexico 
and thus very favorably placed to send to them imme­
diate help, at the same time to act offensively in 
need against the English islands.59
Continuing, the ministry added that the king wanted 
"...to establish on the continent of America, in proximity 
with our colonies of the Antilles, a race of men capable 
of assisting the mother country in her future wars.
In consequence Turgot was ordered to investigate living 
conditions suitable for the propagation of a French white 
population for Guyane and to provide for its settlement. 
Fulfillment of the task required Turgot to explore the 
ancient colony completely and to see if it could produce 
adequately for the settlers and to carry on trade with the 
îles du Vent and Sous le Vent. After fulfilling these 
tasks, Louis XV held, the forces of the colony would be 
sufficient.
From the above references it is obvious that Turgot
59Temaux-Compans, Précis Historique, op. cit., p. 4. 
"(L'objet principal n'était ni 1'exploitation du soi, ni la 
recherche de nouveaux produits ou d'un nouveau débouché.)
On voulait peupler la Guyane parce qu'elle est située au 
îles des Vent francises du golfe du Mexique, et ainsi très 
favorablement placée pour leur envoyer un prompt secours, 
de même que pour agir offensivement, au besoin, contre les 
Iles anglaises."
^®Ibld., p. 1. "...établir, sur le continent de 
l'AmeriquëT & portée de nos colonies des Antilles, une race 
d'hommes capables d'assister la mère-patrie dans ses guerres 
futures,"
^^Instructions A Turgot, o£. cit.. fol. 9,
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was delegated plenary powers to correct the problems at 
Kourou and to establish new settlements; at the same time 
he and the intendant were held responsible for the problems 
caused by failure to perform their duties as stipulated in 
the Mémoire of September, I763. "His Majesty charged 
equally to the governor and intendant to render mutually to 
themselves the acts of respect to which they are bound as 
servants, **^2 Turgot's powers, conferred in 1?63, included 
presiding in the superior council at Cayenne, appointing 
and suspending military and civilian officers in all settle­
ments in Guyane, planning for security measures against 
invasions, not only from the English but the Dutch in the 
neighboring territory of Surinam and the Portuguese in 
Brazil, Reference to border conflicts and invasion from 
the Dutch and Portuguese augmented the importance of a 
successful French colonization in Guyane, In effect, Guyane 
was colonized to serve Choiseul's design for war with the 
English while at the same time to avert a Dutch and 
Portuguese threat. The Mémoire stated that Turgot
,,,will not neglect to take precautions that he believes 
necessary in time of war. His Majesty, being informed 
that the Dutch in Surinam sometimes crossed the Maroni
^^Mémoire du Roi pour servir d 'instructions communes 
â M, Chevalier Turgot gouverneur général et Thibaut de 
Chanvalon Intendant de l'ancienne et nouvelle colonie de 
la Guyane, 20 Septembre, I763, A.N,, Col, C, 14, 26, fol, 254, 
(Hereinafter cited as Mémoire du Roi A Turgot et Chanvalon,) 
"Enjoint également Sa Majesté au gouverneur et â l'intendant 
de se rendre mutuellement égards qu'ils se doivent comme 
étant personnes publiques,,,"
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river in the interior and that this river is the natural 
boundary that separates the French and Dutch territory; 
he recommends to Turgot not to suffer any usurpation 
and since the Dutch governor built a small fort on the 
mouth of the Maroni river although on his territory 
where he placed a detachment,.. .Turgot will examine 
if it would not be convenient, for the safety of 
French territory in this area, to erect a simi^r 
fort and place a detachment of comparable men. ”3
The threat stemming from Holland and Portugal, dis­
cussed fully in the following chapter, was not considered 
imminent at the time of the Kourou expedition in 1763, nor 
was it considered necessary at that time to increase the 
military force— the regiment of Saintonge— garrisoned at 
Cayenne. A year later, however, with the failure of the 
Kourou expedition and the occurrence of border agitations 
caused by the two neighboring powers, greater emphasis was 
placed on augmentation of the military. Consequently, 
in another Mémoire of August, 1?6^, the powers of the 
governor were increased, as stated in Article Sixty-Five 
of the Instructions. "All that concerns the military 
will be under the jurisdiction of the lieutenant governor
^Mémoire du Roi aux Turgot et Chanvalon, 0£. cit., 
fol. 256, "...il ne négligera point de prendre les pré­
cautions qu'il croira devenir nécessaires dans un temps de 
guerre. Sa Majesté étant informée que les Hollandois de 
Surinam ont passé quelque fois la rivière de Maroni et que 
cette rivière est la frontière naturelle qui sépare le 
territoire françois et hollandois, elle recommande au 
Chevalier Turgot de ne souffrir aucune usurpation et comme 
le gouverneur hollandois a fait construire a l'embouchure 
de la rivière de Maroni quoi que sur son terrain un petit 
fort où il a mis un détachement,...Turgot examinera s'il 
ne conviendrait par pour la sûreté du territoire françois 
dans cette partie d'élever un fort semblable & celui des 
Hollandois et d'y placer un détachement d'un pareil nombre 
d'hommes."
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general alone,.. "64 Further, he was Instructed to fill all 
vacancies in the army, to regulate its composition, and to 
improve its discipline. Additionally, Turgot was given 
powers to form a milice. "The intention of His Majesty" 
stated the same article, "being that His colony of Guyane, 
must be capable in case of attack to put up the most 
effective resistance, he charged Chevalier Turgot to form 
a project of general militia for the c o l o n y , I n  Article 
Sixty-Nine Turgot was empowered to appoint an officer 
charged with military power in each canton in a new settle­
ment, and to take all possible means (Article Seventy) to 
improve defenses, internally, and externally, and to repair 
and erect forts. In the event of war or any other emergency 
he was authorized to initiate other actions for the mainte­
nance of defense and security.
With such extraordinary powers, Turgot finally arrived 
in Guyane on December 21, 1?64, but he stayed at the ancient 
settlement instead of at the new settlement. The governor 
feared the epidemic which by that time had destroyed the 
Kourou colony, leaving only 918 survivors out of a total of 
14,000 colonists. Consequently, it was from Cayenne that
^^Instructions au Turgot, og. clt., fol. 14, "Tout ce 
qui concerne le militaire ressortira & gouverneur lieutenant 
général seul,"
^^Ibid., "L'intention de Sa Majesté étant que sa colonie 
de la Guyane soit capable en cas d'attaque de faire la plus 
vive résistance, elle charge le chevalier Turgot de former 
un projet de milice générale pour la colonie,"
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he began to Investigate the catastrophe and to bring charges 
against the intendant and his officers whom he accused of 
dereliction of duties, embezzlement of funds, abuse of 
royal investment, and illegal commerce,The Intendant 
suffered imprisonment and physical torture from an order of 
the governor, an order subsequently used against Turgot as 
evidence for irresponsibility. This, and his failure to 
personally investigate the devastating settlement, to bring 
relief to the helpless survivors, to relocate the colony, 
and in general to carry out the intentions of Louis XV, led 
to serious charges against the governor. When he returned 
to France on April 5t he was tried and condemned to 
imprisonment.
The failure of Turgot's mission, however, did not 
change the course of French policy to remilitarize Guyane. 
Cholseul continued to strengthen the defenses at the ancient 
colony where regular French soldiers began to augment the 
local militia and where armaments were sent to improve 
defenses. Additionally, he sent other expeditions to Guyane 
in the hope that new conquests might be made for colonies. 
These followed shortly after the crisis at Kourou subsided.
The Mission of Bessner
The failure of the Kourou expedition meant that Cayenne 
continued to exist as the oAly French stronghold in Guyane
^Turgot (Cayenne) to Cholseul (Versailles),
December 31, 1?64, A.N., Col, C. 14, jlbis,, pièce 23, No. 2.
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and In South America. Prance was not prepared to abandon 
the ancient colony. Instead, every attempt was made to 
improve, expand, and use it as the bulwark of French forces 
in Guyane. At the same time that Choiseul and his successors, 
Vergennes in particular, tried to strengthen the ancient 
colony, other exploratory missions in Guyane were undertaken. 
The purpose was to establish new colonies. An example was 
the mission of Comte de Bessner who had proposed, as early 
as 1763t to open a new settlement for German families in 
Guyane along the Approuague river, approximately eighteen 
miles south of Cayenne. The proposal sought to establish 
a seigniory, barony, or county in which to settle the 
families. It anticipated obtaining help from Préfontaine 
and the Kourou settlers in order to expedite clearing of 
the land and laying out of the plots. It envisaged the 
use of help from the Indians and the slaves. But the 
Approuague project was tentatively postponed following 
rumors of the disasters at Kourou.However, Louis KV*s 
Mémoire to Turgot in 1?64 made reference to the prospect of 
a settlement at Approuague and once more the project came 
to the fore. Louis XV offered Turgot to relocate the Kourou 
survivors at the Approuague river and to build a new capital 
there in place of the old capital at Cayenne, As intimated
^^Proposition approuvée par le ministre du projet du 
baron de Bessner, 5 novembre, 1763, A.N., Col. C. 14,
Vol. 31, pièce 10, No. 24.
^^Instructions au Turgot, o£. cit.. Article 17, fol, 43.
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above Turgot did not carry out his duties t consequently, 
the project for Approuague failed a second time. The 
failure of Turgot In Implementing the "Intentions" of 
Louis XV affected colonizing activities In Guyane but not 
French plans to remilitarize the colony. It led to the 
sending of another mission to Investigate the Kourou crisis 
and the problems which prevented Turgot from carrying out 
the tasks that had been assigned to him In the Mémoire 
of 1764.
Bessner was ordered to obtain detailed Information 
on the Kourou crisis and to seek possible ways to establish 
a new settlement on the coastal plain as well as In the 
Interior of Guyane and to report on the state of the 
defenses of the colony.^9 in another document to Bessner, 
Louis XV added he should also estimate the number of men 
required to form a new colony, the reforms needed, and to 
recommend ways to strengthen the French In the colony. 70 
The departure of Bessner to Guyane on September 14, 1765, 
with a detachment of French troops, renewed hopes In the 
ministry of the marine that Guyane, together with the French 
Islands In the Caribbean would assure success of Choiseul's
^9lss motifs qui avalent déterminé le Bol A employer 
& la Guyane M. le Baron de Bessner, 22 mal, 1765, A N.,
Col. B. 121, No. 19, fol. 565* 8ee also lettre du 22 mars, 
1765, Ibid., No. 11, fol. 557.
70|iémoire du Bol pour servir d'instruction au Baron de 
Bessner Colonel d'Infanterie et Inspecteur général A la 
Guyane, 1765, AN., Col. C. 14, 3lbls., pièce 46, Nos. 64 
et 66.
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plan. Writing to this effect, during the same year of 
Bessner*s departure, Cholseul stated in his Mémoire to 
Louis XV that in spite of some difficulties in Guyane, he 
believed that his plan would work and that the enemies 
would be threatened and success would prevail in America.^1 
An immediate result of Bessner*s mission was a 
proposal to begin an agricultural colony on the right bank 
of the Tonnégrande river about six leagues from Cayenne.72 
The proposal reached Versailles at the time when a change 
was taking place in the ministry of the marine in which 
Cholseul handed over the ministry to his cousin, the Due 
Choiseul-Praslin. The new minister approved the Tonnégrande 
project, and in 1?66 eighty discharged soldiers were sent 
to Guyane, involving an expenditure of 800,000 livres.
Fate, however, was against any new settlement in Guyane, 
and the colony at Tonnégrande also failed. Bessner made 
another attempt in 1776 to colonize Guyane when he organized 
the Compagnie de la Guyane. But like earlier attempts, this 
too failed. Nevertheless, he kept on promoting the idea 
that Guyane was a suitable place for settlements. It was 
in 1777» however, that France once again renewed interest 
in establishing new colonies in Guyane. This came when 
Sartines became head of the ministry of the marine. The
7^Choiseul, Mémoire. op. cit., p. 20.
72' Note relative au plan des concessions en seigneurie 
proposé par Bessner pour 1'établissement de colons en Guyane, 
1765, A.N., Col. C. 14, 3lbl8., piôce 44.
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new minister Instructed Pierre Victor Malouet, governor at 
Cayenne in 1777» to look into the possibility of another 
settlement. However Malouet was not impressed with Bessner*s 
hope that a new colony could be founded.73 At this time 
Prance was preparing to join the American colonies in a 
war of revolution against England. Prance supported the 
American colonies and 1778 witnessed the final manifestation 
of a war of revenge.
Prench plans to establish new colonies in Guyane 
never materialized until after the Prench Revolution. 
According to H, A. Coudreau, Prance spent over 100 million 
livres and 30 thousand people in trying to colonize Guyane.7^ 
All attempts failed, but the effort to strengthen the Prench 
position at Cayenne succeeded. Bessner was partly respon­
sible for this. In keeping with the terms of his mission 
he was ordered to investigate the condition of the military 
in the colony and to propose a plan for improving the 
defenses. In response he submitted a "plan of defense and 
of fortification" to Choiseul on October 25, 1768. He 
asserted that the forts in the colony should be strengthened 
and the service of two engineers and a military expert 
(architecte militaire) should be obtained. He asked, in 
addition, for a company of fifty workers and that the system
73Malouet, Mémoires et Corresi^ndances. op. cit., I, 6-8.
7^. A. Coudreau, "Histoire de la colonisation 
française en Guyane." Revue du Monde Latin. VII (October.
1885), 369-370. -------------------
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of corvée abolished by Turgot be reinstated. Recognizing 
the need to establish defenses in the interior, he suggested 
that roads be built to connect the coast with the hinterland 
since communications would be indispensable in times of war. 75 
In another communiqué Bessner described the skills needed in 
the company of fifty workers. He included carpenters, 
joiners, edge-tool makers, and stone cutters,76 These 
workers together with others recommended by the officials 
at Cayenne began to reform and improve the defenses in the 
ancient colony. Consequently, the Guyane forces, similar 
to forces in the Caribbean islands, engaged in preparation 
for self-defense and for war.
75Bessner (Cayenne) to Choiseul (Versailles), 
October 25, 1768, A.N., Col. C, 14, 37, fols. 210-211.
76gtat de la compagnie d'ouvriers proposée pour 
l'entretien de fortification et d'artillerie de la Guyane, 
25 octobre, 1768, A.N., Col. C. l4, 37, fols. 213-214.
CHAPTER VII 
FRENCH HILXTABISN AT CAYENNE
When Choiseul ordered in I763 that preparation should 
begin to undertake the Kourou expedition in Guycme, he sent 
a ship, the Diligente, to the ancient colony to convey word 
that peace with England had been made. Following the 
announcement, the colonial officials were instructed that 
a plan for Cayenne had been made to increase the defenses 
and the military in the colony and to prepare for an even­
tual war between France and England. In such a war with 
England, France and her colonies would take revenge for the 
defeat sustained in the Seven Years' War. Reference to the 
plan is seen in a correspondence from Orvilliers, governor 
at Cayenne in 1763,^ In a second correspondence the 
governor indicated that the work of reconstruction would 
commence as soon as the plan was put into effect.^
Orvilliers (Cayenne) to Choiseul (Versailles), 
February 20, I763, A.N., Col, C. 14, fol. §, Gilbert 
Guillouet, seigneur d'Orvilliers, was governor of Cayenne 
from 1736 to 1763.
Orvilliers (Cayenne) to Choiseul (Versailles),
March 27, 1763, A.N., Col. C. 14, fol. 139. See also letter 
dated February 22, I763, ibid., fol. 137.
159
160
The plan Is contained In a Mémoire by Louis XV in 
September, 1763* to Turgot and Chanvalon, future governor 
and intendant, respectively, at Cayenne and the new settle­
ment to be colonized at Kourou. The Mémoire. discussed in 
the previous chapter, instructed the governor to take pre­
cautions in time of war, to not suffer any usurpation from 
the neighboring Dutch in Surinam (Dutch Guiana) or the 
Portuguese in Brazil, and to construct defenses along the 
Prench borders,^ No specific reference was made at this 
time to England or to the English in British Guiana. This 
came a year later in another document to Turgot, the new 
governor of Cayenne. In addressing him, August, 1?64,
Louis XV expressed his "intentions" regarding the security 
and recovery of the French possessions in the Caribbean.
He said that the colony of Guyane should be capable, in 
case of attack, to put the most effective resistance and 
"...to act offensively against the English Islands."^
The Instruction A Turgot called for implementing an 
administrative and military policy which was simultaneously 
carried out in other colonies in the Prench Antilles. At
^Mémoire du Roi pour servir d "Instructions communes 
â Chevalier Turgot, gouverneur général et Thibaut de 
Chanvalon, intendant de l'ancienne et nouvelle colonie de 
la Guyane, September 20, 1?63, A.N., Col. C. 14, 26, 
fols. 254-259* (Hereinafter cited as Instructions Communes 
â Turgot et Chanvalon. )
Mémoire du Roi pour servir d'Instructions au Sieur 
Chevalier Turgot, Gouverneur Lieutenant Général de la 
Guyane, August 31, 1?64, A.N., Col. C. 14, 27, fols. 46-47. 
(Hereinafter cited as Instructions A Turgot.)
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the same time when the Mémoire of 1?64 was written, Louis XV 
expected that the crisis at Kourou could be arrested and the 
problems solved. It was his hope that Kourou and Cayenne 
would not only maintain an able force In Guyane but would 
easily come to the support of the French forces In the 
Caribbean In the event of need. The reverse was true In 
the case that such a need existed In Guyane. The failure 
of the Kourou project did not change the "Intention" of the 
French. Instead It augmented support for reforms and recon­
struction of the military at the ancient colony. Except for 
a brief period following the Impact of the Kourou catastrophe, 
the defense forces at Cayenne received continued attention 
throughout the 1760's and In the next decade.
The military at Cayenne witnessed the beginning of a 
new course after the termination of the Seven Years' War 
and following the general ordinance of March 24, I763. As 
In the case of the other French colonies, the ordinance 
provided for administrative and military reforms, aimed at 
strengthening the colony against Invasion, and supported 
the French colonial policy of a war of revenge. The reforms 
were stipulated In several ordinances, particularly the 
ordinance of March 26, I763. The latter sought to reform 
ten companies of soldiers of the marine and an Infcmtry 
regiment of Saintonge that had been stationed at Cayenne 
since December 10, 1?62.^ At the same time It ordered
^Ordonnance du 26 mars, 1763, pour la réforme des
troupes qui sont A Cayenne, A.N., Col. A. 8, No. 6, fol. 215.
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tiro compemles of one hundred men to Guyane to assist in 
establishing the new colony at Kourou until the arrival of 
Turgot,^ Additionally, it instructed the Swiss regiment of 
the Comte de Hallwyle, stationed at Louisiana, to transfer 
to Guyane in order to strengthen defenses there.7 These 
changes, structural and substantive, reflected a change of 
direction in France's colonial policy not only in Guyane 
but throughout the remaining French empire. As in the other 
French colonies, the milices at Cayenne were replaced by 
regular French troops from the Métropole. an action which 
immensely changed the character and strength of the mili­
tary, The burden of defense was no longer the responsibility 
of the local force. This meant, in addition, that the 
military at Cayenne could request additional troops ai^ 
arms, a course of action which was made throughout the 
period of Choiseul's administration emd in the adminis­
tration of his successors. In consequence, May, 1?64, saw 
the arrival of twenty companies to be called "national 
troops" at Cayenne to augment the French troops sent there
q
in 1763, Two companies of canonnières-bombardiers.
^Ordonnance du 26 mars, I763, pour la réforme des 
troupes qui sont â Cayenne, A.N,, Col, A, 8, No, 7, fol, 217, 
See also Col. B, II6, fol, 513.
7ordonnance du 19 mars, 1763, A.N,, Col. B. 118,
No. Jk, fol, 76, See also No, 129, fol. I7 0, dated 
18 Juillet, 1763. The Comte de Hallwyle was a Swiss general 
serving in the French army,
^Ordonnance du 1®^ mai, 1764, pour 1'établissement de 
vingt compagnies sous la dénomination de troupes nationales 
â la Guyane, A.N,, Col, A, 9, No, 23,
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a company of engineers and another of workers followed In 
August of the same year. 9 The national troops were enletrged 
in September by twenty-five companies of soldiers and by a 
company of canonnières.^^ The steady growth of the military 
gave to Guyane, for the first time in her military history, 
a large force of French troops. However, in I765 the 
colony witnessed a reduction of the military occasioned by 
the impact of the Kourou catastrophe. The reduction was 
encouraged when, in France, the public reacted against the 
promoters of the Kourou expedition. Public sentiment was 
unfavorable to any further attempts to colonize Guyane, and 
this led to a withdrawal of several companies of troops.
But the colonial officials at Cayenne, particularly the 
newly appointed governor, Louis Thomas Jacau de Fiedmond, 
and his pay commissioner, Maillart Dumsle, argued against 
the withdrawal. ^  They urged maintenance of a strong force.
Choiseul's reaction to the Kourou crisis and conse­
quently to the military at Cayenne is significant. He wrote 
to Louis KV in 1765t expressing profound concern about the
^Ordonnance du 1®^ août, 1764, A.N., Col, A. 9, No. 35.
^Oordonnance du 6 septembre, 1764, A.N., Col, B. 119, 
No. 35.
^^See Ordonnance du 21 août, I765, A.N., Col. B. 121, 
Nos. 39-40, fols. 585-586; du 21 septembre, 1765, and 
21 octobre. 1765. ibid. 1 also 1®^ octobre. 1765. Col. A. 9. 
fol, 68.
^Fiedmond (Cayenne) to Choiseul (Versailles),
April 24, 1765, A.N., Col. C. 14, 20, fol. 40.
l6k
failure of attempts to settle in America (French Antilles)
and in Guyane, He charged both Estaing, governor of Saint
Domingue, whom he recalled in 1?66, and Turgot, governor at
Kourou and Cayenne, who was imprisoned for not fulfilling his
duties, for failure in implementing his p l a n , H e  wrote
that he wanted to establish a European system in America,
but he had erred in selecting governors who were incapable,
I have chosen subjects to govern who have thrown me 
into terrible misleading paths i some were greedy, others 
despotic, ignorant and unreasonable. One, such as 
M, Estaing whom I thought had a superior intelligence, 
is nothing but a fool and a dangerous fool: his inten­
dant nonetheless dishonest, H, Turgot is crazy and 
dishonest at the same time. Finally, the disorder in 
this part [referring to Kouro^ has been extreme, l 
have had great griefs. My experience taught me to 
avoid errors. I have changed some of the governors ;
I have reduced expenses. We must change Estaing and 
his intendant next year; emd if we cannot prevent the 
evil that occurred from having taken place, at least, 
with patience and a smooth and wise administration, we 
will suppress it; but this will still demand a lot of 
work,14
Choiseul admitted the failures in Guyane and in the 
Caribbean, but he exonerated himself by placing immediate-
^3choiseul, Mémoire. on. cit,. pp, 18-19.
^^Ibid.. pp, 19-20, "J*ai fait choix de sujets pour 
gouverneur qui m'ont jeté dans des écarts épouvantables les 
uns étaient intéressés, les autres despotiques, ignorants 
et déraisonnables. Un, tel que H. d'Estaing & qui je croyais 
un talent supérieur, n'est que fou et fou dangereux# son 
intendant pour le moins un fripon. M, Turgot est fou et 
fripon en même temps. Enfin le désordre dans cette partie a 
été extrême; j'en ai eu de grands chagrins. Mon expérience 
m'a appris Â me réformer; j'ai changé une partie des gouver­
neurs ; j'ai restreint les dépenses. Il faudra changer M, 
d'Estaing et son intendant l'année prochaine; et, si l'on ne 
peut pas empêcher que le mal fait ne le soit, du moins, avec 
de la patience et une administration douce et sage, le ré- 
primera-t-on; mais cela demande encore du travail, "
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responsibility on the colonial governors. Such failures, 
however, did not change his plans for reforms or for his 
preparations of the French colonial forces. Determined to 
carry out his program Cholseul only replaced the governors 
and other officials. Even to the very last year of his 
ministry, he was determined to carry out his plan amd to 
fulfill his designs to use the colonies to support the 
Métropole against her enemies.
In effect, Cholseul reported that his plan for the 
Caribbean suffered because of the failure of Estaing In 
Saint Domingue and of Turgot In Guyane. But he assured 
Louis XV that Estaing would be replaced by Bohan and Turgot 
by Fiedmond, governors whom he felt would be more capable. 15 
At the same time, he Informed Louis XV that he was pleased 
with the leadership of Ennery, governor at Martinique, and 
of Nollvos, governor at Guadeloupe, both of whom performed 
their duties satisfactorily.^^ Then he assertedi "These 
two points are essential for the defense of America. "17 
Accordingly, the burden of Implementing Choiseul's program 
depended to a large degree on the role of colonial governors. 
This was particularly true of Fiedmond, governor at Cayenne,
15£stalng's role and that of Rohan's were discussed 
In chapter five. The role of Fiedmond constitutes most of 
this chapter.
l^For the role of Ennery and Nollvos, see chapter 
five, and Choiseul's Mémoire, op. clt.. p. 20.
^^cholseul, Mémolie. op. clt.. p. 20. "Ces deux 
points sont essentiels & la défense de l'Amérique. "
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In 1766. His administrative and military skills facilitated 
the continuity of a strong military force in Guyane following 
the troop withdrawal in 1765. Shortly after taking office, 
the governor personally surveyed the entire Prench posses­
sion, including the interior, noting the condition of forts, 
the strength of the armed forces, and those areas susceptible 
to invasion. It was clear to him that Guyane was vulnerable 
to invasion from the Portuguese, Dutch, and English. For 
this reason, he submitted a report to the ministry of the 
marine and a "plan of defense, " Subsequently, as situations 
in Guyane deteriorated, Fiedmond revised his plan and resub­
mitted it to the ministry. Since Choiseul was no longer 
head of the marine from 1766 on, Fiedmond *s plans were 
received by Choiseul's successors, for example, the Due de 
Fraslin, cousin to the former minister of the marine, who 
served from 1766 to 1770,
Fiedmond *s Plan of Defense in 1766 
The important task awaiting governor Fiedmond upon 
taking office in January, 1766, was to improve the military 
and to strengthen the defenses of Guyane, Instructed by 
Praslin to examine the nature of French forces and defenses, 
the governor despatched to Versailles several documents in 
support of defense measures in the colony, A letter on 
January 22, 1766, discussed a potential invasion by sea in 
the event of an Anglo-French war. He argued that the port 
of Cayenne could not support resistance. The letter added
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that Invasion was likely also from the Interior of Guyane,
wheia the Portuguese or Dutch, taking advantage of the
Anglo-French differences, could pake an incursion at any
time,^® In May of the same year, Fiedmond sent Praslin a
memoir showing that the fort at Cayenne had decayed beyond
repair and that forts elsewhere had become obsolete.
For the preservation of the colonies in general such 
as the latter (jSuyan^ being susceptible to be 
attacked by the marine, against which she cannot 
resist without immediate help by forces of the same 
kind, the arrival of which is not always certain, 
there is no hesitation on the choice of defenses; 
the interior defense is most sure when we canno# 
be assisted and the enemy maintains sea superiority.1°
Fiedmond proposed that measures be taken as soon as 
possible for extensive repairs. Judging by the extent of 
the French sea coast, he contended that Guyane could not 
maintain an effective defense from the coastline, particu­
larly given the superiority of the English sea power. The 
maintenance of a coastal defense would depend much on 
support from the French navy. If such support was not given.
^Fiedmond (Cayenne) to Praslin (Versailles),
January 22, I766, A.N., Col. C. 14, 32, fols. 6-7. For 
other correspondence of Fiedmond, see I765, A.N., Col. C. 14, 
28, fols. 31-91. Further treatment of border conflicts from 
the Portuguese and Dutch is given later.
19Mëmoire sur la défense de cette colonie, 22 mai,
1766, A.N., Col. 14, 3 2, fol. 16. "Pour la conservation des 
colonies en général telles que celle-ci susceptible d'être 
ataquée par de la marine, contre la quelle elle ne peut 
résister sans être promptement secourue par des forces de 
même nature dont l'arrivée et toujours incertaine il n'y a 
point â balancer sur le choix de défenses; celle de 1' 
intérieur est la plus sûre quand on n'est pas A portée 
d'être secouru et l'ennemi conservant la supériorité sur 
mer. "
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the colony would have no defense and would remain at the
mercy of the enemy.
In short, everything Is to he feared for Cayenne. In 
addition to Its great weaknesses, her two neighbors will 
always lean on the side of our natural enemies [Sngland] 
as even our colonists for their own Interest which will 
always carry them to suhaltkthemselves as early as 
possible for the safety of their habitations, their 
slaves, their families and their livesi and there Is 
no reason to expect that they will expose themselves 
to the fatigue and danger of an uncertain and useless 
defense.20
Since It was unlikely to receive much support from the 
French navy, the defense of Guyane was to be assured, not 
from the coast, but the Interior. By this he did not suggest 
leaving the coast entirely defenseless. His plan called for 
erecting a series of forts on the coast and at ports of 
entry.
At the same time, in the interior his strategy called 
for a concentrated line of defense that would cut off enemy 
Invasion from both land and sea. Fiedmond argued that an 
English Invasion by sea would lead to grave difficulty 
to penetrate beyond the coast line because of the dense 
forest. Similarly, an Invasion on land via Dutch Guiana 
or Brazil would pose serious problems traversing the thick
20Mëmolre sur la défense de cette colonie, 0£. cit.. 
fol. 17. ^ "Enfin, tout est & craindre pour Cayennei outre 
son extrême folblesse, ces deux voisins pencheront toujours 
du côté de nos enemls naturels comme nos colons même pour 
leurs Intérêts particuliers, qui les porteront toujours A 
se soumettre le plutôt possible pour la sûreté de leurs 
habitations, de leurs esclaves, de leurs familles et de 
leur vie; et 11 n'y a aucun lieu d'attendre qu'ils 
s'exposent aux fatigues et au danger d'une défense 
Incertaine et même Inutile."
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hinterland, Pledmond's plEUi was also based on the assump­
tion that Indians would be recruited to strengthen defense 
measures. Further» he proposed chat free Negroes be trans­
ported to Guyane to be used in strengthening the military. 
This was contrary to Choiseul's plan. But the governor 
contended that the Negroes were less dangerous to the French 
than the enemies. Additionally, he held that free Negroes 
were useful in cultivating land, in surviving tropical 
conditions, and in accepting servitude,^2 «phe governor 
explained that the French colonists were unwilling to live 
in the interior and that they preferred to remain on the 
coast despite susceptibility to greater risks. The interior, 
Fiedmond claimed, provided a degree of natural safety as 
well as defense. In an effort to encourage the colonists 
to move to the interior, Fiedmond requested that some compen­
sation be given to them to aid their settlement.
Fart of the defense plan of Fiedmond provided for 
reconstructing the ancient city of Cayenne and for adding 
to its limited defenses. Since the Seven Years* War, 
Cayenne's defenses had deteriorated steadily and no exten­
sive repairs had been undertaken. Forts were decayed, 
garrisons weakened, and magazines emptied. Host of the 
artillery that remained lacked mortar for firing, or the
2lFurther discussions of Fiedmond *s coastal and 
interior plan of defense are given below,
22Némoire sur la défense de cette colonie, o£, cit., 
fols, 18-19.
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battery was without carriage and platform, and guns were 
rusted. Failure to replace and Increase armaments and to 
augment the regiments, warned Fiedmond, meant that Cayenne 
would be unable to resist any Invading navy even If the 
latter consisted of only four large frigates. Such an 
Invasion would take only three hours to bombard Cayenne.
He proposed, therefore, that the colony be sent arms 
Immediately, that the old obsolete fort be rebuilt, that 
palisades, walls, and parapets be reinforced with cannons, 
and that a series of batteries be erected. He asked that 
a huge concrete vault and a magazine be constructed to 
store gunpowder and arms, and that houses be built to 
accommodate the sick and wounded. The houses In peace time 
would be used as jails which were also needed to Improve 
efficiency of police administration.
In addition, Fiedmond wrote that Cayenne possessed a 
natural form of defense consisting of a huge rock emerging 
from the sea and on which artillery could be erected to 
attack Invading ships. "He would considerably augment the 
defense of the port [Cayenne^ ] by use of a rock which emerges 
out of the water In proximity of the passage, to place a 
battery there at the door of the port which Is, to say, 
unserviceable."^^ From the position of the rock Incoming
Z^Mëmolre sur la défense de cette colonie, on. cit., 
fol. 24. "L'on augmenterait considérablement la defense du 
port en profittant d'une roche A fleur d'eau qui avolslne 
le chenal, pour y placer la batterie de la porte du port 
pour ainsi dire Inutile."
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vessels could be spotted and Identified and the bombardment 
of enemy ships commenced. A similar plan was conceived by 
Préfontaine and Chanvalon at the îles du Diable for the 
protection of Kourou,^^ The roc> could support large 
cannons, for example, which from different heights could be 
disastrous to enemy targets. From such a vantage position 
the defense of Cayenne would be Increased considerably.
Fiedmond also proposed the creation of an entirely 
new colony near Cayenne to be encircled and fortified with 
bastions and fenced with concrete structures or thick 
wooded walls. The purpose of the new settlement would be 
to complement the defense of Guyane from Cayenne. On the 
question of troop augmentation, he proposed the selection of 
only able men capable of withstanding tropical conditions. 
"This troop, prepared In that manner for the preservation 
of the colony, for Its Interior tranquility at all time 
could...contribute also to Its augmentation."^^ Even a 
small select regiment, advised Fiedmond, would be more 
useful and effective than a battalion of soldiers unaccus­
tomed to fighting In a hazardous tropical situation.
In consequence of the project of augmentation of the 
colony In 1763$ I had proposed to raise and form 
four companies destined to the service of artillery.
2^See dhapter six.
^^émolre sur la défense de cette colonie, o£, cit.. 
fol. 27. "Cette troupe ainsi disposée pour la conservation 
de la colonie en temps de guerre, pour sa tranqulllté 
Intérieure en tout temps...contribuerait aussi & son 
augmentation."
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composed of all kinds of workers.. .and all the men 
necessary relative to the prospect of a vigorous 
external and internal resistance in time of war and 
to be able to fulfill many other objects in time of
peace,2o
Augmentation of troops constituted a major phase of 
Fiedmond *s plan of defense in 1?66. Throughout the 
remaining years as governor, he despatched several letters 
and other official communiqués in which he consistently 
sought additional regular French troops and armaments. The 
guns sent to Fiedmond were shorter and lighter than those 
obtained earlier. The improvement resulted from the inno­
vation of artillery that had taken place in France as part 
of the program of general reforms. The improved guns 
contributed to greater accuracy and efficiency of defense. 
The French regulars were also adequately trained, reflecting 
the reforms of the army in the Métropole.
Praslin responded to Fiedmond *s plan of defense by 
sending an advisor, the Marquis de Beauval, in 1?66 to make 
a detailed inspection of the troops in G u y a n e . Beauval
Z^Mémoire sur la défense de cette colonie, o£. cit., 
fols. 27-28. Since Fiedmond was not in Guyane until I765, 
his reference must be regarding an earlier proposal which 
he had made for Guyane as an official of the ministry of the 
marine. "En consequence du projet d'augmentation de la 
colonie en I763, j'avais fait celui de lever et former 
quatre compagnies affectées au service de l'artillerie, 
composée d'ouvriers de toute espèce,..et tous les hommes 
nécessaires relativement aux vues d'une vigoureuse resis­
tance extérieure et intérieure en temps de guerre, et à 
pouvoir remplir tant d'autres objets en temps de paix."
27colonel A. Costantini, "Problèmes militaires de la 
Guyane française durant la seconde moitié du XVIII® siècle." 
Revue Historique de l'Armée. No. 3 (Trimestrielle, 1967), 81,
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was followed by Laforest whom Praslin appointed as major 
commandant of the national troops at Cayenne.^8 Also the 
same year, the ministry of the marine despatched a corps of 
troops to Guyane under the command of the Comte d*Abbé, 
commandant in chief of artillery at Cayenne, ^ 9 And in 
December another corps consisting of 250 men followed.30 
The reinforcement marked a new beginning of French milita­
rism in the ancient colony.
The Portuguese Threat 
Fiedmond *s plan of defense in 1?66 originated from a 
fear of an English invasion. A similar fear existed 
regarding a Portuguese invasion from Brazil. The problem 
with the Portuguese began during the Seven Years* War when 
France engineered a plan td attack Portugal and Brazil in 
a war of diversion against England, As discussed before, 
the plan was based on Behague*s military mission to Guyane 
in 1762. Determined to fight a war of revenge after 1763, 
Choiseul resorted to it once more. There was, however, 
another reason for re-examining the plan. It was to resolve
28iaforest (Cayenne) to Praslin (Versailles),
October 15, 1765, A.N., Col. C. 14, 28, fol. 233.
^^Correspondance d'AbbÔ, 19 juillet, I766, A.N.,
Col. C, 14, 28, fol. 177.
3^250 Hommes de recrues destinées pour Cayenne,
5 décembre, 1766, A.N., Col. B. 124, fol. I70.
3^For a list of ammunition requested and sent to 
Gayane in 1766, see letter of Fiedmond to Praslin, August 3> 
1766, A.N., Col. C. 14, 31, fol. 223.
17^
the unsettled French Guyane-Brazilian border conflict.
The border dispute and the possibility of a war of 
diversion led Brazilian authorities to make periodic incur­
sions into French Guyane. The invasions were encouraged by 
the deterioration of Anglo-French diplomacy after 1763.
The Portuguese, an ally of the English, took advantage of 
the situation.
The Portuguese, our neii^bor, will not act so because 
their political objectives obliged them to be on the 
s^ ide of the English...It was the intention of the 
[French] court at the end of the last war to make a 
diversion in this country. In order to be able to 
promptly execute such a plan...it is necessary to
know the country.
Praslin, in cooperation with Fiedmond, tried to obtain 
information on Brazil through the mission of the lieutenant 
of artillery at Cayenne, Sieur Jean André Bouichon Du Guers, 
who was instructed to survey the border in question. He was 
asked to recommend strategic places to build forts and 
"...to propose means which seem to him most proper to succeed 
and the advantages which could result from them for the state 
and the colony. "33
3^Copie du projet sur la partie de la Guyane occupée 
par le Portugais, 18 décembre, 1765, A.N., Col. C. l4, 28, 
fol. 398. (Hereinafter cited as Guyane occupée par le 
Portugais.) "Le Portugais nos voisins n'en feront pas autant, 
puisque leurs raisons politiques les obligent de se ranger 
du coté des Anglais...C'était l'intention de la cour, vers 
la fin de la dernière guerre de faire une diversion dans ce 
pays 1&. Pour pouvoir mettre proptement en execution un 
tel projet,.. il faut nécessairement connaître le local."
^^Ibid.. fols. 308-309. "...proposer les moyens qui 
lui paraissent les plus propres A réussir et les avantages 
qui pourraient en résulter pour l'Etat et pour la colonie. "
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As a pretext for undertaking the mission Guers was 
authorized to negotiate a cattle trade with the Portuguese 
and was given certification that he was a botanist on an 
exploratory scientific mission. Thus he was able to 
conceal the real purpose of his Investigation.
The Guers mission was to some degree similar to the 
mission undertaken by Behague in 1?62 when Choiseul had 
originated the strategy for a war of diversion. ^  Guers 
provided valuable Information, but Choiseul had no certainty 
when war should commence. The time element depended 
entirely on adequate preparation In France and In the 
colonies. Yet In I763 he predicted that hostility would 
begin as soon as Pitt returned to office. 35 However, In 
1765 he advised Louis XV that war would not come before 
1769.^^ In 1770, the year of his dismissal from office, 
he wrote I
We suppose, therefore, that war will not take place 
In 1770, and that we have time to prepare our 
projects and our means; but we must think that 
this period of delay Is probably the last, and 
that In 1771 we will be very near to war....We 
believe in France that the diversion of Portugal 
Is not only useful but Is even necessary. In case 
that Spain made war with Englsmd. Moreover In 
France we think that no consideration must stop 
Madrid on this diversion which Is the only powerful
3^Lettre de 22 septembre, I763, A.N., Col, C, 14, 26, 
fol, 340,
33Discussed In chapter three.
3^Lettre de 22 septembre, I763, A.N., Col. C, l4, 26,
fol. 340.
176
means to defend America or to compensate for the loss 
that we sustained there,37
The war of diversion, from the position of Fiedmond, 
presupposed ccmpletion of military preparations at Cayenne,
But even in 1770 the forces and defenses in the colony were 
yet inadeqsAte. This situation, and the fear that the 
Portuguese might take advantage of the Anglo-French hos­
tilities and cause a grave border crisis, led Fiedmond to 
believe that if there were to be an invasion, it was as 
likely to come from the Portuguese as from the English. 
Fiedmond *s position for the defense of Guyane was maintained 
throu^out the 1770's until the actual outbreak of hostilities 
in 1778,
The Dutch Threat 
The military preparation in Guyane was influenced not 
only by Choiseul's plan to establish bases for war purposes 
but also by a series of threats from the English, Portuguese, 
and Dutch. Like the other neighbors of the French colony, 
the Dutch in Surinam (Dutch Guiana) presented a threat.
^^Mémoire des questions préalables â la guerre du 
Portugal, 20 Janvier, 1770» B.N., Mss. Fr. 10770, fols. 
43-44. "Nous supposons donc que la guerre n'aura pas lieu 
en 1770, et que nous avons le temps de préparer nos projets 
et nos moyens ; mais il faut penser que ce temps de délai 
est vraisemblablement le dernier et qu'en 1771 nous serons 
très prés de la guerre... .L'on croit en France que la 
diversion de Portugal est non seulement utile, mais même 
est nécessaire, en cas que l'Espagne ait la guerre avec 
l'Angleterre. L'on pense de plus en France qu'aucune 
consideration ne doit arrêter A Madrid sur cette diversion 
qui est le seul moyen puissant de défendre l'Amérique ou 
de compenser les pertes que l'on pourra y faire, "
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Fiedmond wrote about the Dutch problem In a letter to
Praslin: "We suspect the Dutch from Surinam of making
Incursions on French territory; a new war between the latter
and the runaway Negroes Is Imminent. "38 Declaring that the
French government was obligated to protect the Indians In
the Interior and to prevent the Dutch from trespassing Into
French territory, the governor added:
The defense of our rights and the protection which must 
be given to the Indians of our territory who can be 
considered as your subjects will be the only reason 
that will make us act... In the manner compatible with 
the honor of the nation and the Interest of a colony.39
Subsequent letters convey that the Dutch threat had
Increased and that Immediate attention ought to be paid to
the security of the Inhabitants of Guyane.^®
The Dutch situation caused Fiedmond to re-examine the
strength of the French forces and thus to revise his plan
of defense of 1766. On June, I767, he submitted a new plan
to Praslin. "I send you the plans and. outlines of battery.
38piedmond (Cayenne) to Praslin (Versailles), March 10, 
1767, A.N., Col. 14, 34, fols. 25-26. "On suspecte les 
Hollandais de Surinam de faire des incursions sur le 
territoire française; une nouvelle guerre entre ceux-ci 
et les nègres marrons est imminente."
39piedmond (Cayenne) to Praslin (Versailles), March 11, 
1767, A.N., Col. C. 14, 34, fol. 190. "La défense de nos 
droits et la protection qui est due aux indiens de notre 
territoire qui peuvent être considérés comme sujets de Sa 
Majesté seront les seuls motifs qui le feront agir,..de 
manière compatible avec l'honneur de la nation et les 
Intérêts de la colonie."
^^Fiedmond (Cayenne) to praslin (Versailles), March 17, 
1767, A.N., Col. C. 14, 34, fol. 47.
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of large pieces projected for defense of this port,,, ** 
the document stated,Following his description of work 
proposed, of materials needed, and of expense involved, he 
stated that the completion of such projects would substan­
tially contribute to the improving of defenses. Addi­
tionally, he requested more guns, muskets, mortars, and 
bombs. He reported that a training school for target 
shooting had been started under the direction of Valée, 
artillery major and commander of the company of canonnière- 
bombardiers. The school constructed fifty-five gun 
carriages and provided military training for the o f f i c e r s ,  ^ 2 
In April, 1768, Fiedmond again revised the plan of 
defense. Based largely on the first and second plans, the 
new plan proposed two main areas of defenses one from the 
coast and the other from the interior. He supported the 
interior system of defense as being more practical and 
safer and argued that even though it was less attractive 
and more rigorous, it would present immense difficulties 
for enemies invading from the sea. Forts established in the 
interior, wrote Fiedmond, could be connected readily to the 
coast by means of rivers, facilitating reception of supplies 
and reinforcements from the French Antilles. As in the
plan de défense du port de Cayenne, juin,
1767, A,N,, Col, C, l4, 34, fol, 95* "Je vous envoi les 
plans et profils de la batterie, dè grosses pièces, 
projettée pour défendre de ce port, "
42ibid,. fol, 95.
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earlier plans, Fiedmond did not ignore the importance of 
maintaining heavy resistance on the coast. He proposed re­
building coastal forts, erecting batteries on the treacherous 
rock jutting out of the sea near to Cayenne, constructing 
similar batteries on a wall around the ancient colony, and 
establishing a garrison. Similarly, he reiterated his pro­
posal to build a new colony in the savannah adjacent to 
Cayenne and to surround it with mortars and cannons.
The ministry of the marine accepted the plan of 1?68, 
and in a decision on April 23 acquiesced to Fiedmond*s recom­
mendation to construct a new colony and to strengthen defenses, 
Ihider the command of Bessner, newly appointed commandant en 
iHiôoaù and head of the national troops in Guyane, a French 
regiment was despatched to Cayenne.^ Contributing to Fied­
mond *s plan of defense, Bessner requested restoration of the 
corvée. increasing the company of workers, and obtaining 
services of a military architect and an engineer. To these 
requests, Fiedmond added reform and augmentation of national 
troops, construction of a gunpowder factory, and enlargement 
of the canonnière -bombardiers and of the Chasseurs.
^^Défense de Cayenne, avril, 1768, A.N., Col. C, 14,
36, fols. 140-143.
^^Bessner and his contribution to colonization to the 
military has been discussed in chapter six.
^^Projet d* Ordonnance en interprétation de celles ren­
dues le ler octobre, 1765, 5 août, I768, A.N., Col. C. 14,
36, fol. 101. See also la construction de la poudrerie, 
octobre, 1768, A.N., Col. C. 14, 36, fol. 254| Envol de 100 
recrues, 18 mai, 1768, A.N., Col. B. 130, fol. 103, and 500 
fusils pour Cayenne, 18 mars, 1768, A.N., Col. B. 120, foL 29.
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In addition to sending Bessner to Guyane, the ministry
of the marine commissioned Vlctor-Thérëse, Comte d'Ennery,
governor of the îles du Vent and of Martinique, to Inspect
the troops of the -^ .clent colony, The purpose of the
Inspection was expressed In a correspondence to Fiedmondi
He will examine with you the various positions of 
Cayenne and Guyane, the resources for defense, the 
means to employ them...and finally everything that 
could contribute to the safety of this colony. I 
recommend you, therefore, to [give] him all explana­
tions of which he will have need on the actual state of 
the military, of fortification and of artillery and to 
communicate with him all Ideas that you have relative 
to his mission. 47
Ennery submitted two reports to Praslin on the state 
of defense at Cayenne affecting the French possession of 
Guyane. The first, dated February 5» 17^9, was concerned 
with the Immediate artillery needs of the ancient colony.
It urged that cm adequate supply of batteries, cannons, and 
fusils be shipped promptly In order to afford the minimum 
degree of security In the event of attack. He Informed the 
ministry of the marine that mortars and gun carriages were
^^Vlctor-Thdrôse, Comte d "Ennery, was governor of the 
îles du Vent since I763, and governor of Martinique since
1765.
^?8ur les moyens de mettre la colonie de Cayenne en 
état de défense en cas de guerre, 30 septembre, 1768, A.N., 
Col. B. 129, fol, 481. "Il examinera avec vous les diffé­
rentes positions de Cayenne et de la Guyane, les resources 
pour la défense, les moyens d'en faire usage...et enfin tout 
ce qui pourra contribuer à la sûreté de cette colonie. Je 
vous recommande en consequence de lui tous les éclaircisse­
ments dont 11 aura besoin sur l'état actuel du militaire, de 
fortification et de l'artillerie et de lui communiquer toutes 
les Idées que vous pourrez avoir relativement â sa mission. "
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needed, concluding "...that is approximately. Sir, the main 
articles necessary for the defense of Cayenne, and that It 
Is to be sent there Immediately.
In a second report written two weeks later en route to 
Martinique, Ennery added a list of work to be undertaken to 
strengthen Guyanese defenses. There was nothing new that 
had not been recommended ecurller by Fiedmond. The list 
Included new forts, palisades, batteries, artilleries of 
various kind, and a magazine.^9 Assuring Praslin that the 
colony could be secured from enemy attack and war, the 
report addedi
In order to do all this work promptly...It Is necessary 
that you augment the company of artillery by fifty 
workers whom you will send from France, that you send 
as quickly as possible to the national troops 200 
recruited men, that you order the soldiers to work 
at the fortifications and to work only for the king 
while there will be work to do.50
^®Demandes de canons et de munitions, 5 février, 1769, 
A.N,, Col. C. 1 ,^ 38, fol. 196. "Volla â peu près Monsieur 
le Duc, les principaux articles nécessaires & la défense de 
Cayenne, et qu'il est Instant d'y faire passer."
^^Bapport sur le voyage d'inspection qu'il a fait à 
Cayenne, pour examiner les moyens de défense de la colonie, 
18 février 1769, A.N., Col. C. 14, 39, fol. 224.
50gapport sur le voyage d'inspection qu'il a fait & 
Cayenne, pour examiner les moyens de défense de la colonie, 
18 février 1769, A.N., Col. C. 14, 39, fol. 226. "Pour 
faire tous ces travaux promptement...11 est nécessaire 
que vous augmentiez la compagnie d'artillerie de cinquante 
ouvriers que vous enverrez de France, que vous envoyez 
aux troupes nationales le plus promptement possible deux 
cents hommes de recrues, que vous ordonniez que les 
soldats travaillent aux fortifications, et ne puissent 
travailler que pour le roy tandis qu'il y aura des travaux 
â faire."
182
Fiedmond supported the Ennery report and repeated his 
earlier request to augment the effectifs of the company of 
canonnière-bombardiers and the company of chasseurs. He 
also estimated that the total cost of repair and building 
would be approximately 176,973 livres,51
A month earlier Fiedmond had sent another document to 
the ministry listing the conditions of guns, fusils, and 
cannons which were unusable and In need of replacement. 52 
Many of the requests were not acted upon Immediately, and In 
some cases no action was taken. On June 22, 1769, however, 
the ministry of the marine authorized 100 new recruits to be 
despatched from the depot of the île de Ré , to be followed 
by a supply of ammunitions In August. 53 The supply consisted 
of 320 bombs for mortars of twelve Inches, 1,000 for mortars 
of nine Inches, four cannons, and 300 cannon balls.5^ In 
fulfillment of Fiedmond *s request the company of canonnière- 
bombardiers was Increased by fifty men and the governor was 
Instructed to re-establish the local militia. 55 with the
5lFledmond (Cayenne) to Dubuq (Versailles), March 17, 
1769, A.M., Col. C. 14, 38, fol, 110.
52Rapport sur le voyage d'inspection militaire fait 
par le Comte d'Ennery, 10 février, 1769, A.N., Col, C. 14, 
39, fols. 7-10.
53pxaslln (Versailles) to Fiedmond (Cayenne), June 22, 
1769, A.N., Col. B. 132, fol. 23.
54stat des bouches A fau et munitions d 'artillerie A 
envoyer A Cayenne en I769-177O, 26 août, I769, A N., Col. B. 
132, fol. 393.
^5ordonnance du 29 décembre 1769, A.N., Col. A. 12,
fol. 40.
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use of local inhabitants, he also cfeated a company of 
infantry and of artillery and a company of dragons and of 
chasseresse de milice (light infantry s o l d i e r s T o  the 
officer corps of these companies the Métropole would offer 
pensions, promotions, and compensations.In addition, the 
ministry of the marine passed an order to send Dessingy, 
engineer and land surveyor, to Cayenne. He was assigned to 
survey the interior relative to Fiedmond*s plan of defense, 
and "...to make a map before helping to organize the defense 
of the hinterland in case of war. Under Dessingy *s 
initiative the interior was given limited defense measures 
through placement of patrols to ensure that the old forts 
were repaired and fortified and by orgemizing Indians and free 
Negroes into a company of soldiers. "I found nothing more 
indispensable and more immediate," wrote Fiedmond, reflecting
on the work of Dessingy, "than the augmentation of the 
companies of chasseurs which is composed of mulattoes and 
free Negroes..."59
56ordonnance du 29 décembre, 1769, concernant le rétab­
lissement des milices âCCayenne, A N., Col. A. 12, fol. 4l,
570rdonnance concernant les encouragements accordés 
aux officiers de milices de la Guyane, 29 décembre, 1769,
A.N., Col. A. 12, fol. 42.
58voyage de Dessingy, ingénieur géographe dans l'intér­
ieur des terres, 15 octobre, I769, A.N., Col. C. 14, 38, 
fols. 89-90. "...pour lever une carte devant servir A 
organiser la défense de 1 'arrière-pays en cas de guerre."
59Fiedmond (Cayenne) to Dubuq (Versailles), February 3, 
1769* A.N., Col. C. 14, 38, fols. 3-5. "Je ne trouve rien de 
plus indispensable et de plus pressé que l'augmentation de la 
compagnies des chasseurs qui est composée de mulâtres et 
nègres libres..."
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The Institution of patrols in the interior served not 
only to maintain some degree of security from outside inva­
sion but also to check the flow of Indian migration to 
Surinam where they escaped military duties. The exodus to 
Surinam was evident as early as the Seven Years ' War. In 
1766 Fiedmond established two military posts on the French- 
Dutch border in an attempt to restrain the flow of migration. 
He also posted a detachment of fifty soldiers on the border.^ 
But, encouraged by the Dutch, the natives continued to 
escape, hence the basis for hostilities between French 
Guyane and Surinam. Following Dessingy's investigation, 
French regulars were sent to the interior to augment the 
patrols and colonists were encouraged to settle there. 
Fiedmond wrote about this in 1770.
I have had the honor. Sir, to present to you different 
points of view about defense. I do not know of any 
greater safety than in the interior of the country,...
In order to create our needed establishments in the 
interior, missionaries will perform marriages between 
soldiers and Indian women, between Indians and free 
Negro and mulatto women in order to augment, also by 
population, the defenses which can become more and 
more impregnable in time. 61
éÛFiedmond (Cayenne) to Praslin (Versailles),
October 10, 1766, A.N., Col. C. 14, 32, fols. 63-64.
^^Fiedmond (Cayenne) to Dubuq (Versailles), March 20, 
1770, A N,, Col. C. 14, 40, fols. 3-6. "J'ai eu l'honneur. 
Monseigneur, de vous présenter différents points de vue de 
défense. Je n'en crois pas de plus sûr que cette dans 
l'intérieur des terres,...Pour former nos établissements 
nécessaires dans l'intérieur, les missionnaires marieront 
les soldats avec les indiennes et les indiens avec les 
négresses et mûlatresses affranchissement A fin d'augmenter 
aussi par la population les défenseurs qui peuvent devenir 
de plus en plus inexpugnables par succession de temps."
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Time was. Indeed, an Important factor in the strategy 
of the French at Cayenne as well as that of the diplomacy 
of the ministry of the marine. Just as Choiseul wanted time 
to prepare for a war against England, so did Fiedmond need 
time in planning against a possible invasion from the 
Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English. All three border 
powers threatened the French; but the English presented the 
greatest menace. Consequently, Fiedmond continued in the 
1770 *s to face the possibility of an invasion. His mili­
tary preparation, influenced by the threat, supported the 
plan of the ministry of the marine. To this extent Guyane 
contributed to the maintenance of the French military 
system in the Caribbean.
War Humors
In 1771 war rumors began to circulate in Guyane. The
news made Fiedmond apprehensive.
The rumors that the last French ships announced here 
about the probability of war have greatly alarmed 
this colony which recognizes its weakness and limited 
resource for defense in case of an attack. It would 
be necessary that we were warned if this war was 
immediate or remote.
Fiedmond used the occasion to request reinforcements 
and to express willingness to accelerate preparations if
^^Bruit de Guerre, 10 avril, 1771* Cayenne, A.N., 
Col, C. 14, 40, fol, 20. **Les bruits que les derniers 
bâtiments de France ont répandu ici sur les apparences 
de la guerre ont beaucoup effrayé cette colonie, qui 
connaissait sa faiblesse et le peu de ressources pour la 
défense en cas d'attaque, il serait bien essentiel que 
nos fussions avertis si cette guerre était prochaine ou 
éloignée. *•
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war came. In an earlier correspondence he imported the
activities of England on the îles Turques, and wrotet
"You see. Sir, that the English have established lately
on the anchorage a battery of sixteen cannons of twelve
and that additional help from Europe were being awaited.
It is of the greatest consequence for us to destroy this
establishment, "^3 a  similar warning about the English
came from Praslin in 1770. He wrote to Fiedmond t
I inform you. Sir, that England made considerable 
armament whose destination we do not know. It is 
necessary at all events that you be on guard and 
make preparation for the safety of the colony....
We arc attentive of what is happening in England 
and the king (Louis X\Q will send you advice and 
help as circumstances necessitate."04'
Several other letters were exchanged between Cayenne 
and Versailles describing English activities in the Vest 
Indies and along the South American coast. One of these 
in 1772 described that English troops were gathered on 
the îles St. Vincent to reduce the Car lb Indians who had
^3piedmond (Cayenne) to Praslin (Versailles), July 28, 
1768, A.N., Col. B. 131, fol, 162, "Vous verrez, Monsieur, 
que les Anglais ont établi depuis peu sur le mouillage une 
batterie de I6 canons de 12 et qu'on y attendait de nouveaux 
secours d'Europe. Il est de la plus grande conséquence pour 
nous de faire détruire cet établissement."
^^Praslln (Versailles) to Fiedmond (Cayenne),
September 29, 1770, A.N., Col. B. 135» fol. 294. "Je vous 
préviens. Monsieur, que l'Angleterre fait un armement 
considérable dont nous ignorons la destination. Il est 
nécessaire qu'& tous événements vous teniez sur vos gardes 
et que vous fassiez vos dispositions sur la sûreté de la 
colonie... .nous sommes attentifs A ce qui se passes en 
Angleterre et le roi vous^era parvenir les avis et les 
secours que les circonstances exigeront."
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resisted their military establishment. ^ 5 Another, from 
Versailles, reported that England had built forts at 
Dominique. Also, English squadrons were reported on the
île de Crabe.^7
The effect of this correspondence not only exposed 
some of the whereabouts of the English forces In the West 
Indies but made the French forces alert to the possibility 
of an Invasion. It led Fiedmond to request two large ships 
with adequate military supplies and gun boats. Additionally, 
he requested that the effectifs be increased including the 
canotiers, bateliers, and coureurs des bols, and that the 
French marine be despatched to Cayenne Immediately In the 
event of war. He reminded the ministry of the marine that 
until sufficient French battalions were received, the 
defense of the colony would be aided by employment of 
mulattoes and free Negroes In the armed forces.
Fiedmond*s request did not receive attention imme­
diately. Following the dismissal of Choiseul, several 
changes took place In the ministry of the marine. Praslin 
was replaced In December, 1770, by Joseph Marie Terray,
65piedmond (Cayenne) to Nozlêres (Versailles), 
September 11, 1772, A.N., Col. B. l4l, fol. 75. See also 
letter of December 1772, A.N., Col. B. l4l, fol, 106.
^^Fledmond (Cayenne) to Nozlêres (Versailles), 
October 30, 1774, A.N., Col, B. 148, fol. 56,
^^ Fledfflond (Cayenne) to Nozlêres (Versailles),
July 7, 1774, A.N., Col, B. 148, fol. 39.
^®Brult de Guerre, op. cit., fols. 21-25.
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former controller general. The latter, in turn, was 
replaced by Pierre Etienne Bourgeois de Bogue in the 
following April. Another change in August, 17?4, brought 
in Antoine Raymond de Sartine as head of the ministry of 
the marine after an interim of one month under Anne Robert 
Turgot. The changes delayed action. But with the advent 
of Louis XVI in 177^ measures were taken to improve the 
military at Cayenne, for in that year an ordinance effected 
a new form for the national troops and regulated the 
officer corps and all companies of the military. It pro­
vided for more arms and for the standardization of the 
composition and administration of the c o m p a n i e s .  ^ 9 jn the 
years following, when it was clear that English privateers 
had patrolled along the coast of Guyane, Fiedmond accelerated 
the defense at Cayenne. When the Franco-American treaty was 
signed in 1778, Fiedmond obtained permission to double the 
strength of the national troops. He reported, at that time, 
to the French ministry of the marine th&t English ships 
from New England had made incursions at the Approuague River, 
south of Cayenne, But Fiedmond received little help because 
French forces had begun to cross the Atlantic to aid the 
American colonies, a course of action predicted by Choiseul 
since 1765, However, when word reached Versailles that 
the César, the main defense ship at the entrance at Cayenne, 
had been captured by the English in 1779, a French regiment
^9ordonnance du 8 août, 1775, A.N,, Col, A, 15, fol, 24,
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of 100 men and sixteen cannons were despatched to the 
colony. Then on March 22, 1779, Fiedmond received orders 
to prepare the colony for an attack. The Guyanese forces 
were summoned Immediately to augment the French Caribbean 
forces, and the war of revanche. which had been predicted 
since 1765, had finally come.70
7^Costantlnl, "Problems Militaires de la Guyane 
Française durant la seconde moitié du XVIII® siècle," 
OP. cit., pp. 84^ -85,
CHàPTBB VIII 
test cases op FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
In the foregoing it was held that French foreign 
policy after I763 aimed at saving the French empire from 
total ruin and revenging England for the defeat sustained 
in the Seven Years* War, that France followed such a course 
on the assumption that her war-time alliance with Spain 
would be strengthened to enable the Bourbon powers to regain 
what they had lost from the war. The accomplishment of 
such a policy was also based on military and naval prepara­
tion in Europe and in the colonies. Time was an important 
factor to allow for adequate preparation of the forces, and 
throughout the period Choiseul tried his best to prevent 
any eruption of hostilities between the Bourbon powers and 
England, He was convinced that after "a few years" France 
would be able to carry out the course which she had begun 
in 1763. As preparations continued, however, one event 
after another threatened the peace of Europe and the colonies 
and A ^ c e  was forced, against her will, to intervene on 
behalf of her Bourbon ally to avert the beginning of a major 
conflict. In the course of Choiseul's negotiation with
190
191
Spain and England, military and naval preparations in the 
French colonies increased and espionage missions to English 
colonies and England were ordered to assess the intention 
and position of the traditional enemy. Under the adminis­
tration of Choiseul's successor Vergennes, France continued 
to send out espionage missions and to lorepare for war. 
Convinced that Choiseul's foreign policy was sound,
Vergennes followed the same course. He wanted France to 
recover from the loss of 1763 and, like his predecessor, he 
was determined to maintain the peace until France was 
adequately prepared for war. In 1778 it became clear to 
himkthat the peace of Europe could no longer be maintained 
and that war was inevitable. Choiseul's prediction of 
1765 that there would be an American revolution was accurate 
and his policy of revanche, which had been sustained for 
almost two decades, came to fruition. In 1778 France 
formally declared war with England and joined the American 
colonies in rebellion against the mother country.
Isle of Turk
There were several events which contributed to the 
disturbance and eventual rejection of the peace of Europe. 
One was a controversy in 1764 over the Isle of Turk. The 
island formed a link of the Bahamas connecting Santo Domingo 
and Cuba and affording communication with Jamaica. In 1764, 
French authorities demanded the expulsion of the English 
from the island. The French explorer, the Comte de Guichen,
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after securing permission from the Spanish governor of 
Santo Domingo» arrested the English colonists and captured 
eight of their ships. For several months correspondence 
was exchanged by the courts of London» Madrid» and Versailles 
In an attempt to negotiate a settlement.^
George III protested against the expedition of Guichen 
and demanded restorationi at the same time Charles III 
expressed his determination to hold the Island of Turk at 
the cost of war If necessary. Choiseul thought that the 
English demands should be satisfied since a conflict over 
such a small Island was not worth the cost of breaking the 
peace. In the end, the English government dropped the 
matter» an action which revived In Lord fiochfort» the 
English ambassador at Madrid» hopes of restoring the English 
party at the court of Spain and of breaking the power of 
the Family Compact. That Compact was not broken until after 
the French Revolution» but there were Incidents during the 
administration of Choiseul that weakened Franco-Spanlsh 
ties. One of these was an attempt to secure commercial and 
military bases on the Philippines. The Issue arose out of 
an expedition to the South Seas by an English Admiral»
Blron» In 1765. In an effort to remove English Influence 
on the Islands and to strengthen the Bourbons In the pacific» 
the French ambassador» Ossun» pressed the ministers of
^Louls Blart» Les Rapports de la France et de L"Espagne 
après le Pacte de Famille tPAriai Librairie Félix Alcan»
Ï9Ï5T, ppTIS^ -127.
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Charles III to put the Philippine Islands In a state of 
defense. It sas also {oroposed that Spanish vessels to the 
East Indies be allowed to stop at the îles de France and 
de Bourbon, and that, in exchange, a French mercantile 
house be established on one of the Islands In the Philippine, 
The arrangement would enable France to secure a base of 
operation which would benefit the commerce and position of 
both Bourbon countries In the east. Spain at this time, 
however, declared unwillingness to accept the arrangement 
because of her fears of precipitating a conflict with 
England.^
The Manila Episode 
A more serious threat which disturbed the peace of 
Europe and the colonial world was the controversy and 
struggle for the Maloulne Islands.^ Spain and England 
attempted to control the Islands In 1766, and in the years 
following their failure to reach an agreement erupted Into 
a diplomatic war. Believing that It was In the French 
Interest to Intervene, Choiseul supported his Bourbon ally 
and negotiated for a settlement. Unwilling to allow, 
once more, a rupture of the peace of Europe, Choiseul
^Blart, Les Bapports de la France et de L 'Espagne 
après le Pacte de Famille. op. cit., pp."140-147.
%he Maloulne Islands, known as Falkland Islands, are 
situated In the Atlantic Ocean, east of the Straits of 
Magellan, below the fiftieth parallel, south latitude and 
about the sixtieth degree longitude.
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"...invited him [Charles III] to propose an arbiteation; he 
advised to avoid war at all cost. It is true that the two 
crowns, I speak especially of France, are not ready as they 
will be in three years.Choiseul recognized the inadequate 
state and the incomplete preparation of the Bourbon navies 
and the necessity of avoiding an illusion of readiness for 
war. On the other hand, he considered the possibility that 
France might be forced into an earlier conflict with England 
if no settlement was reached in the Malouine episode. 
Consequently, he conceded that if France should be drawn 
into a war "...it would be necessary to have it last a long 
time, which will be advantageous to us. "5 The Pacte de 
PftBii lie committed Prance to Spain. Hence if Spain made 
war France would have no alternative but to defend her; 
in the circumstances war would have to endure a long time.
Why a long time? The answer is seen in his Mémoire to 
Louis XV of 1765 in which he said that a long and expensive 
war would ultimately lead England to financial collapse and 
to colonial defeat. In consequence he proposed to Grimaldi
^Lettre particulière du Duc de Choiseul au Marquis de 
Grimaldi, 21 mars, 1?66, Affaires Etrangères, Espagne,
Vol. 545t fols. 213 et seq. "Il l'invita A proposer un 
arbitrage; lui conseilla d'éviter A tout prix la guerre.
Il est vrai que les deux couronnes, je parle surtout de la 
France, ne sont pas prêtes comme elles le seront dans trois 
ans."
^Ibid., See also Choiseul, Mémoire. o p . oit., pp. 9 
and 18. "Il faudrait la faire durer longtemps. Mettons 
nous bien dans la tête que ce ne sera que le temps, et un 
temps très long, qui nous donnera l'avantage."
195
that any war with England had to he well planned to ensure 
success.
Write me, my dear colleague, If you approve of my 
preliminary ideas and if they are pleasing to the 
Spanish king. I will present them also to my master.
It is for them to determine how to be servedt it is 
for us to execute it for the best. I will certainly 
not leave, but I will say that I will be very useless 
in a war that, if it is not conducted with as much 
skill as of wisdom, of fidelity and of work, would 
dishonor the crown. I came in office at a time when 
the war had a bad beginning. This time 1 want neither 
the beginning nor the end to be the same.»
The Manila problem was crucial. It occurred at a time 
when Prance was deeply engaged with colonial reforms and 
preparations of her forces. It made international relations 
among colonial powers tense. A war scare was evident. In 
order to see the impact of the Manila crisis after 1?66, 
some historical background is essential.
It is uncertain when the group of islands called the 
Malouines were discovered, but between 159^ and 159^ two 
English navigators, John Davis and Richard Hawkins, were 
reported to have seen the islands. The Dutch made claims 
to them in the seventeenth century when an expedition was
^Lettre particulière du Duc de Choiseul au Marquis de 
Grimaldi, 21 mars, 1766, Affaires Etrangères, Espagne,
Vol. 5^51 fols. 213 et seq. "Mandeznnoi, mon cher confrère 
si vous approuvez mes idées préliminaires et si elles sont 
du goût du roi d'Espagne. Je les présenterai de même A mon 
maîtreI c'est A eux A régler leur service, c'est A nous A 
l'exécuter de notre mieux; je ne déserterai pas certaine­
ment, mais je dirai que je serai fort inutile dans une 
guerre qui, si elle n'est pas conduite avec autant d'adresse 
que de sagesse, de fidélité et de fermeté, déshonorerait la 
couronne. Je suis entré en place au milieu d'une guerre mal 
enfournée. Je ne voudrais pas cette fois-ci, que le 
commencement ni la fin fussent les mêmes."
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undertaken by a navigator, De tfeert. In the early eighteenth 
century, French navigators crossed the pacific and stopped at 
the islands for water and supplies. At that time they named 
the islands Malouines. Then in 1763 another French explorer, 
the Chevalier de Bougainville, in the course of one of his 
voyages around the world, disembarked on the îles Malouines 
and took possession of it in the name of Louis He
settled about 150 colonists on the island. In 1765 he 
returned with more colonists and supplies and founded Port 
Saint Louis as a permanent French settlement. During this 
time England despatched two expeditions to settle the same 
group of islands in the name of King George III, These were 
launched in 1?64 under the command of Captain John Byron and 
the islands were named Falkland, Byron returned to England 
shortly thereafter and in 1766 an English squadron was sent 
to the Falkland islands and founded Port Egmont, In 
December of the same year another English captain, Marbride, 
came to the Grande-Malouine island which had become Spanish 
and demanded the expulsion of the Spaniards, It was at this 
time that Anglo-Spanish relations deteriorated and that 
France entered into the negotiation on behalf of Spain,
Actually, the deterioration of Anglo-Spanish relation 
began in I762 when the city of Manila was captured by 
England, Shortly thereafter the city was spared from 
pillage on the assurance that a ransom of 4,000,000 pesetas 
was paid. It was agreed that half of the amount would be
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paid on the spot with the remainder to be secured by a 
draft» signed by the archbishop of Manila, to be redeemed 
on demand In Spain, The Incident was not mentioned at the 
Peace of Paris In I763, hence no reference of It was made 
In the treaty. However, when the transaction was reported 
to the Spanish government. It disavowed the act of the 
archbishop of Manila and refused to honor the arrangement, 
Spain protested that the whole affair was contrary to Inter­
national law and that the archbishop had no authority to 
commit the Spanish government, 7
The English government rejected the Spanish arguments 
and demanded full payment. In early I766, Choiseul entered 
Into the negotiation in support of Spain, In the Initial 
stage, he Informed Ossun that England was not likely to 
press her case for the ransom since she was busily occupied 
with Internal problems and with colonial disputes, Choiseul 
expressed, however, that war should be avoided In I766 and 
that Spain should honor the ransom. On the other hand, he 
conceded that the coming of a war depended not on payment 
as on the expected return of Pitt to office. He wrote 1 
"With regards to war I doubt that we will have It this 
year; Spain will pay the ransom of Manila and we will gain 
time, but the next year will be difficult to pass If
7Julius Goebel, Jr., The Struggle for the Falkland 
Islands t A Study In legal and diplomatic history 
INew HavenT Yale University press, 1927),^p. 224-226,
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Sir Pitt returns this year, In all probability it was 
Choiseul*s intervention in the Manila crisis that revived 
England's stand on the ransom question, England informed 
her ambassador at Madrid, Bochfort, that she expected a 
response from Spain, The message was communicated to 
Grimaldi who in turn sent a copy to Choiseul, Concurrently, 
Choiseul learned that an English squadron was being equipped 
that was destined, most likely, for the Malouine Islands, 
Accordinglyt he wrote to Durand, the French Ambassador in 
London, to keep informed about the destination of the 
squadron. Undoubtedly, the armament of the squadron 
created suspicions and gave Choiseul reason for supporting 
his Spanish colleague,*
Choiseul maintained close watch on diplomatic 
relations between Spain and England between 1?68 and I77O,
He corresponded regularly with Grimaldi and in general, 
advised that a rupture was inopportune in I766, "I say 
therefore that we must try for our common interests to
^Lettre particulière du Duc de Choiseul au Marquis 
d'Ossun, 22 mars, 1766, Affaires Etrangères, France,
Mémoires et Documents, Vol, 57^> fol, 184, (Hereinafter 
cited as A,E,M,D. ) "Quant & la guerre, je doute que nous 
l'ayons cette année; l'EspEigne payers la rançon de Manille 
et nous gagnerons du temps, mais l'année prochaine sera 
difficile â passer si Sir Pitt rentre cette année,"
*Choiseul (Versailles) to Durand (London),
July 12, 1766, Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance politique, 
Angletèrrev Vol, 470, fols, 224-225, (Hereinafter cited 
as A,E,C,P,)
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avoid war for the next eighteen months." he wrote. 10 He 
advocated the lessening of tension and the avoidance of 
conflict. Hoping that peace would be maintained, he 
reminded Grimaldi that Article Eight of the Treaty of 
Utrecht gave England the right to settle In the Malouine 
Islands. Yet he argued that If an English establishment 
In the Islands presented a serious threat to Spain then 
"...we must prepare to have war In eighteen months on this 
single object."11 He conveyed the same message to Ossunt 
"I must say with truth that France Is not In a position to 
enter(JwaiQ In this moment and that X have never promised 
to be ready before 1768, "12 Choiseul was very concerned 
about using all the time at his disposal to prepare for 
war, not to provoke one. And If war came sooner, he wished 
It would be sufficiently timed to allow for maximum prepa­
ration and acceleration.
Cholseul's time-table for war was flexible. As 
mentioned earlier. In 176$ he predicted the outbreak of
^°Lettre particulière du Duc Choiseul au Marquis de 
Grimaldi, 2 octobre, 1766, A.E.C.P., Espagne, Vol. $47, 
fol. 1$2 et seq. "Je dis donc qu'il faut tâcher pour nos 
Intérêts communs d'éviter la guerre d'Icl & dlx-hult mois."
^^Lettre particulière du Duc de Choiseul au Marquis de 
Grlmaldl, 2 octobre, 1766, A.E.C.P., Espagne, Vol. $47, 
fol. 1$2. "Il faut se préparer à faire la guerre dans dlx- 
hult mois sur ce seul object."
^^Lettre particulière du Duc de Choiseul au Marquis 
d'Ossun, $ octobre, 1766, A.E.M.D., Espagne, Vol. 575» 
fol. 2$. "Je dois dire avec vérité que la France n'est pas 
en état d'y entrer (en guerr^ dans ce moment-cl et que 
je n'al jamais promis d'être prêt avant 1768."
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hostilities in 1?68. Shortly thereafter he wrote that 
France would be more prepared if the date was changed to 
1769, Once again he changed it to 1770, He wrote 1 "We 
cannot deny that the two courts will be in a better position 
in 1770 than in I769, and in 1769 than in 1768. "^3
Between I766 and I767 Choiseul was instrumental in 
preventing a diplomatic rupture between Spain cuid England, 
and he should be credited for averting the outbreak of war. 
On February 2 3, I768, however, the maritime powers entered 
another phase of the struggle. On that date Spain gave 
orders to Bucaœelli, governor of Buenos Aires, and to 
Afanuel de Amat, Viceroy of Peru, in addition to other 
Spanish officiais in the Malouine Islands, to expel English 
settlers and to capture their establishment on the islands.
A copy of the order was sent to Choiseul for his approval. 
Unsure of the proper course to follow but being aware of 
increasing difficulties in the English cabinet and troubles 
in the English colonies in America, Choiseul sanctioned the 
Spanish order to Bucarelli,^^ The orders were finally 
carried out on June 10, 1770, after over two years of 
diplomatic correspondence among the three powers. Those
^Lettre particulière du Duc de Choiseul au Marquis 
d'Ossun, 24 mars, 1767, Affaires Etrangères, Espagne,
Vol. 348, fol. 253. "On ne peut pas nier que les deux 
cours seront plus en état en 1770 qu'en 17o9 et en I769 
qu'en I768. "
l4
John F, Bamsey, Anglo-French Relations. 1763-1770. 
A Study of Cholseul's FoMlgn Foiicv XBërEëTëy, California t 
University of California Press, 1939), pp. 204-205.
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years witnessed increasing tension and "a war scare" that 
led to accelerating the preparation In the military, navy, 
and artillery. It Is generally agreed among French hlsto-- 
rlans that Prance was ready to join Spain If Charles III 
went to war with England, But In late 1770 Choiseul began 
to experience much difficulty In his ministry and at court, 
HlSKcolleagues, Eenë-Nlcolas-Charles-Augustln de Maupeau, 
the chancellor and Joseph-Marie Abbé Terray, the controller- 
general, disliked him. They were supported by Cholseul's 
subtle enemy, Jeanne Antlonette Poisson Pompadour, mistress 
of Louis XV, Accused of discrediting France In diplomacy 
and of almost Involving France in a war with England, 
Choiseul was dismissed from office. In the weeks before 
his removal Choiseul wavered between war emd peace. Before 
he left office, however, Choiseul advised Grlmaldl to accept 
peace at all cost. His dismissal on December 24 forced 
Spain to formulate a change of course regarding the 
Malouines, Falling to obtain assistance from Louis XV, the 
Spanish ambassador In London signed a humiliating note dis­
approving the removal of the English colonists and promising 
the restoration of Port Egmont to England despite the 
general acknowledgement In Spain that the group; of Islands 
was Spanish, Concurrently, Charles III wrote to Louis XV 
appealing to his pride as a Bourbon and urging him that
preparations be continued In the event war was Inevitable.
In a letter to Charles III announcing the dismissal of his
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foreign minister, Louis XV explained that France was in no 
condition to engage in war, and urged the king of Spain to 
make concessions to preserve the peace,Seeing that it 
would be impossible to engage in war, Charles III decided 
to submit to the English propositions.
In the Malouine crisis Choiseul cem be accused of 
having brought Prance to the brink of war. Indeed, he 
pursued a policy of revenge, and consequently of wear. But 
he was reluctant to engage in war prematurely. He wanted 
adequate preparations and proper timing. In addition, 
Choiseul conceived of a war of diversion and one essentially 
maritime and colonial. These conditions were not present 
during his ministry, and as a result he rebuffed Spain's 
attempt to drag France into a major confrontation. But 
conditions changed after he was succeeded by Vergennes, and 
the decade of the 1770*s witnessed the coming of war with 
England.
Secret Missions 
In pursuit of revenge, Choiseul sent secret agents to 
the English colonies in America and to England to collect 
pertinent information relative to the plans and positions 
of the enemies in case of war. The agents, acting in
^^Lettre du Hoi d 'Espagne au Roi de France, 27 décembre,
1770, Affaires Etrangères, Espagne, Vol. 56I, fols. 455,
561 et seq.
^^Lettre du Roi d'Espagne au Roi de France, 2 janvier,
1771, Affaires Etrangères, Espagne. Vol. 562, fol. 11.
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similar capacity as officers of the quartermaster staff which
Bourcet had Introduced In 1766. prepared topographical
sketches of the provinces or coasts to he Invaded,^7 The
first mission was despatched In 1764. The agent. Pont-le-Roy.
a lieutenant In the French army, was charged with engaging
In espionage activities In North America, Documentation
on Pont-le-Roy's activities Is scanty, but according to
C. A, Julien he was Instructed
,,,to sail to every American port, to be Informed 
about the time of the year that the English arrive, 
the strength of their convoy, the means to be used 
to disturb their commerce In times of war. the 
proper time we could attack them with most success 
upon their arrival or return,19
According to a report coming from the French Embassy In 
London. Pont-le-Boy visited New York. Maryland. Pennsylvania. 
Florida, and Georgia, The report was limited ; neverthe­
less. according to Julien It Indicated some degree of
l^See chapter four for further discussion,
^^Hlsslon de Pont-le-Boy. Lieutenant de Vaux. Mission 
dans les colonies anglolses de l'Amérique, A.M.. Fonds 
Marine, B, 4, Vol. 107, fols, 91-92,
19c. A, Julien. Les Français en Amérique 1713-17841 
SâSSââ» lA Louisiane. La Guyane. La politique Américaine 
Se CholseujfTParls i Centre de Documentation Universitaire. 
n,d,}. p, 86, (Hereinafter cited as Les Français en 
Amérique. ) ", ,,de naviguer dans tous les ports deT'AmérIque. 
s'instruire des saisons auxquelles les Anglais ont coutume 
d'y arriver, de la force de leurs convois, des moyens dont 
on pourrait se servir pour troubler leur commerce en temps 
de guerre, du moment où on les attaquer avec le plus de 
succès, soit & leur arrivée, soit & leur retour,"
^®Mlsslon de pont-le-Boy. o£, cit.. fols. 91-92.
See also A.E.C.P,. Vol, 471, Angleterre, fols, 7-8,
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England's preparation in North America, and it showed that 
there were about 10,000 infantrymen without cavalry,
The report confirmed Choiseul *s expectation that England 
was planning for war and his own plans that France should 
continue preparing for the eventual hostility.
In 1767 a second espionage mission was sent. It was 
led by the Baron de Kalb, a lieutenant in the French army. 
His purpose was "...to investigate the sentiments of the 
people, and their ability to furnish munitions of war and 
competent officers, to ascertain how many troops they could 
raise, the probability of a revolt against England, and of 
its success if it were a t t e m p t e d . Julien agrees that 
Kalb was instructed "...to enquire of the resources of the 
colonies and of their possibilities of revolt..." against 
England. He had to Investigate the types of weapons which 
the colonists possessed, the extent of their unwillingness 
to submit to the yoke of England, and their plan and 
strategy for r e v o l t . K a l b  sent a series of reports to 
Choiseul indicating that the colonists objected to the 
Stamp Act and the imposition of duties on tea, and that they
Julien, Lea Français en Amérique. op. cit., p. 86.
22james B, Perkins, France in the American Révolution 
(New York# Houghton Mifflin Co., 19II), p. 27.
23julien, Les Français in Amérique, o p . cit., p. 86, 
"...de s'enquérir des ressources des colonies et de leurs 
possibilités de révolte."
^^Instructions to De Kalb, M. et D,, A N., Fond Divers, 
Etats Unis, Vol. 2, fol. 4.
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needed military help to resist and reject England. "1
met with the same opinions as in the provinces I had
already visited, only expressed with greater violence and
acrimony, "25 But when Kalb returned to Versailles in June,
1768, he discovered that Cholseul's interest in American
affairs had diminished. The minister was occupied with the
annexation of Corsica and the Malouine crisis, and there
seemed to be no immediate prospect of pursuing further the
interest in the English colonies. Simultaneously, Choiseul
kept a close watch on England, His aim was to maintain
peace I on the other hand, he wanted to know of any move by
England that would threaten the peace. For this reason,
in 1767 he sent a secret mission to London. Its purpose
was to check on military and naval activities. Margaret
Morison wrote in an article that Choiseul despatched the
London mission because he was definitely planning to attack
England sometime between I766 and 1770.
With thessp thoughts in view, Choiseul caused in 
the year 1767» a thorough survey to be made of all 
the ports along the northern coast of France, to 
ascertain their exact condition, and the number of 
ships they were capable of harbouring; and in the 
same year he started the far more delicate under­
taking of examining the southern coast of England 
with a view to descent on her s h o r e s .26
Morison contended that Choiseul deliberately planned
^^perkins. Prance in the American Revolution, o p . cit.,
p. 28.
^^Margaret C, Morison, "The Due de Choiseul and the 
Invasion of England, 1768-177O," Royal Historical Society 
Transactions* Third Series, IV (1910), 86-87.
206
an offensive war ",. .within ten years of the late peace
being in a position once more to take the offensive... "
Then she addedi
There can be little doubt that the plans which Choiseul 
had in view, as soon as the resources of France would 
enable him once more to take the offensive, were to make 
direct and sudden attack upon England. This was a 
scheme which from its very nature would strongly appeal 
to the brilliant French statesman, but there was also 
much sound policy to recommend it...He believed, a point 
which they had failed to grasp, that the only effectual 
way to attack England was to strike at London; if once 
the capital lay at the mercy of a hostile army, the 
invaders, he thought, would be able to dictate their 
own terms. 27
Morison*s position does not agree with the position 
discussed in this research; for it has been said above that 
in 1768 Choiseul was not planning for war; he tried to 
prevent one. This was obvious in his treatment of the 
Malouine situation and in his e^ortation to Grimaldi to 
maintain the peace at all costs. Indeed, Choiseul was 
preparing for war, but in 1768, even in 1769 or in 1770, 
the necessary preparations were not accomplished. Therefore, 
Choiseul did not plan to initiate a war with England between 
1768 and 1770. Bather, it was Choiseul*8 expectation that 
if war came during this period or earlier, it would be the 
initiative of England, In addition, the war of Choiseul 
was to be a colonial and maritime war, not a continental 
one; and even if England attacked France on the continent, 
the war was to be diverted to other parts of the continent
^^Morison, "The Duo de Choiseul and the Invasion of 
England, 1768-I77O," 0£, oit.. p. 86,
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and to the colonies. As seen in the French negotiation of 
the Malouine crisis, Choiseul pursued a policy of peace, 
a policy which he consistently defended, and one to be 
maintained until a French declaration of war, 28 in 
particular, Morison stated that Choiseul had sent Colonel 
Grant of Blairfindy, a Scotchman who took service in France, 
to investigate the military activities and position of 
England in 176?. Grant was instructed to visit the 
southern coast of England, to examine places for a French 
debarkation, and to ascertain the nature of the physical 
features between the sea coast and London.Grant's report 
showed that England's militia regiments were weak and that 
they included fifty-two battalions each consisting of three 
hundred men. Describing the confusion of English political 
affairs and the weakness of the English defenses, the report 
concluded with a plan of attack on Sussex or Kent where the 
main French regiment would land. He said that the march on 
Sussex would have three advantagesi "Firstly, because it 
would cut off the enemies ' retreat t secondly, it would cut 
off their communications with the north; lastly, by the
2®The reference which Morison makes about her sources 
is Mémoires Militaires faits par ordre du Ministre, par H. 
Grant de Blairfindy, Colonel des Troupes Légères. Année 1767, 
and covers 110 folio pages in manuscript. She also states 
that most of the memoirs are now among the Pitt Papers 
(Chatham MSS; Vol. 86) deposited at the Public Record Office. 
She added fu^her that some of the sources stemmed from 
"Anonymous informer" and "secret memoirs." Additional 
research is needed to sustain the thesis of Morison.
29lbid.. p. 87.
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loss of Tilbury and Gravesend, they would have no resources
left on the Thames. "30 Morison contended that Choiseul sent
other secret missions to London and Alternate plans were
submitted to Choiseul for the invasion of England, But,
she conceded, these plans coincided with Cholseul's
involvement with the Malouine problems and led to a revision
of policy in 1770, She wrotet
His despatches are full of conventional phrases 
expressing a desire for peace 1 yet he never took the 
only real means of securing it, namely, that of telling 
Spain that Prance would not join her in a war she con­
sidered unjustified; on the contrary, he always 
promised cooperation,31
In addition to Blairfindy *s plan, another was sub­
mitted during the administration of Vergennes by the Due de 
Broglie, This ambitious plan sought the conducting of a 
secret reconnaisseuice mission on the English seaboeod or 
on the coast of Ireland in 1778.^^ But by this time France 
had begun overtures for a Pranco-American alliance, A 
treaty was concluded in 1778 and the Broglie plan was no 
longer necessary. The revenge for which Prance had prepared 
since 1763 finally came. It was to this task that the 
Vergennes ministry and the French colonies began to 
undertake.
30Morison, "The Due de Choiseul and the Invasion of 
England, 1768-1770," og, cit., pp, 91 and 93,
31lbid,, p, 103.
32oallas D, Irvine, "The Origin of Capital Staffs," 
Journal of Modem History, X, No, 2 (June, 1938), I67.
CHAFTEB IX 
FRAHCE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Cholseul's policy of revenge against England was 
finally realized in the American Revolution. This was 
brought about in 1778 when Prance signed a treaty with the 
American colonies supporting their rebellion and cession 
from England, The rebellion had been predicted by Choiseul 
as early as I765 as indicated in his Mémoire to Louis XV.
He expected that the colonies would sever relations from 
England thereby giving France the chance to lend her support 
and to bring the plan for revenge into reality. Certain of 
the coming of the American revolution and of the defeat of 
England, Choiseul expected the return of the French empire 
and of the power of France. However, his ministry ended 
almost unexpectedly in I77O when France saw neither the 
beginning of revenge nor the fulfillment of his prediction 
of the coming of the American revolution. But he did live 
to see the continuity of his policy in the ministry of 
Vergennes beginning in 177^* The year also saw the commence, 
ment of a new administration under the reign of Louis XVI. 
Faced with increasing domestic problems, the new king made
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little progress in foreign affairs. But Vergennes was alert 
to the problems which he inherited and which continued to 
face France. He renewed the task of re-establishing the 
dignity and pride lost in the Seven Years ' War, of con­
tinuing the bond with Spain contracted in the Pacte de 
Famille, of maintaining the strength of the armed forces 
attained by Choiseul's reforms, and in general, of carrying 
out the foreign policy France begun after the Peace of Paris 
in 1763. These were some important objectives which the 
Vergennes ministry attempted to carry out.
The army received further reforms during the adminis­
tration of Vergennes. Under the leadership of a Prussian 
army officer, Pirch, who had entered the French military 
service, the French army saw some additional changes. In a 
memoir Pirch criticized the Instructions of I769 which 
Choiseul had adopted for light infantry. Pirch also rejec­
ted Guibert's Essai Général and sutmltted in its place an 
elaboration of his earlier work. Mémoire raisonné sur les 
parties les plus essentielles de la tactique, to the 
minister of war, the Prince de Honteynard. Additionally, 
he drew a new set of ordinances for the infantry contained 
in the Instruction which he issued on May 30, 1775. His 
ideas on tactics, adopted in the army, were notable for 
prescribing fire drill for troops who were to fire at targetsj 
at ranges from a hundred yards and to perform various 
commands of firing. To a considerable degree the search
211
for flexibility and speed gave way to an attempt to achieve 
precision and accuracy. The Innovation took on major 
Importance when Prance entered the American revolution.^
Foreign Policy of Vergennes
The emergence of Vergennes as head of the ministry
of foreign affairs In 17?4 witnessed no marked departure
of policy that had been present under the earlier ministry
of Choiseul. Like his predecessor, his central Idea was
the glory of France, and he defined his position shortly
after assuming office. In a memoir to Louis XVI on
December 8, 177^# describing the political situation of
France vls-A-vls the other European powers, Vergennes asked
that the alliance with Spain be strengthened. The Spanish
alliance would not only consolidate the Bourbon forces In
times of war but would also threaten England's position In
the colonies. Vergennes argued that the duration of the
Peace of Paris for twelve years was not a guarantee of Its
continuity and of the removal of the threat to France, that
the best way to assure the maintenance of peace was not to
fear the advent of war. He addedi
Indeed, the example Is not lacking of a case in which 
the cry of war against France has united parties In 
England. Let us add that we should find ourselves 
Involved In a naval war, even contrary to the wishes 
of the court of London as well as to our own; we 
have a treaty with Spain which makes common cause
iRobert 3. Qulmby, The Background of Napoleonic 
Warfare (New York; Columbia University Press, 1957), 
pp. 202-205,
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with her In any war, offensive and defensive,,,.The* 
engagement Is a burdensome one, no doubti but In spite 
of this appearance. It Is probably more advantageous 
to France than to Spain,,,,If there Is anything that 
will Impress her and keep her [England] In check. It Is 
the spectacle of Prance and Spain united, and the 
certainty that the first cannon fired by her against 
either will be replied to Immediately by both,^
The document Indicated Vergennes ' expectation of war 
with England, a position clearly similar to the one held 
by Choiseul, But unllkek Choiseul, who had laid out a 
definite plan for war— a war of diversion— Vergennes did 
not have a plan at the time the memoir was written. Only 
when developments In the American colonies degenerated and 
pointed to the Inevitability of war with England did he lay 
out his strategy for war. Events In the English colonies 
had hardly developed sufficiently In 1774 to foreshadow 
the coming of war and, at that time, Vergennes failed to 
grasp the American revolt compared with the quick discern­
ment of Choiseul, a decade earlier. Therefore the decision 
for war was not reached In 1774; yet Vergennes reported to
^Henrl Donlol, Histoire de la participation de la 
France â 1 'établissement des Etats Unis d^AmavigwA. 5 fols, 
(parlsi” Imprimerie Nationale, 1086-1892),1, 19. "Il 
n'est pas sans example que le cri de la guerre contre la 
France a êtê le signal du ralliement des partis qui 
divisaient l'Angleterre, Ajoutons que nous pouvons nous 
trouver engagés dans une guerre de mer contre le voeu de 
la cour de Londres de même que contre le nôtre; nous avons 
un traité avec l'Espagne qui doit nous rendre commune toute 
guerre, soit qu'elle soit offensive ou défensive,,,.L'engage• 
ment est sans doute très onéreux; mais, tout onéreux qu'il 
parait, peut-être cependant est 11 plus avantageux & la 
France qu'A l'Espagne,,,,31 quelque chose la retient et 
lui Impose, c'est la représentation de la France et de 
l'Espagne unie, c'est la certitude que le premier coup de 
canon qu'elle tirera contre l'une ou l'autre sera répondu 
par toutes les deux,"
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Louis XVI the logical premises for war. He said that war 
would come ",. .but his policy was to maintain peace until 
such time as France might wage war with some hope of succès*"^ 
At the same time that Choiseul redoubled his assurances 
to England of the peaceful disposition of the French govern­
ment, he kept informed of developments between the English 
colonies in America and the mother country. He watched the 
negotiations of England with the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel 
for a levy of troops to be sent as mercenaries to fight the 
English colonists in America.^ He instructed the Marquis 
de Noailles, French Ambassador to the Hague, to follow 
developments from reports circulating in the Netherlands 
pertaining to rumors of war in the English colonies.
Vergennes also ordered the Comte de Guines, French ambassador 
to London, to obtain information concerning an alleged 
agreement with the Empress of Russia, Catherine the Great, 
to furnish 20,000 troops to aid England to put down revolt 
in her colonies. At the same time he ordered that the French 
embassy in St. Petersburg confirm the truth of the agreement.5 
From all over Europe the French foreign ministry collected
^John J. Meng, ed., Francet Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères. Historical Documents, Institut fryicais de 
Washington. Deap6che~et Instructions de Conrad AlexanSre 
Gèra^. ’^ 78-!CT^ tBaltimore I John Hobk&ns Press, 1939), 




Information, as it had during the Choiseul ministry,
concerning developments between England and her American
colonies. The idea that Prance might support the coloAists
against England, pursuant with the plan and prediction of
Choiseul, germinated to fruition in the mind of Vergennes
by late 1775* But according to some historians. Tower
in particular, overtures for war began as early as August,
1774, when Vergennes addressed his memoir to Louis XVI,
Vergennes wrote 1
,,,that a nation could be free itself from the 
arrogance of a successful rival, that is to say, 
revenge itself for former defeat, was bound to 
do so. This mesmt war. He never concealed the 
fact that the possibility of war must always be 
kept in view by Prance,6
Edward 3, Corwin contended that the line of reasoning
by which Prance was brought into the American revolution
comprised for the most part the following ideast
that Prance was entitled by her wealth, power, and 
history to the preponderating influence in continental 
affairs; that she had lost this position of influence 
largely on account of Great Britain's intermeddling;
,,,that America, become independent, would be an almost 
total loss,,,that since the two were rivals, whatever 
abased the power of Great Britain would elevate the 
power of Prance, This,,,was the main chain of reason­
ing, but there were also supporting ideas that should 
not be lost to view,?
^Charlemagne Tower, The Marauis de Lafayette in the 
American Revolution with some account of the attitude of 
Prance toward the war of Independence ^Philadelphia* J, B, 
Lippincott Co,, I9OI), p, 68,
?Bdward 3, Corwin, "Prench Objectives in the American 
Revolution," American Historical Review. XXI (October,
1915), 60,
215
Corwin added that it was not a question of intervening or
not intervening but rather that France knew that she would
find herself, sooner or later, at war with England in
defense of the French West Indies and that France seized
the opportunity to reduce a power which threatened her
expansion in the colonial world and her influence in Europe,
Van Tyne asserted that Choiseul urged "...ceaselessly
that England must be destroyed....When Choiseul fell and
Vergennes rose to power the new minister had the same
policy toward England," Continuing to show that Vergennes
made no significant change in the course of French foreign
policy. Van Tyne added that the minister expressed his
position to Louis XVI in a Mémoire stating that England
...is an enemy at once grasping, ambitious, unjust, 
and perfidious. The invariable and most cherished 
purpose in her politics has been, if not the des­
truction of France at least her overthrow, her 
humiliation, and her ruin,...It is our duty then 
to seize every possible opportunity to reduce the 
power and the greatness of England.»
Van Tyne concluded that "...besides this motive of
revenge Vergennes* memoir and many others of the time dwell
upon the fact that the fundamental economic interests of
the French nation were at s t a k e . B u t  in addition to
commerce the motive of revenge was supported by other
considerations. The thesis supported by professor Frederick
C^. H. Van Tyne, "Influences which determine the French 
Government to make the Treaty with America. 1778.” American 
Historical Review. XXI (April, 1916), 529-530.
9lbld.
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Jackson Turner showed that Prance expected territorial gains 
by aiding the English colonists, that Prance hoped to 
replace England in Canada and Spain in Louisiana, and 
that after the war France induced Spain to give her the 
ancient colony of Louisiana. But these objectives merely 
augmented an attempt to redress the preponderance of power 
gained by England in I763. They reflected no innovation 
in 1770's I they emphasized the traditional position of 
Prance held a decade earlier. According to Corwin,
Vergennes followed a policy that had been engineered in 
the past, "Able, ambitious, conservative, of vast 
experience, yet not a little pedantic, Vergennes was 
thoroughly indoctrinated in the traditional methods,
Robson's monograph stated that in 17781 inspired by the 
motive of revenge and untroubled by European distractions. 
Prance was able to play a decisive part in the operation 
in the new world.^ The primary consideration, therefore, 
which led Vergennes to become increasingly involved in 
the American revolution was the desire to strike against 
England,
^^Prederick Jackson Turner, "The Policy of Prance 
toward the Mississippi Valley in the period of Washington 
and Adams," American Historical Review, X (January, 1905),
250-254,
^^Corwin, "French Objectives in the American Revo­
lution, " 22. cit., p. 58,
^%ric Robson, The American Revolution in its Political 
and Military Aspects (New York# W. W. Norton & Co, Inc., 
1 ^ 6 %  p. i42.
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The Pacte de Famille Strengthened 
When news reached Prance of the outbreak of hostili­
ties in the English colonies of America, Vergennes thought 
at first that the revolt was not serious enou^ to warrant 
French intervention. But early in 1775 the shipment of 
troops by England to the colonies and the rumors that 
England had made an extensive preparation for war attracted 
Vergennes* attention. He was then convinced that a con­
frontation was imminent. Before making any commitment to 
aid the English colonists, Vergennes followed the policy 
of Choiseul in which the defensive and offensive alliance, 
contracted with Spain in the Pacte de Famille, was 
strengthened. As in the period of the 1760*8, the alliance 
was the cornerstone and bulwark of French foreign policy. 
Through Ossun, Vergennes drew Spain*s attention to 
developments in the English colonies in America, He reported 
to Charles III about England*s subjugation of the colonies 
and the fear that this might be perpetuated to other English 
colonies in the West Indies, He said that such a course of 
action would threaten Pranco-Spemish colonies in the 
Caribbean and in South America, In addition, Louis XVI 
wrote a letter to Charles III on August 7, 1775» on the 
occasion of the birth of a son to the Comte d*Artois, 
brother of Louis XVI, informing him about the English threat,
I take advantage of this occasion to present to Your 
Majesty some reflections upon the present state of 
affairs, I know the aversion which Your Majesty has
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to war, and I agree sincerely with you in this 
sentiment. Possibly there never was a time when 
a war with England seemed less probable.. .England 
is very much engaged with her colonies in America 
...I think therefore, that we ought to direct our 
attention on the preparations which we must make to 
implement there and take mutually the most effective 
precaution to prevent war...I believe that we ought 
not now to neglect our precautions.13
In his reply on August 21, 1775, Charles III wrote t
"I am even convinced that if the English recognize that
we are ready or able to be ready at every point they will
let us alone, and we shall enjoy that peace which we are
anxious to preserve.,. "1^ The pledge of Spanish support
emd consequently, the strengthening of the Family Compact,
cleared the way for French intervention to render military
assistance to the English colonies in their revolt against
England. To this end Vergennes wrote to Ossun $
...we believe here that upon the first open act of 
hostility committed by England we should no longer 
feel called upon to use moderation but that we should
l^Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France â 
1* établissement des Etats Unis d*Amérique, o p . cit., 1, 13Ï.
•*Je saisis en même temps cette occasion pour lui présenter 
quelques réflexions sur l'état present des affaires. Je 
connais l'aversion de V. H. pour la guerre, et je partage 
bien sincèrement ce sentiment. Peut-être n'y eut-il jamais 
d'occasion, oû les aparences d'une guerre avec l'Angleterre 
soient moins probables,..Elle est très occupée dans ses 
colonies de l'Amérique...je pense donc qu'il faut porter 
toute notre attention sur les préparatifs qu'on doit y â 
porter, et prendre de concert les précautions les plus 
utiles pour éviter la guerre...Je ne crois pas cependant 
qu'il faille négliger les précautions,"
l^Ibid.. I, 14U, "Je suis même convaincu que si le 
Anglois nous reconnoissent prêts ou en mesure sur tous 
les points, ils nous laisseront en repos, et nous jouirons 
de cette paix, que nous désirons de conserver..."
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seize immediately all English ships which will 
be found in parts and in the high sea.^5
He added that the colonists should be aided in their 
struggle to free themselves from the yoke of England, and 
that the Bourbon powers should even issue a joint declara­
tion recognizing them as a free people and inviting them 
to use French and Spanish ports for privileges of commerce.
Like his predecessor, Vergennes sent secret agents 
to the English colonies in America for the purpose of 
assessing their position with England and for enquiring 
whether French aid was needed. The mission was conducted 
by BonVouloir who had been attached to the regiment "du Cap* 
and had knowledge of the colonies. Bonvouloir's report 
revealed that the colonists were prepared to relinquish 
ties with England and that they had recruited a force of 
50 ,000 soldiers and a large number of volunteers to fight 
for their separation from the mother country. The report 
served little purpose, for Vergennes had already believed 
that a war with England was certain. What he was awaiting 
next was firm commitment that Spain would join France in 
assisting the colonies in their rebellion against England.
^^oniol. Histoire de la participation de la France A 
1*établissement des Ëtats Unis æ»Amérique, op. cit., I, 12?. 
"...nous pensons ici qu'au acte d’hostilité bien avoué 
de la part de l'Angleterre ce ne sera pas le cas d'user de 
modération, mais qu'il sera A propos de se saisir de tous 
les navires anglois que l'on pourra rencontrer A la mer et 
qui se trouveront dans les ports."
16James B. Perkins, France in the American Revolution 
(New York# Houghton Mifflin Company, I9II), pp. 45-48.
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The French historian Donlol wrote that France was aiming 
a blow at England but with the support of Spain, that 
Vergennes departed to some degree with Cholseul's plan 
by not using the strategy of a war of diversion which had 
been accepted a decade earlier. But Vergennes was justi­
fied In dictating a new strategy. Whereas earlier, when 
war was expected on the continent and by Pitt's Initiative, 
In the seventies It was on the opposite side of the Atlantic 
and from the colonists' Initiative. Therefore a change 
of plan was necessary. In addition, the war In 1?78 was 
colonial. Just as Cholseul had predicted. The strategy 
In fighting such a war, Vergennes contended, was to concen­
trate the attack. To divert the enemies to the Caribbean 
would weaken the offense and prolong the war. Nevertheless, 
Vergennes was aware that In the event the war Sfoead, the 
Bourbon colonial forces could be employed In a two-front 
attack. As It turned out the French emd Spanish Islands 
were ready. They played an Important part In the war and 
contributed to success In the American revolution.
An Important document which throws some light on 
France's decision to help the English colonists was la Palx 
ou la Guerre by Pierre-August In Beaumarchais. It states 
that
...we must help the Americans....
If England triumphs over America, It can only be at 
enormous cost both In men and money. Now the only 
compensation which the English have in view for so
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great a loss Is to seize in turn the French Islands....
In that event. Sire, it would only remain for you to 
choose between beginning too late an unproductive war 
or sacrificing to the most shameful, idle peace all 
your American colonies (French Antilles .^7
Undoubtedly Vergennes was beginning to formulate his
plans for war. He committed at the same time Spanish
involvement into the American revolution by requesting
Charles III to grant a loan of one million livres to the
English colonists. The loan created a hostile attitude
between Spain and England and led to a new phase of
Anglo-Spanish diplomacy.
Vergennes Plan for War 
In late 1775 and early 1776 a widening breach was 
created between France and England. Supplied with reports 
from secret missions conducted in London, France was kept 
informed of the latest developments of the war in the English 
colonies. During these months Vergennes received reports 
indicating that the colonists in America desired help, and 
in March, 1776, he expressed firmly his American policy and 
plan for war. This was contained in his Considération.
Since the document is important it is quoted extensively.
17Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France &
1*établissement des Etats Unis d "Amérique. op. cit. .1. 205- 
20^. "Il fautsecourir les Américains..,.
Si l'Angleterre triomphe de l'Amérique, ce ne peut être 
qu'avec une dépense énorme d'hommes et d'argent; or le seul 
dédommagement que les Anglais se proposent de tant de pertes 
est d'enlever A leur retour les îles françaises.«..Alors, 
Sire, il vous resterait uniquement le choix de commencer trop 
tard une guerre infructueuse, ou de sacrifier A la plus hon­
teuse desspaix inactives toutes vos colonies d'Amérique,"
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The position of England vis-ft-Tis her American colonies 
• ••present all kind of reasons for the most serious atten­
tion on the part of Prance and Spaln^..Ve can from one 
side regard the continuation of the civil war as Infi­
nitely advantageous to the two crowns.. • that the English 
ministry defeated upon the continent of America may seek 
compensation at the expense of France and Spaln^ •.
These various propositions can almost certainly lead to 
a war more or less remote with France and Spaln^ The 
first because, with the forces which the court of London 
has prepared, she could be tempted to employ them In the 
very easy conquest that Is offered In the West Indies• 
Second, because the subjugation of the Métropole can be 
accomplished oAly by fomenting the national hatred and 
jealousy of the American colonies by a war the duration 
of which would make England accustom to the yoke,,.
It would be necessary therefore to neglect no possible 
means In order to make the next approaching campaign as 
active as possible and In order to secure advantages for 
the Americans, The degree of fury and exhaustion of 
both parties that would result would determine the moment 
to strike such decisive blows which would make England 
Into a second rate power,
l^Donlol, Histoire de la participation de la France A
I 'établissement des Etats Unis d'Amérique, op. cit., I, 275- 
é?5. "LapÔsïtion de !l7Angleterre vis^-vis de ses colonies 
de l'Amérique,,,à toutes sortes de titres, l'attention la 
plus sérieuse de la part de la France et de l'Espagne,..On 
peut d'un côté regarder la continuation de la guerre civile 
comme infiniment avantageuse aux deux couronnes,, .que le 
ministère anglais, battu sur le continent de l'Amérique, ne 
cherche un dédommagement aux dépens de la France et de 
l'Espagne,,,
Ces différentes suppositions peuvent presque également con­
duire â une guerre plus ou moins éloignée avec la France et 
avec l'Espagne, La première, parce que, avec les forces 
que la cour de Londres a préparées, elle peut être tentée 
de les employer A la conquête trop facile que les Indes 
occidentales lui offrent. La deuxième, parce que l'asser­
vissement de la métropole ne pourrait s'opérer qu'en flattant 
la haine et la jalousie nationale par une guerre dont la 
durée la formerait au joug,,,
II faudrait alors ne négliger aucun des moyens possibles pour 
rendre la campagne prochaine aussi vive qu'il se pourrait, et 
pour procurer des avantages aux Américains, Le degré d'achan»- 
ment et d'épuisement des deux peurtls qui en résulterait déter­
minerait alors l'instant de frapper des coups décisifs qui 
feraient rentrer l'Angleterre dans l'ordre des puissances 
secondaires,"
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The central thought of the document waa that France 
and Spain were threatened with war, whatever might be the 
outcome of the American revolt. In reviewing the state of 
the colonial struggle, of domestic troubles In British 
politics, and of the danger of an eventual war, Vergennes 
argued that the Bourbon powers, desirous of peace, should 
not compromise themselves with England. He said the con­
tinuation of the American, war for at least another year 
would be to the advantage of the Bourbon crowns, for It 
would enfeeble England and allow France and Spain more time 
to prepare for an eventual attack. The best way to achieve 
this goal, he said, was to convince England of their peace­
ful Intentions and at the same time sustain the Americans 
by secret aid In order that the colonial quarrel might not 
be settled at once and become the prelude to an Anglo- 
American attack on France and Spain and their possessions.19 
The 8onsld€rat 1 ons was submitted to the Comte de Maure pas. 
Prime Minister, Anne Bobert Jacques Turgot, Controller 
General of Finance, Antoine Sartlne, Minister of the Marine 
and the Comte de Saint Germain, Minister of War. Of these 
only Turgot opposed Intervention. Spain approved the policy 
embodied In the Considérations and the objectives of 
Vergennes began to be realized. From the spring of 17?6 
France arranged for the support of the Insurgents and
^9oonlol, Histoire de la participation de la France A 
1 * établissement des Etats Unis d'Amérique. on. cit.. I. ~ 
273-275. ---
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persuaded Spain to do the same. This marked the beginning 
of Pranco-Spanlsh active Intervention In the cause of 
the American revolution to revenge themselves against 
England.
Hole of French Antilles 
From the beginning of the French Intervention In the 
American revolution, France concentrated her forces In the 
Caribbean. Britain's only hope of carrying on the campaign 
In North America depended largely upon her ability to retain 
all sea communications Intact. If France had secured North 
American bases Immediately the British would have had to 
withdraw from want of supplies. Instead France concentrated 
her military strength In the Ceurlbbean and collected her 
colonial forces that had been prepared In order to secure 
her sugar colonies retained In 1?63. Consequently, British 
ships made their way to New York for almost two years with 
little obstruction from the French. However, when Washing­
ton finally secured the active support of a strong French 
fleet In 1781, It was Indicative that the war was coming to 
an end and that American Independence was to be realized. 
Joined by Spain In 17791 France was In a position not only 
to challenge British superiority but actually to win con­
trol of the sea. The forces of Prance, Spain, and their 
colonies emerged as a combined force for which England was 
not prepared. To this effect George III wrote In June 24, 
1781, that ''...If we could demolish either a considerable
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French or Spanish squadron, we should then be in a situation 
to gain our wanted superiority at sea, without which an 
honorable end to the war is not bo be effected, "20
The Bourbon forces in the Caribbean joined in the 
fighting with the intention not only of assisting the 
revolution but also of seizing or plundering British 
possessions in the Caribbean. For the first time in the 
eighteenth century the French and Spanish fleets were able 
to establish a superior force in the Caribbean, The French 
navy had been greatly expanded and strengthened under 
Choi seul. The Spanish was less efficiently prepared and 
manned, but it included many new ships of excellent design 
built under French influence. On the other hand, British 
ships, tied down in support of the armies in America, were 
unable to launch a strong force in the Caribbean to blockade 
French ports. Thus French and Spanish navies were able to 
cross the Atlantic to attack in North America or in the 
Caribbean when weather and other favorable conditions 
permitted,
The French Antilles served French and Spanish forces 
well in supporting the revolution in America, In the cam­
paign of 1781, for example, supplies and reinforcement from
28as quoted in Robson, The Ameyi «nn Revolution in its 
Political and Military Aspects, op. cit., pp. 1^5-l46,
21p, M. Sherlock and J. H. Parry, A Short History of 
the West Indies (New York# St. Martins Press, 19^7),
pp. 133:137.
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Martinique and St. Domlngue contributed to the admirable 
concentration at Yorktown. The operation of the Antilles, 
says Hanotaux, was one of the main objects of activity of 
the marine in the war; the Islands provided for defense 
and assured security for the French establishments and 
traffic.
Also, the chief naval stations for American conti­
nental ships were In the Antilles. These were at St. Pierre 
In Martinique, Cap François In Hispaniola, and at Havana.
The American colonies had commercial agents at these ports. 
At MartlAlque the continental vessels were refitted, 
repaired, and provisioned whenever it was convenient, or 
if stress of weather compelled docking. More significantly, 
the Antilles contributed In the revolution through the 
expansion of the war in the Caribbean.
^^Gabriel Hanotaux et Alfred Hartineau, Histoire des 
colonies françaises et de l'expansion de la France dims~Ië 
monde (Parisi L'Histoire Nationale, 1^977 PP. 496-4^.
CHAFFER X 
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the basic objective in French 
foreign policy after the Seven Years* War was preparation 
for another war to avenge the destruction of the French 
empire. Beginning immediately after the Peace of Paris, 
this policy marked the advent of a new era in French inter­
national affairs, and one can say that the year 1763 was a 
water-shed in French history since the decline of the 
greatness of France at the end of Louis XIV*s regime.
In the new era France made vigorous attempts to 
recover from the Seven Years' War and to chart a course in 
foreign affairs that guaranteed stability and influence in 
Europe and continuity and leadership in the colonial world. 
Prompted by these objectives, France made basic changes at 
home and in the colonies in the period after I763. Also 
she tried to strengthen diplomatic ties with Spain.
Frenchmen saw the deep humiliation emd staggering 
defeat in the Seven Years' War as the beginning, not the 
end, of France's colonial activities. Accordingly they 
revised policies and reconstructed defenses. In the words
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of the historian Charlemagne Tower
...nobody In Prance believed that the Seven Years'
War was definitely closed.,..But to all Frenchmen 
the Treaty of Paris was not a peace t it was a cessa­
tion of hostilities. Its obligations, honestly 
assumed, meant to their minds effacement, national 
destruction, and disgrace. 1
Hence a common chorus to resume the war echoed through­
out the land. French minister, Cholseul and Vergennes In 
particular, believed that In addition to restoring national 
pride emd material resources, France had to strike once 
more against England to ensure a lasting peace In Euiope 
and security In the colonies. Cholseul championed these 
objectives and chartered the new course. A skillful archi­
tect In planning for war and an able diplomat In obtaining 
Spanish support for French policy, he set forth his plan. 
Immediately following the signing of the peace. Until the 
actual outbreak of a war of revenge against England In 17?8, 
his plan became the cornerstone of French foreign policy 
which rested largely on renewing the war-time alliance with 
Spain contracted In l?6l In the Pacte de Famille and on the 
general overhauling of French continental and colonial 
defenses. In I765 he made it clear to Louis XV In a memoir 
that a Franco-Spanlsh alliance was more reliable than the 
Franco-Austrlan Alliance of 1756* He described the alliance 
with Austria au "precarious" whereas that with Spain was
^Charlemagne Tower, The Harquls de la Fayette In the 
American Revolution, with some account of""€heattitu9e ot 
France toward the war of the Independence, ^nd ed. 
(Philadelphia* J. B. Llppincott Company, I901), II, 6I.
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"fundamental. " Cholseul assured Louis XV that if the bond, 
with Spain was strengthened and France became involved in 
a war with England, Spain could be summoned to the aid of 
France, Conversely, if Spain was in war, France would come 
to her help. Together, he declared, the Bourbon nations 
would be able to deal with the traditional enemy,
Louis XV accepted Cholseul's argument and began 
negotiation with Spain for closer diplomatic relations and 
a coordination of policies in the colonial world. As 
discussed above, Cholseul undertook, concurrently, necessary 
reforms in France to reorganize the army, reconstruct the 
navy, and improve the artillery. Changes were also evident 
in the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of the Marine, and Ministry of War. The ministries 
were strengthened and made more efficient and their work 
coordinated. These developments clearly reveal that France 
had embarked on a new era in foreign affairs.
Students of French foreign policy during this period 
give little recognition to the important role which the 
colonies played in Cholseul's plan for another wstr. While 
not completely ignoring the colonies, they emphasize the 
part undertaken by the Métropolei that is, they give atten­
tion to the reforms carried out in France, and the negotia­
tions for the Pacte with Spain as constituting the thrust 
of France's preparation. And when reference is made to the 
French colonies, they say little. Perhaps scholars have
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lacked interest in the French colonies during this period 
and consequently they have not investigated these times.
Such neglect seems hardly justifiable, it would appear, 
when documentary sources are available in French archives, 
the Bibliothèque Ikitionale, and colonial archives in the 
Caribbean,
This present study, however, has attempted to show 
the considerable degree of influence which the French 
Caribbean exerted in Choiseul's plan for war. The evidence 
given supports the thesis that the objectives contained in 
French diplomacy were not to be carried out by the French 
alone, without the help of her colonies, particularly since 
the proposed war was essentially maritime and colonial,
Choi seul was aware of the potential and location of the 
Caribbean bases which constituted an important part of his 
plan for a war of revenge. To some degree the presence of 
the forces in the colonies were decisive in persuading him 
to undertake another war immediately following the conclusion 
of the Seven Years' War, Recognizing the fact of the 
destruction of the French army and navy, the great debt 
incurred in the war against England, and France's loss of 
prestige and power in Europe, Choiseul searched for adequate 
ground to convince Louis XV to resume the colonial struggle. 
He succeeded by showing that the forces in the Caribbean 
could be greatly enlarged and strengthened and that the 
colonies would play a major part in another war, the expense
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of which they would, share. Cholseul's arguments to Louis XV 
were, therefore, based on a plan for a war to be waged in 
the colonies.
At the same time that Choiseul turned his attention 
to preparing for a colonial war, he did not ignore the 
possibility of a continental war which he expected might 
be launched by England if Pitt returned to office. For this 
reason his plan bore the marks of a war of diversion that 
would lead to division of English forces in Europe. When 
this happened the colonial war would come to fruition and 
English colonies, being defenseless, would be invaded.
In addition to contending that the French colonies 
as a whole contributed signifioantly to the inception and 
formation of Choiseul's war plans, this present thesis 
brings to the fore the role of Guyane as a specific example 
of the vital part shared by the colonies. The thesis gives 
a "new dimension" to the study of French foreign policy and 
it opens an avenue to investigate the importance of the 
colonies to France, both in connection with their contri­
bution to the American revolution and to the coming of the 
French Revolution.
As earlier discussed in this study, and for purposes 
of review, the Kourou expedition was designed to create a 
military base to link with similar bases in the French 
islands and to establish a formidable white settlement.
Even though the settlement failed almost from the very
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beginning, Cholseul did not abandon his plan. Instead he 
ordered a relocation of the settlement. This too, having 
failed, did not change his colonizing motives In Guyane, 
Cholseul was convinced that the ancient colony was valuable 
for purposes of defense * consequently, he despatched 
commissions to survey the military needs at Cayenne, the 
ancient colony In Guyane, and later he replaced the local 
officials with Instructions to recommend necessary measures 
to maintain a French stronghold. The Instructions were 
supplemented by direct orders from Louis XV himself ass seen 
In the memoirs to Turgot In 1?64, The governor was specifi­
cally Informed about the "Intentions" of Louis XV to use 
the ancient colony for military purposes. Falling to carry 
out the Important mission, Turgot was dismissed and 
Imprisoned, The task assigned to him was then delegated to 
such other officials as Bessner and Fiedmond, When Bessner 
failed to establish a new settlement, France built the weak 
defenses at Cayenne, Under the leadership of Fiedmond and 
with the augmentation of troops and supplies of artillery 
from the Métropole, a formidable base was established, 
Cayenne became the French military stronghold in Guyane 
which linked with French bases in the Caribbean, Such an 
important development not only supports the position that 
the ancient colony was vital to French war plans but adds, 
as indicated earlier, a "new dimension" to the study of 
Anglo-French rivalries after 1763.
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Hence Guyane and the French Antilles influenced 
French foreign policy and contributed to the preparation 
for a war of revenge against England. Consequently, one 
cannot overlook the importance of the colonies in analyzing 
French international diplomacy between I763 and 1778. Even 
though Choiseul failed to add strategic bases in the 
Caribbean, he succeeded in implementing his military, 
naval, and artillery reforms for war. Further, the thesis 
holds that the fall of Choiseul from office in I770 did not 
alter the course of French policy, that his successor, 
Vergennes, continued the program laid down since 1763, 
and that, when in 1778 it became clear that a major conflict 
with England was imminent, the new minister finally brought 
the war of revenge first planned by Choiseul to fruition.
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